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ABSTRACT 
 
ARUM PARK:  Truth, Falsehood, and Reciprocity in Pindar and Aeschylus 
(Under the direction of Peter M. Smith) 
 
 The numerous studies of truth and falsehood in Greek thought are quite varied in 
scope and methodology but tend to fall into one of two categories:  detailed word-studies 
that identify and explicate terms for truth and falsehood, usually in the poetry of Homer 
and Hesiod, or general explorations of the nature of truth and the processes for its 
formation across Greek literature. 
 This study seeks to fill the gaps left by these two approaches by combining 
meticulous examination of Aeschylus’ and Pindar’s terms for truth and falsehood with a 
broader discussion of how truth and falsehood operate in their poetry.  The focus is on 
passages that explicitly mention truth and falsehood, an approach that generates 
conclusions both about the use of these terms and about the influence of these concepts 
on a poet’s self-conscious purpose.  The major claims are that Aeschylean and Pindaric 
truth and falsehood are generically determined concepts and are incorporated in 
relationships or cycles of reciprocity integral to each poet’s genre. 
Thus truth and falsehood cannot be understood without adequate consideration of 
genre and purpose.  As a praise poet, Pindar’s aims are twofold:  he must convince his 
audience of his devotion to the person he is tasked with praising (the laudandus), and he 
must persuade them that his claims about the laudandus are accurate.  He thus 
incorporates truth into the relationship he constructs between himself and the laudandus 
 iv 
by espousing a truth that combines sincerity with accuracy and by denouncing falsehood 
for the threat it poses to this relationship.  
Aeschylus likewise assimilates truth and falsehood to his poetic purpose.  Since 
his primary concern as a tragedian is to present plots of retributive violence, ideas about 
truth and falsehood appear in contexts of belief or disbelief.  Thus characters who speak 
truth are believed or disbelieved in accordance with what will facilitate plots about 
violent reprisal; similarly, whether characters successfully or unsuccessfully enact a 
deception depends on what is required to tell a story of reciprocal aggression. 
 v 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation addresses the topics of truth and falsehood in the poetry of 
Pindar and Aeschylus.  Studies of aletheia in Greek thought have been abundant, 
probably because of a modern fascination with the idea of truth, but most of the work has 
focused on Homer and to some extent Hesiod.  For example, Luther’s 1935 book 
examines Homeric and Hesiodic terms for truth and lies,1 while Levet follows up forty 
years later with a more detailed study of such words and their contexts in Homer.2  
Luther makes a valuable contribution with his implicit argument that aletheia can cover a 
range of meanings, as Heidegger himself pointed out,3 and his insight that truth has wide-
ranging implications for speech, poetry, and justice.  Levet argues that aletheia/alethes 
denotes an absence of concealment; his word-study concludes that the various Greek 
words for truth and falsehood reflect the psychological disposition of the Greeks and thus 
cannot find exact equivalents in modern languages.4   
The scholar most persistently focused on aletheia is Detienne, whose influential 
1960 article “La notion mythique d’bλHθεια” argues forcefully for an opposition between 
                                                 
1 Luther 1935. 
 
2 Levet 1976. 
 
3 See Luther 1935, 14:  “Heidegger…unterscheidet zwischen FλHθεια als „Charakter der Aussage“ und 
FλHθεια, die die „Sachen selbst“ bedeutet, „das Seiende im Wie seiner Entdecktheit“.” 
 
4 Levet 1976, 17.  Adkins 1972, 12 seems to disagree:  “True statements about present events which fall 
within the experience of the person making them have the same relation to ‘the facts’ in any society, literate 
or non-literate and are confirmable in the same manner; and if an individual wishes to know the truth about 
an important (recently) past event in a non-literate society, the fact that he is a member of a society makes it 
possible for him to ask other members about the event; and if different people give him the same account, 
their agreement will be more in the forefront of his mind than the fact that, had they forgotten what 
happened, they would be unable to tell him anything.  These situations are surely the majority, and 
certainly suffice to produce a concept of truth quite familiar to ourselves.” 
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FλHθεια and λHθη in the mythical thought of the ancient Greeks.  Seeking to contribute to 
Heidegger’s well known observations about aletheia’s etymology, Detienne adds a new 
dimension by examining the imagery surrounding aletheia in mythical representations 
such as in Plato’s Phaedrus.  His argument further points out similarities between aletheia 
and Hesiod’s Muses and thus concludes that truth and memory are nearly equivalent. 
Detienne’s article precedes a series of discussions concerning the semantic fields 
of words for truth, of which one of the most cited is Krischer’s 1965 article clarifying the 
differences of perspective between etumos and alethes in Homer.5  Snell and Cole have 
written more recent studies of aletheia, both of which similarly focus on its leth-root and 
the perspective therein.6  The somewhat myopic preoccupation of these studies has been 
with the etymology of aletheia from lethe, which is probably correct, but not 
unquestionably so, and thus remains a problematic focus.  In Plato’s Cratylus 421b 
Socrates posits ale and theia as possible roots of aletheia, which would therefore 
etymologically mean “a wandering that is divine.”  He is being ironic of course, but even 
the playful Cratylus with its tongue-in-cheek etymologies usefully reminds us to question 
our own assumptions.  Aside from the (slight) possibility that aletheia does not derive 
from lethe, an additional problem is that Greek words in context, just like English words, 
do not always reflect their etymological meanings.  Just as modern English “idiot” does 
not retain its original Greek sense, there is no reason to assume that aletheia must always 
convey the opposite of forgetting or concealment.  If that were indeed the case, aletheia 
would appear most often in tandem with ideas of memory and perhaps bear some 
discernible relation to time as a factor in preserving or hindering memory, but it does not.  
                                                 
5 Cf. Krischer 1965, 167:  “Diese Stellen zeigen allesamt, daß der Bezug auf den Sprecher, der für FληθHς 
charakteristisch ist, bei Mτυµος fehlt.” 
 
6 See Snell 1975 and Cole 1983. 
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For example, Pindar’s aphorism about the way of truth in Pythian 3 bears little relevance 
to a lack of forgetting or oblivion:  εi δj νXl τις Mχει θνατnν Fλαθεoας pδXν, χρr πρsς 
µακUρων | τυγχUνοντ’ εupsilonpsiliperisp πασχzµεν (“If any mortal has in mind the way of truth, he must 
suffer well what happens from the gods,” Pyth. 3.103-105).  Aletheia here designates 
“what generally happens” and shows no sense of time or reference to historical record. 
Previous aletheia-studies include sparse—if any—reference to epinician or 
tragedy.  No extensive study of Aeschylean terms for truth and falsehood has been 
published, and there is only one devoted solely to Pindar:  Komornicka’s work examines 
the nuances of various words, some that obviously and expectedly denote truth or 
falsehood (e.g., FλUθεια, Mτυµος, ψεupsilonperispδος), while others are less commonly associated 
with these concepts (e.g., µαχανU, τzχνα, βουλU).  She identifies eight possible aspects of 
truth, each of which, she argues, Pindaric FλUθεια denotes at one time or another.7  Her 
valuable and meticulous work demonstrates that aletheia has a much wider range in 
Pindar than in Homer or Hesiod and thus merits further attention.  As I will discuss in 
Chapter Two, aletheia in Homer has largely to do with spoken utterances;8 although 
context may indicate a desire for sincerity or authenticity when one speaks of aletheia, 
these senses are not inherent in the word itself.9  Hesiod’s poetry presents a greater range 
for aletheia/alethes—for example, the use of these words to characterize speakers and not 
                                                 
7 These possible aspects are:  “le réel,” “l’authentique,” “l’essentiel (opposé à l’illusoire, à l’apparent),” “le 
vrai dans toute oeuvre poétique qui s’appuie sur l’imitation de la réalité (opposé à fiction pure),” “le vrai 
sur le plan moral de la véracité (sincère, véridique, fidèle) par rapport à l’homme, à ses paroles et à ses 
actes et par rapport à la divinité,” “le vrai c’est-à-dire ce qui est propre, correct (right, appropriate),” “le 
vrai, ce qui est vérifiable, ce qui se laisse prouver par rapport,” and “le vraisemblable (verisimile, 
wahrscheinlich et scheinbar).”  Komornicka 1979, 252. 
 
8 Cf. Cole 1983, 9, who also observes that FλHθεια/FληθHς in Homer refers to spoken truths. 
 
9 Cf. Adkins 1972, who examines Homeric situations of truth-telling and concludes that pleasantness, 
indicated by phrases like κατ κXσµον, is a more valued component of truthful speech than FλHθεια and 
may even denote truthfulness or veracity.  One example Adkins cites is Odysseus’ praise of Demodocus’ 
song in Od. 8.487-491. 
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only their utterances—but again falls short of this full range of meanings, perhaps 
partially as a consequence of the limited number of examples.  Komornicka leaves for 
other scholars to determine how these different aspects of truth might be related to 
generic tendencies of epinician poetry, a topic that I will probe in this dissertation.  Her 
work is strictly a word-study and does not explicitly try to explain her findings in terms 
of genre. 
Scholarship that discusses truth and falsehood beyond the limits of a word-study 
does not pay focused attention to these issues in Pindar or Aeschylus.  Within a much 
larger volume Bremer devotes several pages to Pindaric truth that amount to a survey and 
summary of the various references to truth in the odes.  He makes some notable points, 
particularly on the role of the poet as a seer who interprets and clarifies a hidden or 
obscure truth,10 but leaves room for future scholars to deepen his observations.  The two 
most influential works on truth and falsehood in Greek poetry are Detienne’s seminal The 
Masters of Truth and Louise Pratt’s Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar.  The central 
premise of Detienne’s book, like his earlier article, is the equivalence he posits between 
truth and memory that is based on the etymology of aletheia.  Reasoning that modern 
conceptions of truth should not cloud our understanding of aletheia, he argues that in the 
pre-literate societies of archaic Greece, the role of truth-tellers (who, for Detienne, are 
oral poets, seers, and kings) is to preserve existence through memorialization of people or 
events:  not to be talked about is to be forgotten and thus, in the absence of written 
historical record, to cease to exist.11  Detienne’s work is not without its detractors, 
                                                 
10 Bremer 1976, 301-310. 
 
11 See Detienne 1996, esp. 39-52. 
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notably Adkins, who argues that the archaic Greeks had a conception of truth similar to a 
modern one, regardless of their illiteracy.12 
Pratt’s work explores the other side of the truth-falsehood dichotomy by 
examining the relationship between poets and liars and focusing on the idea of fiction in 
early Greek poetry.  She engages with the prevailing notion of poets as truth-tellers13 to 
argue that self-consciously fictional elements appear in Greek poetry: 
The way reflection on truth and lies is formulated in archaic poetry leaves 
room for archaic appreciation of fictional narrative, narrative that is 
acknowledged to be made-up, invented, a product of the poetic 
imagination.  (Pratt 1993, 7) 
 
Her chapter on epinician poetry takes up this thesis, pointing out that Pindar and 
Bacchylides make claims to truth to validate their praise, but noting that these claims do 
not amount to  
a rejection of fictional elements in mythical narrative.  Rather, the way 
truth claims are handled in epinician creates a distinction between victor 
praise and mythical narrative, so that separate standards are applied to 
each…mythical narrative must conform not so much to the truth…as to 
the standards of decorum that regulate traditional narrative poetry.  (Pratt 
1993, 8) 
 
Both Pratt and Detienne have a fondness for neatly aligned oppositions:  Pratt identifies 
truth and falsehood as important issues in epinician only insofar as they enable accurate 
praise and blame,14 a dichotomy that, according to Detienne, parallels aletheia-lethe.15  
These oppositions correctly imply that praise is the primary goal of epinician and thus 
adhere to Bundy’s view that “there is no passage in Pindar and Bakkhulides that is not in 
                                                 
12 See Adkins 1972, esp. 11. 
 
13 Proponents of this notion include Luther 1935, Ortega 1970, and Detienne 1996. 
 
14 Pratt 1993, 115.  Cf. Hubbard 1985, 100-106. 
 
15 Detienne 1996, 49. 
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its primary intent encomiastic—that is, designed to enhance the glory of a particular 
patron.”16  I aim, however, to add more detailed explanation than what Pratt and Detienne 
offer in their respective works.  Furthermore, neither scholar significantly incorporates 
Aeschylus into his discussion, but as I will explain below, what Aeschylus’ characters 
say about truth and falsehood can provide critical comparanda for Pindar’s treatments of 
these topics. 
Despite comparative inattention to Pindar and Aeschylus, both poets’ treatments 
of truth and falsehood warrant more focused study.  In Pindar the sheer frequency of 
truth-telling claims indicates the importance of truth to his epinician program, as does the 
variety of forms these claims take:  the poet professes truth through denials of falsehood 
(cf. Ol. 4.17, 13.52; Pyth. 2.83; Nem. 1.18, 7.49), metaphors designating accuracy,17 
oaths or wishes (Ol. 2.92, 6.20-21, 7.20-21, 13.98-100; Pyth. 1.42-45; Nem. 7.70, 8.35-
36), declarations of friendship (Nem. 7.61-63), and occasional invocations to a goddess 
Alatheia (Ol. 10.4, Fr. 205), in itself a striking and unusual personification (as I will 
discuss in Chapter Three). 
In addition to his own claims of truthfulness Pindar implies that the duty of poets 
in general is to combine artistry with accuracy.  In Nemean 7 he praises Homer’s skill, 
                                                 
16 Bundy 1986, 3. 
 
17 E.g., Mπεχε νupsilonperispν σκοπ τXξον, γε θυµz (“Now hold the bow to the target, come, my heart,” Ol. 2.89); 
γνnναo τ’ Mπειτ’, Fρχαον νειδος FλUθεσιν | λXγοις εi φεupsilonoxiaγοµεν, Βιωτoαν upsilondasiaperispν. Sσσ γαρ γγελος ρθXς, | 
υκXµων σκυτUλα Μοισν, γλυκupsilonvariaς κρατrρ Fγαφθzγκτων Fοιδν (“and then to know if we escape the 
ancient taunt of Boeotian pig with our true words, for you are a true messenger, a message stick of the fair-
haired Muses, a sweet bowl of songs that ring clear,” Ol. 6.89-91); Sµj δ’ εupsilonpsiliθupsilonvariaν FκXντων | zντα Xµβον 
παρ σκοπsν οupsilonpsili χρH | τ πολλ βzλεα καρτupsilonoxiaνειν χερον (“But when I hurl the whirling javelins on a 
straight path, I must not hurl those many missiles from my hands and miss the mark,” Ol. 13.93-95); 
αupsilonpsilioxiaξεται κα Μοσα δι’ Fγγελoας ρθς (“The Muse also is exalted through true reporting,” Pyth. 4.279); 
Mλποµαι | µzγα εiπν σκοποupsilonperisp ντα τυχεν | τ’ Fπs τXξου ες (“I hope to speak a great claim and to hit the 
mark head on, as if shooting from a bow,” Nem. 6. 26-28); µαθν δz τις νερε, | εi πρ µzλος Mρχοµαι 
ψUγιον αρον Sννzπων (“One who knows me will declare if I come and speak a crooked utterance out of 
tune,” Nem. 7.8-69); πολλ γρ πολλ λzλεκται, νεαρ δ’ SξευρXντα δXµεν βασUνl Sς Mλεγχον, πας 
κoνδυνος (“For many things have been said in many ways, but it is complete danger to discover new ones 
and put them to the test on a touchstone,” Nem. 8.20-21). 
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but faults his mendacity (7.20-23), while in Olympian 1 he famously criticizes previous 
accounts of the Tantalos and Pelops myth as untrue while seeming to praise the charis of 
such accounts:   
 θαupsilonoxiaµατα πολλU, καo ποupsilonoxia τι κα βροτnν φUτις upsilondasiaπjρ τsν Fλαθ λXγον 
δεδαιδαλµzνοι ψεupsilonoxiaδεσι ποικoλοις Sξαπατnντι µupsilonperispθοι 
ΧUρις δ, περ παντα τεupsilonoxiaχει τ µεoλιχα θνατος, 
Sπιφzροισα τιµν κα πιστον SµHσατο πιστsν 
Mµµεναι τs πολλUκις.  (Ol. 1.28-32) 
 
Indeed, there are many wonders, and somehow the speeches of mortals, 
stories, have been embellished beyond the true account and deceive with 
intricate falsehoods; for Charis, who provides mortals with all pleasant 
things, often renders the incredible credible by bringing honor.     
 
These statements are in and of themselves unsurprising, but they are undermined by a 
subsequent  
assertion that poets ought to speak well of the gods:  Mστι δ’ Fνδρ φUµεν Sοικsς Fµφ 
δαιµXνων καλU· µεoων γρ αiτoα (“It is fitting for a man to say good things about the 
gods, for the blame is less,” Ol. 1.35).  The idea that a poet ought to do what is fitting 
(SοικXς) seems incongruous with Pindar’s immediately previous criticism of inaccuracy 
in other poetry, and thus raises the interpretive question of what role truth and falsehood 
must play in poetry.  Similar questions are raised when the poet circumvents full 
disclosure in Nemean 5: 
στUσοµαι· οupsilonpsilioxia τοι πασα κερδoων 
φαoνοισα πρXσωπον FλUθει Fτρεκzς· 
κα τs σιγν πολλUκις Sστ σοφτατον Fνθρπl νοσαι.  (Nem. 5.16-18) 
 
I will stand back; indeed, not every truth is more profitable when it shows 
its precise face.  And often keeping silent is wisest for a man to think.   
 
The poet’s hesitation to speak ill of Peleus and Telamon ostensibly showcases his desire 
to speak the truth only when expedient, yet in other contexts he purports to be a truthful 
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poet.  The abundance and variety of his truth claims must be reconciled with these 
questionable statements about the relationship between truth and poetic content. 
Some of this incongruity can be explained with recourse to Plato, whose 
recommendations about poetry in the kallipolis echo Pindar’s comments about poetic 
duty.  Socrates in the Republic prescribes how stories will be chosen in the ideal state: 
Then we must first of all, it seems, supervise the storytellers.  We’ll select 
their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful (καλXν) and reject them 
when they aren’t.  And we’ll persuade nurses and mothers to tell their 
children the ones we have selected, since they will shape their children’s 
souls with stories much more than they shape their bodies by handling 
them.  (Rep. 2.377b-c)18 
 
According to Socrates the aesthetic quality of stories must determine their inclusion in 
the kallipolis; he qualifies such stories as truthful when he later excludes much of Homer, 
Hesiod, and other poets for being untrue (οupsilondasiaperispτοι γUρ που µupsilonoxiaθους τος Fνθρποις ψευδες 
συντιθzντες MλεγXν τε κα λzγουσι, 377d).  His criterion that stories be fine or beautiful 
(καλXν) and not false (ψευδες) resemble Pindar’s comments in Olympian 1 about 
combining art with truth, but he then makes a surprising point about the importance of a 
true account:   
First, telling the greatest falsehood about the most important thing doesn’t 
make a fine story—I mean Hesiod telling us about how Uranus behaved, 
how Cronus punished him for it, and how he was in turn punished by his 
own son.  But even if it were true (οupsilonpsiliδ' ν εi ν Fληθ), it should be 
passed over in silence (σιγσθαι), not told to foolish young people.19  
(Rep. 2.377e-378a) 
 
The implication is that unflattering stories about the gods are likely untrue, but whatever  
truth they may have to them should be edited for the sake of decency.   
                                                 
18 From C.D.C. Reeve’s 1992 revision of G.M.A. Grube’s translation. 
 
19 Emphasis mine. 
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Like Plato, Pindar seemingly privileges silence over truth in certain contexts, and 
the similarities between their respective instructions about the truth of myth and its 
ultimate importance are striking.20  But Pindar’s rationale for speaking well of the gods 
and heroes differs from Plato’s.  While Socrates in the Republic argues that poetry should 
play an educative role by depicting models of good behavior, Pindar’s hesitation to 
slander the gods and heroes seems to stem from self-interest, for he makes reference to 
the blame and impoverishment that await the unflattering poet.  These differences alone 
indicate that a strictly Platonic explanation of Pindar’s relationship to truth is 
insufficient.21 
The complexity of truth in Pindar is further deepened by the poet’s unusual uses 
of words for truth, which, aside from his two invocations to Alatheia, are for the most 
part separate from his truth claims.  At the very least Pindar’s conception of truth and its 
role in poetry is rather complicated:  he does not wholeheartedly embrace the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, but he does not completely subordinate truth to his 
praise either.  Pindar’s putative adherence to accuracy, coupled with his distinctive 
language of truth, begs examination both of his terms for truth and falsehood and of the 
contexts in which they appear. 
                                                 
20 For further discussion of Pindar’s and Plato’s views of poetry, see Komornicka 1984.  For a biographical 
comparison between Pindar and Plato, see des Places 1949. 
 
21 Furthermore, a Platonic interpretation of any body of work is untenable if for no other reason than that 
the breadth and concomitant inconsistencies within the Platonic corpus itself make any firm notion of a 
“Platonic reading” highly problematic.  The density and profundity of Pindaric thought are certainly 
remarkable and, I believe, inherently consistent, but if any philosophical bent occurs in the poetry, it is 
unique to Pindar and cannot be narrowly identified with only one branch of philosophy.  A truly thorough 
examination of Pindaric “philosophy” would have to take into account many philosophical branches, and 
such a project was beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Finally, even if possible, a strictly Platonic 
interpretation would have detracted and distracted from a deeper understanding of Pindar’s poetry and its 
internal complexity. 
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Aeschylus too has been given short shrift in scholarly discussions of truth and 
falsehood, even though his treatments of these concepts raise many unanswered 
questions.  As I will discuss in the next chapter, Aeschylus pays homage to his Homeric 
predecessor by treating truth and falsehood as verbal entities, but he expands the scope of 
application of words for truth and falsehood:  aletheia or alethes in Aeschylus can refer to 
accuracy or to sincerity, whereas Homeric uses are limited to the former application; 
furthermore, Homer reserves aletheia/alethes for statements about the past, but Aeschylus 
expands the time dimension of truth by designating statements about either past or future 
as true or false.  The contexts in which truth and falsehood appear also demand 
examination, as they point up the issue of who possesses the truth.  Without the third-
person narrator of epic or first-person of lyric, tragedy less clearly indicates where 
authority over truth and falsehood lies, thus engendering an interplay of doubt and belief.  
Moreover, tragedy’s point-counterpoint interaction between characters forms an 
interesting way in which to view truth and falsehood, for it allows us to examine these 
concepts through the lens of credibility and to consider which criteria mark characters as 
inherently truthful or not.  When the Chorus of the Agamemnon question Clytemnestra’s 
knowledge of Troy’s fall, do they demonstrate Aeschylus’ adherence to traditional 
prejudices against female credibility or his challenge to them?  In both Pindar and 
Aeschylus gender is a considerable factor as something to be considered in contexts of 
truth and falsehood, yet the scholarly treatment of gender in Pindar is effectively 
nonexistent, while scholarship on gender in tragedy has not included much discussion of 
truth and falsehood. 
I have determined that there is need for studies of truth and falsehood in 
Aeschylus and in Pindar, but what justifies discussion of both in one work?  Comparison 
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of these two poets is not unprecedented:  John Finley published his lectures on Pindar and 
Aeschylus in one volume (1955), and the Oresteia myth in Pythian 11 has occasioned at 
least one critical essay comparing Pindar’s rendition with that of Aeschylus22 as well as a 
commentary on the ode that includes similar comparison between the two treatments of 
the myth.23  On the simplest level there is the coincidence of time period:  both poets 
were composing during the same decades of the 5th century BCE, a contemporaneity that 
invites comparative study and elicits observations of differences between the poets in 
terms of focus.  The traditional view is that Pindar, as a Boeotian praise poet, looks 
backward to preserve aristocratic and heroic ideals, while Aeschylus, an Athenian during 
the city’s golden age, exalts progressivism and democracy.  The broad truth of this view 
can be explained partly by differences of genre.  Pindar’s epinician task demands praise 
that is easily recognizable as such and thus draws on the familiar heroes of old as models 
for the present athletic victors.  Tragedy, by contrast, presents irresolvable conflicts that 
undermine tradition and challenge the status quo.  Although some would argue that 
Aeschylus ultimately upholds tradition,24 his tragedy at the very least problematizes and 
perhaps overtly criticizes it. 
The primary claim of this dissertation is that both Pindar’s and Aeschylus’ 
treatments of truth and falsehood must be understood within the context of their 
respective genres.  While Pindar’s underlying purpose, as Bundy says, may be to praise 
the victor, he expresses this purpose as a duty to tell the truth.  Pindar couches his claims 
in terms of truth and falsehood, but these terms in turn are defined as part of the 
                                                 
22 Herington 1984. 
 
23 Finglass 2007. 
 
24 E.g., Thomson 1941, Jones 1962, Vickers 1973 on the sexual conflicts of the Oresteia.  See Betensky 
1978, 11 for a summary of their specific arguments and further discussion. 
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relationship of obligation and reciprocity between poet and victor.  He thus defines truth 
in terms of praise to the victor by implicating aletheia as part of his poetic duty.  
Aeschylus, on the other hand, has a different purpose, which is to tell the story of a 
mythical or historical change of fortune, as Aristotle would say.  He incorporates truth 
and falsehood as part of this storyline by creating issues of credibility in the dialogue 
between characters.  Whether various characters are perceived as truthful or not furthers 
the plot, which often centers on retributive justice. 
This dissertation represents an amalgam of various approaches and is heavily 
indebted to an eclectic mix of scholarship.  The first chapter seeks to emulate the rigorous 
scrutiny of a word-study, but subsequent chapters aim to synthesize the data into a 
unified thesis.  I endeavor to deepen and broaden the studies of Pratt and Detienne, both 
of whom pay little attention to Pindar and none to Aeschylus.  Pratt discusses epinician 
poetry more extensively than Detienne, but she examines primarily passages that refer 
directly to poetry.  I expand on her discussion by including examination of the mythical 
content as also applicable to Pindar’s views on truth and falsehood in relation to poetry.  
At times I differ from Pratt’s interpretations, particularly in my discussion of falsehood in 
Pindar where my argument relies on the premise that Pindar’s mythical narratives can 
provide valuable insight into his conception of praise poetry.  Pratt, by contrast, does not 
discuss the parallelism between praise poetry and mythical narrative. 
My general approach to Pindar borrows from a number of scholars including 
Bundy, Race, and Kurke who differ greatly in many respects but share at least one 
commonality:  all seem to presume a connectivity or coherence of thought and purpose in 
Pindar’s poetry, which is manifested through his imagery, ideas, rhetorical devices, and 
language.  This dissertation is premised on the consistency of Pindaric thought, a 
 13 
consistency that allows for explanation of one difficult passage to be sought in another.  
Bundy aims to demonstrate that Pindar’s many diffuse elements can be explained as 
matters of generic convention.  He thus argues that the stylistic and rhetorical features of 
Isthmian 1 and Olympian 11 are emblematic of epinician’s generic patterns and provides 
as evidence comparison to similar elements in other odes.25  Kurke, on the other hand, 
attempts to situate Pindar’s odes in their socio-historical context and refers to her book 
The Traffic in Praise as a “sociological poetics.”26  To that end she focuses on the images 
and metaphors of poetry as a social function and draws on the work of economic theorists 
to argue that Pindar’s mixture of metaphors reflects the transition of archaic Greece from 
an “embedded economy” based on symbolic wealth (e.g., fame or kleos) to a 
“disembedded economy” that is currency-based and therefore less intertwined with social 
institutions.27  My dissertation is informed by her work to some extent, particularly her 
observations about the poet-patron relationship and the language of exchange that 
characterizes it.  This relationship is often construed as one of friendship or guest-
friendship (cf. Pyth. 1.93, Ol. 1.103, Nem. 7.61) or likened to a marriage alliance (cf. Ol. 
7.1-10).28  Where my project is both indebted to and differs from Kurke is in its focus on 
aletheia as it relates to Pindaric xenia.  Louise Pratt hints at a connection between aletheia 
and poetic obligation when she asserts that praise, blame, and propriety are more central 
to epinician poetry than truth and falsehood are, but I believe her observations can be 
clarified by close examination of what truth and falsehood mean, and how these concepts 
                                                 
25 Bundy 1986, 4-7. 
 
26 Kurke 1991, 10. 
 
27 Kurke 1991, 166-167. 
 
28 For Kurke’s discussion of these passages, see Kurke 1991, 47, 86, 100, 118-122, 140. 
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help define the goals of epinician poetry.  To some degree I synthesize the work of Kurke 
and Pratt while providing a fresh look at passages or aspects of Pindar’s poetry that 
neither scholar examines, particularly in my discussion of falsehood and deception in 
Pindar. 
My approach to Aeschylus is similarly eclectic:  the specific nature of my topic 
demands close examination of certain passages key to discussions of truth and falsehood, 
but I have endeavored as well to consider each passage within the larger context of the 
play in which it appears.  I have been influenced by a number of scholars who run the 
gamut between general studies of Aeschylus (e.g., Gagarin 1976, Winnington-Ingram 
1983) to specialized studies focusing on gender in tragedy (e.g., Goldhill 1984, Zeitlin 
1996, Foley 2001).  My interest in a gender-conscious approach grew both from my 
observations about Pindar’s treatment of women and deception (see Chapter Three) and 
from a realization that Aeschylus often depicts sexual conflicts or uses gender differences 
to represent the various conflicts within his tragedies and that this gender dynamic affects 
his presentation of truth and falsehood as well. 
My two major purposes are to clarify what Pindar and Aeschylus mean when they 
speak about truth and falsehood and to show how these meanings are manifested in their 
poetry.  To those ends the next chapter examines terms for truth and falsehood in Pindar 
and Aeschylus, Chapter Three discusses specific contexts for truth and falsehood in 
Pindar, and Chapter Four provides a corresponding discussion for Aeschylus.  The 
contexts in which aletheia appears in Pindar demonstrate the specificity of his genre, for 
the meaning of aletheia is colored by its association with ritualized relationships of 
obligation.  I consequently examine Pindaric truth and obligation in Chapter Three, 
arguing that the poet’s adherence to a “true” account stems from a notion that truth is 
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connected to the poet’s obligation to praise:  the poet may claim to tell the truth by 
suggesting that a truthful account is one that depicts its subject in a flattering light.  As I 
hope to demonstrate, Pindar embraces both truth and praise simultaneously by defining 
truth as inextricably linked to his obligation to his patron.  I then examine the relationship 
of falsehood and deception to Pindaric xenia.  I hope to elucidate not only that falsehood 
and deception are considered negative qualities—this should be obvious—but that Pindar 
construes their negativity as stemming from their harm to the stability of sacred social 
institutions.  Furthermore, gender figures into the relationship of deception and falsehood 
to xenia, for Pindar often associates the corruption of social institutions with deception by 
a female character.  He thus exploits a familiar misogyny by incorporating it into his own 
genre.   
The fourth chapter deals with truth and falsehood in Aeschylean tragedy, for 
which, of course, it is not as easy to determine the poet’s conception of truth and 
falsehood since tragedy, unlike epinician, lacks a first-person voice that reflects the 
persona of the poet.  It is possible, however, to make conjectures based on examinations 
of the characters who claim to speak the truth and how such characters affect, and are 
treated within, the overall tragedy.  This chapter includes a discussion of gender, which, 
as in Pindar, plays a role in how Aeschylus presents issues of truth and falsehood.  Many 
of Aeschylus’ female characters, for example Clytemnestra, Cassandra, the Chorus of 
Danaids, and the Chorus of the Seven, must grapple with the problem of not being 
believed or heeded, despite telling the truth.  Like Pindar, Aeschylus develops the motif 
of female deception, but he complicates this by putting true yet disbelieved statements 
and judgments in the mouths of his female characters.  Unlike Pindar, who incorporates 
truth into a system of xenia, perhaps even redefining truth in the course of doing so, 
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Aeschylus incorporates truth into the inevitability of retributive violence, employing both 
truth and falsehood as propagators of retribution. 
Throughout the dissertation I use the text of Snell and Maehler’s Teubner edition 
of Pindar and Page’s Oxford Classical Text of Aeschylus.  Translations of all Greek texts 
are my own unless otherwise indicated.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO:  TERMS FOR TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD 
METHODOLOGY 
 In this chapter I will examine some key terms for truth and falsehood in 
Aeschylus and Pindar.  I begin with a general discussion of definitions provided by LSJ 
and various word-studies, then move outward to consider particular instances in 
Aeschylus and Pindar in order to determine what context may tell us about the two poets’ 
applications of terms for truth and falsehood.29  The assumption underlying this method is 
that any use of a word is governed by an understanding of its socially recognized 
definition and that individual instances reflect this definition by their adherence to, 
variance from, or variation of it.  Accordingly, the definitions I mine from the lexica are a 
starting point for what a word’s recognized, “normal” definition might be, and I compare 
these definitions to individual examples in context.  My assumptions are informed by 
Saussure and, I suspect, other semiologists who posit a distinction between utterances 
themselves and the underlying conventions that make such utterances possible and 
comprehensible.  Saussure articulates this difference with the terms parole (“speech”) and 
langue (“language”).  At the level of the individual word the relevant Saussurean 
distinction would be that between value and meaning (signification), where “meaning” 
refers to a word’s simple definition, i.e., the object or concept that a word represents, and 
“value” encompasses a word’s signification, but additionally refers to the word’s function 
within the system of language and can be understood only in comparison or opposition to 
                                                 
29 At some points I refer to a word’s etymology, for which I rely on Chantraine. 
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other words.30  In my study “meaning” corresponds to the definitions supplied by 
Chantraine, LSJ, Italie, and Slater, while “value” corresponds to the designations 
conveyed by their contexts.  In a sense when I compare terms for truth and falsehood, I 
am attempting to determine Pindaric and Aeschylean values for these terms, treating each 
poet’s oeuvre as a system of language, even though both poets, obviously, compose in 
Greek.   
These distinctions may seem forced since it is impossible to understand a word 
without recourse to an examination of individual uses in context; the distinction between 
meaning and value might thus be a moot point since meaning can never be fully 
determinable without recourse to context.  Indeed, the definitions proposed in the lexica 
of LSJ, Italie, and Slater are derived from studies of individual words in context.  My use 
of various lexica as starting points, however, should not undermine my method, as lexical 
definitions are themselves theories of usage, and my examination of particular words in 
context tests those theories.  In the absence of absolutely extra-contextual definitions, I 
turn to the lexica as reasonable starting points, and I have used Saussure to explain why I 
take context into consideration.  I begin with a summary of LSJ’s various definitions and 
the scholarship related to them before I devote a section each to Aeschylus and Pindar. 
 
LSJ 
 I have focused on five key terms for truth and falsehood—FλHθεια, 
Mτυµος/SτHτυµος, FπUτη, δXλος, and ψεupsilonperispδος—and supplement with etymological 
information where necessary.   
FλHθεια 
                                                 
30 Cf. Saussure 1983, 13-14, 112-114. 
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LSJ note that in Homer FλHθεια is used only in the sense of “opposite to a lie,” 
i.e., as an indication of verbal veracity.  Accordingly, FλHθεια and the neuter substantive 
Fληθzα appear primarily as direct objects of verbs of speaking.31  Post-Homeric uses of 
FλHθεια indicate its opposition to mere appearance, hence designating something akin to 
reality or on the personal level, a disposition towards truthfulness and sincerity.  Its 
adjectival form reflects a similar history and range and may necessitate a translation other 
than simply “true,” depending on what it describes.  For example, when applied to an 
oracle FληθHς has two definitions cited by LSJ:  “true, unerring” or “realizing itself, 
coming to fulfillment.”  As an example of the first definition LSJ cites Pindar, Pythian 
11.6 where Ismenion is called “the true seat of seers” (Fλαθzα µαντoων θnκον) for 
providing prophecies that do not err.  The second application of FληθHς appears in 
Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes 944, where, as I will discuss below, the key factor in 
this second application of FληθHς is time and whether the event predicted by the oracle 
has occurred yet.  Furthermore, the use of FλHθεια/FληθHς with verbs of speaking has 
drawn attention from a number of scholars,32 including Krischer who argues that the 
word inherently conveys the perspective of the truth-teller.33 
 The communis opinio regarding FληθHς is that it derives from an alpha-privative 
of λHθη, thus etymologically designating something devoid of oblivion or concealment.  
Scholars have made much hay over this apparent etymology, each attempting to identify 
ever more precisely how it ultimately affects the use of FληθHς.  Heitsch has argued that 
                                                 
31 Cf. Starr 1968, 349, Cole 1983, 9. 
 
32 Cf. Starr 1968, 349:  “Homer employed [alethes] almost exclusively with verbs of saying as an object to 
connote precision and clarity.” 
 
33 Krischer 1965. 
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FλHθεια designates what is evident and not concealed,34 while Detienne seems to focus 
on the perspective of the perceiver rather than what is perceived, as he promotes a near 
equivalence between FλHθεια and memory.35  Several other scholars have similarly tried 
to identify the perspective of the root λHθη:  Snell argues that the root refers to 
forgetfulness in the perceiver of an object rather than to a quality of concealment in the 
object described,36 while Cole further qualifies Snell’s observation by arguing that 
FλHθεια involves or results “from a transmission of information that excludes lêthê, 
whether in the form of forgetfulness, failure to notice, or ignoring.”37  Studies of FλHθεια 
have been so abundant that nearly every scholar who studies truth and falsehood in Greek 
thought has been compelled to weigh in on the topic, however briefly.  Pratt has found 
that the opposition between truth and forgetting, suggested by the etymology of FλHθεια, 
is only one of many such oppositions:  “Aletheia…excludes not only forgetfulness but 
also invention, falsehood, fiction, intentional omission, insincerity, equivocation—
anything that might prevent the hearer’s perceiving accurately the subject matter under 
discussion, anything that might interfere with the process of communication.”38  My own 
examinations of FλHθεια in Aeschylus and Pindar have led me to conclude with Pratt that 
whatever the correct interpretation of the etymology, memory and oblivion are only 
somewhat apparent in, and largely irrelevant to, the contextualized use of FλHθεια; 
FλHθεια must be understood in relation to its context and whatever comparisons or 
oppositions context might reveal.  What I attempt in this word study is thus an 
                                                 
34 Heitsch 1962.  Cf. Levet 1976, 17 who argues that aletheia/alethes denotes an absence of concealment. 
 
35 Detienne 1960. 
 
36 See Snell 1975, 17. 
 
37 Cole 1983, 8. 
 
38 Pratt 1993, 21. 
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examination, in Saussurean terms, of the “value” of FλHθεια, rather than its “meaning” or 
“signification.” 
Mτυµος/SτHτυµος 
Defined by LSJ as “true,” Mτυµος in its neuter singular form comes to be used as a 
substantive designating “the true sense of a word according to its origin.”  This use of 
Mτυµον derives from the idea of reality or authenticity inherent in Mτυµος.39  Krischer 
articulates the difference between Mτυµος and FληθHς as one that centers on the 
perspective of the speaker:  while Homer uses FληθHς or FλHθεια to indicate “the type of 
truth which may be communicated by an individual on the basis of his own 
experience,”40 Mτυµος does not contain this experiential aspect and more broadly refers to 
factual reality. 
FπUτη, δXλος 
These terms can refer either to a specific trick or act of deception or can more 
abstractly designate treachery, guile, craft, or cunning.  The verbal forms 
FπατUω/SξαπατUω and δολXω correspondingly mean “to cheat, deceive” and “to 
beguile;” the passive, however, of FπατUω may remove the idea of an exterior agent of 
deception and denote self-deception or misapprehension instead. 
ψεupsilonperispupsilonperispupsilonperispupsilonperispδος 
 This noun has two English equivalents, “lie” or “falsehood,” as the degree of 
intention underlying the falsehood varies.  The term ψεupsilonperispδος has received much less 
scholarly attention than FλHθεια, perhaps as a result of its less remarkable etymology:  it 
may derive ultimately from a root meaning “blow,” which is used idiomatically to 
                                                 
39 Chantraine 1983-1984, s.v. “SτεXς.” 
 
40 Kromer 1976, 425, summarizing the argument of Krischer 1965. 
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designate a lie.41  Although FλHθεια has more intriguing origins, the word ψεupsilonperispδος is 
comparatively complex and has a considerably broad range.  Contextually, the word can 
indicate a purposeful deceit, as in Pythian 2 where the word is used of the Hera-
apparition concocted by Zeus to deceive Ixion, or it can be used of anything false, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally so.  As Pratt notes, “The noun pseudos and the 
related verbs and adjectives do not necessarily imply that the speaker deliberately seeks 
to deceive the hearer; they denote only the objective falsity of what is said.”42 
 The corresponding verb ψεupsilonoxiaδω, defined by LSJ as “cheat by lies, beguile,” 
conveys intention much more pointedly than the noun, at least in its active voice.  Like 
FπατUω, its passive form can denote misperception on the part of its subject, thus 
focusing on the deceived rather than a separate deceiver who may or may not exist.  The 
older and more common middle form ψεupsilonoxiaδοµαι shows a range of application similar to 
the noun, denoting alternatively the actions of lying, saying what is untrue (whether 
intentionally or not), or deception.  The middle form, then, is flexible as to whether it 
conveys intentional falsehood or not.  Because of its broad nature, ψεupsilonperispδος and its 
cognates function as antonyms to several words for truth.  The famous words of Hesiod’s 
Muses best exemplify this flexibility of ψεupsilonperispδος:  £δµεν ψεupsilonoxiaδεα πολλ λzγειν Sτupsilonoxiaµοισιν 
pµοα, | £δµεν δ’, εupsilonpsiliperispτ’ Sθzλωµεν, Fληθzα γηρupsilonoxiaσασθαι (Theog. 27-28). 
 
AESCHYLUS 
TRUTH  
                                                 
41 Chantraine 1999, s.v. “ψεupsilonoxiaδοµαι” summarizes this hypothesis. 
 
42 Pratt 1993, 56. 
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 The words FληθHς and Mτυµος and their variants overlap a great deal in Aeschylus 
and are nearly synonymous.  For both adjectives Italie’s primary definition is verus 
(“true”), with FλHθεια corresponding to veritas (“truth”), and the contexts in which both 
sets of terms appear involve messages or statements that accurately convey reality, either 
specific or general.  The difference between the two adjectives seems to lie primarily in 
usage:  FληθHς is largely used of verbal messages,43 while Mτυµος describes accurate non-
verbal signals.  By and large Aeschylean instances of FλHθεια and its cognates and 
compounds (e.g., Fληθεupsilonoxiaω, FληθXµαντις) consist of references to verbal statements, a 
usage pattern that reflects a variation of Homeric usage and characterizes a direct verbal 
interaction between two parties.  When Clytemnestra speaks of her qualities as a faithful, 
loyal wife, she claims that her boasts are teeming with truth (τς Fληθεoας γzµων, 613), 
although she is lying, of course.44  Similarly, the Herald describes his report to the Queen 
in the Persians as FληθHς: 
ταupsilonperispτ’ Mστ’ Fληθ, πολλ δ’ Sκλεoπω λzγων 
κακnν ¥ Πzρσαις Sγκατzσκηψεν θεXς. 
 
These things are true, but I omit many of the woes a god has hurled 
against the Persians.  (Pers. 513-514) 
 
                                                 
43 This is not a hard and fast distinction:  Aeschylus applies the adjective FληθHς to the message of the 
beacon-fires in the Agamemnon (491) and to accurately foreboding dreams in the Seven Against Thebes 
(710), but only the second instance serves as a real exception; as I will discuss in Chapter Four, Ag. 491 
applies FληθHς to the beacon-fires only when their accuracy is to be confirmed by the verbal report of the 
Herald.  
 
44 Goldhill 1984, 56 observes that this phrase τς Fληθεoας γzµων (“full of the truth”) “implies the 
possibility of its opposite, that the language may have no truth content—as indeed in this case it has not.” 
 There is some debate about the speaker of these lines, which belong to the herald in the 
manuscripts.  Most scholars, following Fraenkel, Hermann, and Wilamowitz, make Clytemnestra the 
speaker of these lines, but Thomson 1966 ad 613-616 argues for following the manuscripts.  Given the 
general scholarly acceptance that the manuscripts are wrong here and the play’s tendency to associate the 
female characters with incredibility, which I will discuss in Chapter Four, I am inclined to follow Fraenkel 
et al. 
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The adjective FληθHς notably does not imply that the account is complete, as the Herald 
himself acknowledges, but only that none of the words uttered by him is patently false.  
Describing events that have already occurred, the Herald applies FληθHς to statements 
about the past.  The adverb Fληθnς adheres closely to its adjectival form; the Chorus of 
the Agamemnon thus apply this adverb to their comprehension of Cassandra’s prophecies 
and use the term to confirm the veracity of what she has said (τrν µjν Θυzστου δατα 
παιδεoων κρεnν | ξυνκα κα πzφρικα, κα φXβος µ’ Mχει | κλupsilonoxiaοντ’ Fληθnς οupsilonpsiliδjν 
Sξ¨κασµzνα, “Thyestes’ feast upon his children’s flesh I understand and shudder at, and 
fear takes hold of me as I hear it truly told and not in images,” Ag. 1242-1244). 
Similarly, the term Mτυµος/SτHτυµος denotes accuracy in reporting, but is more 
likely than FληθHς to be applied to non-verbal representations of what has happened.  As 
such, it characterizes interpersonal communication less often and reflects an individual’s 
understanding of something rather than a communication between two people.  When the 
Chorus of the Agamemnon wonder about the accuracy of the beacon-fires or the Chorus 
of the Seven Against Thebes interpret a dust-cloud as signaling an advance of troops, 
they use the terms SτHτυµος and Mτυµος to specify the accuracy of their respective signals 
(εi δ’ SτHτυµος, | τoς ο©δεν, ª τι θεXν Sστo π¨ ψupsilonoxiaθος; “Who knows if it is true or somehow 
some godly lie?” Ag. 477-478; αiθερoα κXνις µε πεoθει φανεσ’ | ναυδος σαφrς Mτυµος 
γγελος, “A cloud of dust on high appears and persuades me, a messenger clear and true, 
though voiceless,” Sept. 81-82).  Although Aeschylus departs from the Homeric formulae 
for FληθHς, his application of it to verbal statements and his contrasting use of Mτυµος for 
nonverbal signals parallels the Homeric distinction between Mτυµος and FληθHς that 
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Krischer discusses,45 for Mτυµος refers to messages that do not carry the subjectivity of a 
specific speaker so much as of the interpreter of the message.  
 There are some instances where FλHθεια, FληθHς, and Mτυµος designate accurate 
prophecies of events that have not yet occurred.  For the adjective FληθHς, Italie 
distinguishes these instances under the separate definition ratus (“fixed, settled”), but 
does not create similar sub-headings for FλHθεια or Mτυµος.  When these words refer to 
future events, they involve individual prescience or interpretation of divine will.  For 
example, Clytemnestra confirms that certain predictions are in line with FλHθεια: 
Xo.  νειδος «κει τXδ’ Fντ’ νεoδους, 
δupsilonoxiaσµαχα δ’ Sστ κρναι. 
φzρει φzροντ’, Sκτoνει δ’ p καoνων· 
µoµνει δj µoµνοντος Sν θρXνl ∆ιsς  
παθεν τsν Mρξαντα· θzσµιον γUρ. 
τoς ν γονν Fραον SκβUλοι δXµων; 
κεκXλληται γzνος πρsς τ­.  
Κλ.  Sς τXνδ’ Sνzβης ξupsilonvariaν Fληθεo­ 
χρησµXν.   (Ag. 1560-1568) 
 
Chorus:  This reproach meets reproach, and it is difficult to judge.  
Someone plunders the plunderer, and a murderer pays the price.  It awaits 
that the doer suffer while Zeus abides on his throne, for it is the law.  Who 
would cast out the cursed stock from the home?  The race is bound fast to 
ruin. 
Clytemnestra:  You have come upon this prophecy with truth.   
 
The Chorus’ prophecy is deemed ξupsilonvariaν Fληθεo­ because of what generally happens in such 
cases.  Although neither Clytemnestra nor the Chorus knows the specifics of what is to 
occur, both acknowledge that the law of Zeus dictates retributive events to come, and 
Clytemnestra attaches the term FλHθεια to this law. 
                                                 
45 Krischer 1965. 
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 Both FληθHς and Mτυµος can similarly be used to specify the accuracy of 
injunctions regarding the future.  This use of FληθHς occur in the Seven Against Thebes 
in reference to Oedipus’ curse on his sons: 
κUρτα δ’ Fληθ πατρsς ΟiδιπXδα 
πXτνι’ °ρινupsilonvariaς Sπzκρανεν.  (Sept. 885-886) 
 
The dread Fury of father Oedipus brought exceedingly true things to 
fulfillment.   
 
πικρsς λυτrρ νεικzων p πXντιος 
ξενος Sκ πυρsς συθεoς, 
θηκτsς σoδαρος, πικρsς δ’ p χρηµUτων 
κακsς δατητς ±ρης, Fρν πατρ² - 
αν τιθες Fλαθ.  (Sept. 941-946) 
 
The stranger from over the sea is a bitter decider of strife, hastened by fire, 
Ares, a sharpened steel, bitter, evil distributor of possessions, making their 
father’s curse true.   
 
The actions of Eteocles and Polyneices demonstrate the prescience of Oedipus’ curse on 
his sons.  In these lines the Chorus frame their story as one that has essentially been 
written by the previous generation.  What has already been said is FληθHς even though 
the statements precede the event.   
 An analogous use of SτHτυµος appears in an inquiry posed to Cassandra by the 
Chorus of the Agamemnon:  εi δ’ Sτητupsilonoxiaµως | µXρον τsν αupsilondasiaτς ο©σθα, πnς θεηλUτου | 
βοsς δoκην πρsς βωµsν εupsilonpsiliτXλµως πατες; (“But if truly you know your fate, how do you 
walk courageously toward the altar like a god-driven cow?” Ag. 1296-1298).  The adverb 
Sτητupsilonoxiaµως serves the emphatic function of English “really” or “truly”; in this context, 
particularly with its syntactical proximity to µXρον, the Chorus’ question effectively 
becomes, “If you know your fate truly” or “If you know your true fate.”  In the special 
case of Cassandra, whose prophetic ability allows her clear sight of events regardless of 
when they occur, Sτητupsilonoxiaµως now comes to qualify accurate knowledge of the future, as it 
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is applied here to a situation that has not yet played itself out.  Italie does not identify this 
instance as a distinct application of Sτητupsilonoxiaµος, but it is comparable to FληθHς-ratus, where 
FληθHς refers to the fulfillment or accomplishment of a statement; what this example of 
Sτητupsilonoxiaµος does demonstrate is its similar applicability to events not yet unfolded. 
Secondarily, terms for truth can underscore interior truthfulness, i.e., sincerity or 
the tendency toward matching word with disposition and deed, but such uses are 
relatively rare.  Aeschylean FλHθεια in one instance does show the post-Homeric 
application to sincerity or truthfulness, as Italie identifies: 
τoς δ’ Sπιτupsilonoxiaµβιον α©νον Sπ’ Fνδρ θεol 
σupsilonvariaν δακρupsilonoxiaοις iUπτων 
Fληθεo­ φρενnν πονHσει;  (Ag. 1548-1550)  
 
Who will send forth with tears and, with the truth of his mind, labor at 
praise over the tomb for the godly man?   
 
The Chorus utter these lines to Clytemnestra, specifying FλHθεια as a quality desired in a 
loyal eulogist of Agamemnon.  This instance thus differs from Clytemnestra’s earlier use 
(613), where FλHθεια qualified a statement rather than a disposition.  The difference 
between these two applications of FλHθεια is comparable to an interior-exterior contrast:  
while FλHθεια is predominantly used of statements that accurately represent events 
exterior to the speaker, this secondary use of FλHθεια refers to the inner disposition of a 
speaker and how this disposition affects the quality of his words.  Furthermore, the 
contrast between the Chorus’ and Clytemnestra’s respective uses of this word cannot be 
denied:  the Chorus’ use of FλHθεια encompasses both accuracy and sincerity, while 
Clytemnestra uses FλHθεια more narrowly to denote accuracy.  Of course, in her case 
neither her disposition nor her actions match her words, and she is neither accurate nor 
sincere.  She knows what a good wife ought to do and say in her circumstances, and she 
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consequently claims to act accordingly, attaching the term FλHθεια to these claims.  The 
Chorus’ desire for a eulogist with aletheia in his mind demonstrates their more expansive 
understanding that merely saying what is suitable for the occasion is not sufficient, but 
must be accompanied by a similar disposition, a sentiment familiar from epinician 
poetry.46 
 The adverbial form Sτupsilonoxiaµως can also denote sincerity, although slightly differently 
from FλHθεια.  Italie cites two instances where Sτupsilonoxiaµως denotes sincerity (Sept. 919 and 
Supp. 81), but I would argue that both these passages showcase the use of Sτupsilonoxiaµως for 
emphasis along the same lines as English “really” or “very,” and their conveyance of 
sincerity is more a function of the high emotional context than of the word’s inherent 
meaning.  The Saussurean value of a word is a helpful tool here for understanding since it 
is the relationship between Sτupsilonoxiaµως and its surrounding context that conveys sincerity.  
When the Chorus of the Seven Against Thebes report to Ismene and Antigone the deaths 
of their brothers, the language is rife with emotionally charged terms and syntax: 
προπzµπει δαϊκτrρ 
γXος αupsilonpsiliτXστονος αupsilonpsiliτοπHµων, 
δαϊXφρων, οupsilonpsili φιλογα-  
θHς, Sτupsilonoxiaµως δακρυχzων 
Sκ φρενXς, ¥ κλαιοµzνας µου µινupsilonoxiaθει 
τονδε δυον FνUκτοιν.  (Sept. 916-921) 
 
 A heartrending lament sends them forth, for one’s own griefs, for one’s 
own woes, miserable, not mirthful, truly shedding tears from the mind, 
which diminishes as I weep for these two lords.   
 
The adverb Sτupsilonoxiaµως, which I have translated “truly,”47 reinforces the tone of sincerity of 
those lamenting through emphasis of its surrounding context.  The passage as a whole 
stresses interiority (Sκ φρενXς) and mournfulness with a series of words for lament in 
                                                 
46 I will discuss Clytemnestra and FλHθεια in more detail in Chapter Four. 
 
47  Cf. Hutchinson 1985, ad 919, who provides “in truth.” 
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asyndeton and a chiastic ordering of repeated roots (δαϊκτrρ |…αupsilonpsiliτXστονος αupsilonpsiliτοπHµων, | 
δαϊXφρων, 916-918).   
 Similarly, the other instance of Sτupsilonoxiaµως-sincere appears in another emotionally 
charged passage, this time from the Suppliants: 
Fλλ θεο γενzται κλupsilonoxiaετ’ εupsilonpsiliperisp τs δoκαιον iδXντες 
+«β­ µr τzλεον+ δXντες Mχειν παρ’ α©σαν, 
upsilondasiaoxiaβριν δ’ Sτupsilonoxiaµως στυγοupsilonperispντες  
πzλοιτ’ ν Mνδικοι γUµοις.  (Supp. 79-82) 
 
But ancestral gods, listen and behold justice well.  Granting nothing 
contrary to pronounced decree and truly hating insolence you would be 
righteous to marriage.   
 
In the Chorus of Danaids’ appeal to the gods the adverb Sτupsilonoxiaµως emphasizes the emotive 
excitement already present in the vivid language.  This passage effects a similar tone with 
its use of imperatives and loaded words such as upsilondasiaoxiaβριν and στυγοupsilonperispντες.  In each passage 
the adverb Sτupsilonoxiaµως connotes sincerity because it appears in and reinforces such 
psychologized contexts. 
Where Aeschylean Mτυµος differs from FλHθεια/FληθHς is in its much broader 
range of uses.  Italie specifies verus, sincere, and recte as possible applications of 
Mτυµος/SτHτυµος and their adverbs.  In addition to veracity and sincerity the word may 
designate accuracy in the sense of suitability, appropriateness, or aptness.  When Athena 
promises to select a jury for Orestes’ trial in the Eumenides and to pronounce the best 
verdict possible, she characterizes her intent to do so as Sτητupsilonoxiaµως:  κρoνασα δ’ Fστnν τnν 
Sµnν τ βzλτατα | «ξω διαιρεν τοupsilonperispτο πργµ’ Sτητupsilonoxiaµως (“After choosing the best of my 
citizens, I will come to judge this affair correctly,” Eum. 487-488).  Italie rightly defines 
this instance of Sτητupsilonoxiaµως as recte rather than vere, for Athena does not mean to make a 
factually accurate judgment so much as one that is fair and just.   
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 The adjective Mτυµος can designate proper lineages of abstract concepts.  
Likewise, when the Chorus of the Eumenides exclaim, “How truly is Hubris the child of 
Impiety” (δυσσεβoας µjν upsilondasiaoxiaβρις τzκος ¶ς Sτupsilonoxiaµως, 534), it does not assert Hubris’ descent 
from Impiety as a matter of scientific, historical, or theological fact;48 rather, the Chorus 
convey the close association between δυσσεβoα and upsilondasiaoxiaβρις and the natural tendency to 
think of these two concepts as interconnected.  Likewise, the choral ode to Justice 
following Orestes’ and Clytemnestra’s last exchange of the Choephoroi incorporates the 
term SτHτυµος in its discussion of Justice’s pedigree:   
Mµολε δ’ · µzλει κρυπταδoου µUχας 
δολιXφρων ΠοινU, 
Mθιγε δ’ Sν  µUχ­ χερsς SτHτυµος 
∆ιsς κXρα, ∆oκαν δz νιν 
προσαγορεupsilonoxiaοµεν 
βροτο τυχXντες καλnς, 
λzθριον πνzουσ’ Sν Sχθρος κXτον.  (946-952) 
 
The crafty goddess of Vengeance has come, who concerns herself with the 
secret battle, and the true daughter of Zeus took hold of her hand in battle.  
Justice is what we mortals call her, hitting the mark well, since she 
breathes deadly rancor on her enemies.   
 
The Chorus etymologize Justice’s name ∆oκα from ∆ιsς κXρα, although there is some 
debate as to whether SτHτυµος actually refers to an etymology or simply describes the 
aptness of Justice’s descent from Zeus as the accomplisher of his work.49  In either case 
SτHτυµος designates accuracy in the sense of appropriateness, whether of Dike’s name or 
her descent.50 
                                                 
48 Pace Sommerstein 1989, ad 533-7 who translates ¶ς Sτupsilonoxiaµως “in reality,” contending that Aeschylus 
means to correct traditional proverbial thought, which posits κXρος as the mother of upsilondasiaoxiaβρις.  Given the 
flexibility of parentage for abstract concepts, I find it improbable that Aeschylus would reference and 
rectify a hard and fast family tree for hubris.  
 
49 See Garvie 1986 ad 948-51 for a discussion of these lines and for relevant bibliography.   
 
50 According to Headlam 1891, 152, SτHτυµος “is frequently used in later Greek in connexion with 
descent.” Cited in Garvie 1986 ad 948-951. 
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 In Aeschylus we can see the precursor to the later use of τs Mτυµον as 
“etymology,” for the adjective designates appropriateness in naming.51  In the famous 
choral ode about Helen in the Agamemnon, the Chorus etymologize, albeit falsely as in 
the case of Dike in the Choephoroi, the name Helen as originating from a root meaning 
“to kill.”  The use of Mτυµος again designates accuracy in the sense of aptness rather than 
historical or linguistic fact, as Italie notes by defining this instance as recte rather than 
vere: 
τoς ποτ’ ¸νXµαζεν ºδ’ 
Sς τs πν SτHτυµως, 
µH τις »ντιν’ οupsilonpsiliχ pρnµεν προνοo- 
αισι τοupsilonperisp πεπρωµzνου 
γλnσσαν Sν τupsilonoxiaχ­ νzµων, 
τν δορoγαµβρον Fµφινει – 
κ θ’ ½λzναν;  (681-686) 
 
Who ever so truly named this bride of battles, wooed all round, Helen?  
Someone unseen with knowledge of the foreordained successfully using 
his tongue?   
 
The Chorus proceed to provide an etymology of Helen’s name as a derivation from a root 
¾λε- meaning “kill” and list a string of words with similar roots (¾λzνας, ¿λανδρος, 
¾λzπτολις, 689-690).  The etymology provided here is appropriate for the context, for the 
meaning of Helen’s name, whether real or imagined, matches the destruction she 
causes.52 
FALSEHOOD 
The range of ψεupsilonperispδος and its various forms is large, although Italie provides 
simply falsus for the adjective ψευδHς and falsa loqui, vates falsa, and falso nominatus 
for the compounds ψευδηγορzω, ψευδXµαντις, and ψευδνυµος, respectively.  Italie is 
                                                 
51 There is one instance where Fληθnς is used instead to designate an apt name:  Àπαφος, Fληθnς υσoων 
Sπνυµος (“Epaphos, truly named after deliverances,” Supp. 312).   
 
52 The importance of etymology and naming is a recurrent theme in the Oresteia; see Goldhill 1986, 19-21. 
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more precise with the verb ψεupsilonoxiaδω, designating deception (fallere) in the active and either 
deception or lying (fallere, mentiri) in the middle.  While Aeschylus uses two distinct 
words for “true,” FληθHς and Mτυµος, the single root ψευδ- designates the opposite of all 
their applications.  The word ψεupsilonperispδος thus encompasses a much broader range than either 
FληθHς or Mτυµος.  Moreover, through its compounds ψεupsilonperispδος conveys a wider variety of 
applications than FληθHς or Mτυµος, the latter of which does not appear in compounds at 
all.   
 As opposites to spoken truth uncompounded ψευδ-forms appear only three times 
in the extant Aeschylus plays, each time as the adjective ψευδHς, and each time 
describing untrue speech,53 whether concerning past occurrences or future events.  Two 
of those instances appear in close proximity to one another and are spoken by the herald 
of the Agamemnon attesting to the veracity of his report (Ag. 620, 625).  These two lines 
are the only applications of the adjective ψευδHς to reports that inaccurately represent 
what has already happened.  The other instance of ψευδHς describes speech concerning 
future events.  When Io appeals to Prometheus to tell her truthfully what lies in store for 
her, she requests that he not deliver false stories out of pity for her (µupsilonoxiaθοις ψευδzσιν, PV 
685), i.e., stories of events that will not happen.  The dual application of FληθHς, Mτυµος, 
and ψευδHς to reports about either past or future events is a function of the Greek 
conception of prophecy as knowledge of past, present, and future, as Calchas claims in 
Iliad 1 (Áς Âδη τU τ’SXντα τU τ’ SσσXµενα πρX τ’ SXντα, 70).  When Cassandra accurately 
reports the past ills of the house of Atreus, she challenges the Chorus to deem her a 
                                                 
53 The noun pseudos does not appear at all in Aeschylus. 
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ψευδXµαντις (Ag. 1195), yet she can use its opposite, FληθXµαντις, to refer to her 
prediction of future events (Ag. 1241).54 
Accordingly, pseudos in this application to prophecy appears in connection with 
what Zeus speaks or wills:  ψευδηγορεν γρ οupsilonpsiliκ Sπoσταται στXµα | τs ∆ον, Fλλ πν 
Mπος τελε (“For the mouth of Zeus does not know how to speak falsely, but accomplishes 
every word,” Pr. 1032-1033).  As Hermes warns Prometheus about his ill-fated future, he 
gives voice to the predominant assumption that Prometheus aims to derail the 
overarching power of Zeus.  This short line reveals that for Zeus, ψεupsilonperispδος would not 
simply be a lie as opposed to the truth, but rather the inability to effect a future 
occurrence.  The line introduces Zeus’ relationship to truth and falsehood, for Hermes 
equates Zeus’ will with the formation of events.  For Zeus to speak falsely (ψευδηγορεν) 
would entail the ineffectuality of his will; ψευδηγορεν is thus something outside the 
domain of Zeus Teleios.55 
Compounds of ψεupsilonperispδος are also used to negate etumos in its application to naming.  
Aeschylus uses the adjective ψευδνυµος three times to describe names that either do or 
would ill fit their bearers: 
 δτ’ ν ε£η πανδoκως ψευδνυµος 
∆oκη, ξυνοupsilonperispσα φωτ παντXλµl φρzνας.  (Sept. 670-671) 
 
Indeed, Justice would be falsely named, if she were linked with a man 
audacious in his mind.   
 
«ξεις δ’ Ãβριστrν ποταµsν οupsilonpsili ψευδνυµον.  (PV 717) 
                                                 
54 I am compelled here to discuss briefly the authorship of the Prometheus Bound.  Of course, the whole 
scholarly community in Classics is well aware of the basics of this controversy, each Classicist taking a 
stance, or refusing to, as appropriate for her aims.  For now, I belong to the latter category, as my word 
examination has revealed nothing unusual about terms for truth and falsehood in Prometheus as compared 
to the other Aeschylean plays, and a discussion of its authorship would be irrelevant to my particular study.  
For a fuller discussion, see Griffith 1977, who himself is skeptical about Aeschylean authorship of this 
play. 
 
55 Griffith 1983 ad 1032-3.  Cf. Suppliants 524-526 and Agamemnon 973. 
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You will have come to Insolence, a river not falsely named.   
 
ψευδωνupsilonoxiaµως σε δαoµονες Προµηθzα 
καλοupsilonperispσιν· αupsilonpsiliτsν γUρ σε δε προµηθoας, 
»τl τρXπl τσδ’ SκκυλισθHσ¨ τzχνης.  (PV 85-87) 
 
The gods name you Prometheus falsely; for you yourself are in need of 
forethought as to how you’ll be extricated from this trap.  
 
In each of these cases ψευδνυµος marks a name that belies the actions or character of its 
bearer.  Hutchinson’s explanation for Sept. 670, “νοµα and Mργον should naturally be 
one, particularly with a personified abstraction,”56 could double as a definition of a name 
that is Mτυµος, which when applied to naming posits a relationship of equivalence 
between word and deed.57  A person’s very actions could prove his name false, regardless 
of his inclination toward either truth or falsehood. 
As for the verb ψεupsilonoxiaδω, Italie divides Aeschylean uses into two categories, those 
that designate deception and those that refer to lying.  What is striking about this verb is 
the varying degree to which it indicates intention on the part of the instigator of the 
ψεupsilonperispδος.  In three of the four instances intention is ascribed to a speaker or agent (Pers. 
472, Eum. 615, Ag. 1208).  By contrast, the nurse in the Choephoroi compares the knack 
for intuiting a young child’s needs to prophecy and refers to her errors in judgment as 
deception, but declines to name any agent:  τοupsilonoxiaτων πρXµαντις οupsilonpsiliperispσα, πολλ δ’ ο£οµαι | 
ψευσθεσα (“Being a prophetess of these things, I suppose I was deceived often,” Cho. 
758-759).  In the passive ψεupsilonoxiaδω naturally emphasizes the perceiver of the pseudos rather 
than the agent, yet here there is not even an implied agent other than, perhaps, Loxias, if 
                                                 
56 Hutchinson 1985 ad 670. 
 
57 Cf. Griffith 1983 ad Pr. 85-6:  “Such play on proper names…is common in Greek poetry…It stems from 
the widespread popular belief that things, or people, and their names are linked by more than accident or 
convention:  the name reflects their true nature.” 
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we are to entertain the metaphor of prophecy to that extent.  Instead, the nurse is the 
source for her own experience of ψεupsilonperispδος, which refers to her confusion and error in 
intuition, and indeed, the passive of ψεupsilonoxiaδω is used in such a way as to imply that the one 
who errs is the agent of her own deception. 
Furthermore, even when there is a supposed actor behind a pseudos, this actor is 
unspecified, as in the Persians where Atossa’s exclamatory wails bemoan the defeat of 
Xerxes’ troops:  (Ä στυγνj δαµον, ¶ς ρ’ Mψευσας φρενnν | Πzρσας (“O hateful god, 
how you deceived the minds of the Persians!” Pers. 472-473).  While superficially Atossa 
attributes the Persian defeat to a god’s deception, her lament primarily concerns the 
Persians’ miscalculated decision to engage the Athenians.  Moreover, in Aeschylus and 
elsewhere the ascription of unfortunate or inexplicable events to an unnamed deity58 does 
not expropriate all causality and responsibility from mortals to the gods.  Rather, such 
exclamations reflect double determination or motivation whereby both gods and mortals 
equally cause what happens.59  The point is that the use of the verb ψεupsilonoxiaδω here points up 
the misapprehension of the perceiver more than misdirection by any deceiver. 
As for ψεupsilonperispδος and its compounds as a whole, the idea of intention may be explicit 
or implied in many of its uses, but the focus is on the perception of the ψεupsilonperispδος as a 
deception or falsehood regardless of its intent.  The uses of ψευδ-words tend to indicate 
focalization through the perceiver rather than through the agent, whether or not an 
explicit agent is present.  The term ψεupsilonperispδος thus introduces a different angle in the study 
of truth and falsehood, namely the perspective from which something is deemed true or 
                                                 
58 Cf. Pers. 158 and Hall 1986, ad loc.  This is a recurrent theme in the Persians, for Darius’ ghost repeats 
this sentiment at Pers. 743. 
 
59 For a lucid explanation of double motivation in Homer and in Aeschylus, see Gagarin 1976, esp. 17-18 
and 49-50. 
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false.  Krischer articulated this aspect of perspective with his comparison of FληθHς and 
Mτυµος, but parallel studies have not been done for the various words for falsehood and 
deception. 
Unlike ψεupsilonperispδος, the other main words for deception in Aeschylus, FπUτη and 
δXλος, consistently indicate intentional deception.  The term FπUτη appears only three 
times in the extant plays (Supp. 110, Pers. 93, Eum. 728), each time reflecting calculated 
guile.  The word δXλος appears much more often, and in fact surpasses all other words 
for falsehood or deception in its frequency in Aeschylus.  Despite this frequency my 
discussion of δXλος will be brief, for this term in Aeschylus shows the least variation of 
the deception words, as it very consistently refers to a specific trick or to guile in general 
and always connotes intention on the part of its agent.  Furthermore, the focalization of 
this term is very even between deceiver and deceived, reflecting both guileful intent as 
well as the perception of guile.  The one possible exception is at Ag. 273 where 
Clytemnestra refers to her possibly excessive credulousness of the beacon-fires as the 
deception of Hephaestus, the god of fire (Mστιν, τo δ’ οupsilonpsiliχo; µr δολσαντος θεοupsilonperisp).60  This 
statement resembles Atossa’s exclamation at Pers. 472 and may similarly couple a god’s 
deception with a potential error of the perceiver, but in Clytemnestra’s case the physical 
manifestation of a beacon-fire puts the blame squarely on someone other than herself if 
the fire’s report turns out to be inaccurate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
My discussion thus far has meant to illuminate the wide range of applicability of 
terms for truth and falsehood, a range that the lexica cannot fully reveal.  A simple 
equation between “true” and FληθHς or Mτυµος does not identify the largely interpersonal, 
                                                 
60 Hephaestus is explicitly named at 281. 
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communicative nature of FληθHς nor the function of Mτυµος as a marker of suitability or 
appropriateness.  Lexical definitions also do not show how relative time affects the 
various applications of FλHθεια, FληθHς, and Mτυµος and the role of time in revealing 
truth.  Aside from the usual hints of veracity or accuracy, truth and falsehood words 
touch on ideas of prophecy, suitability, and sincerity, although the latter is much less 
prevalent than in English.  The wide range of applications manifests itself in various 
ways:  for Mτυµος, the word’s various contexts showcase its different applications, 
whereas FληθHς and ψευδHς broaden their range of applications through appearance in 
compounds.  Furthermore, ψεupsilonperispδος is most likely to obscure any agency behind it, 
transferring the focus instead to the perceiver.  The privileging of experience over agent 
is particularly appropriate for tragedy, in which forces larger than individual actions or 
agency are the focus, although certainly this sense of ψεupsilonperispδος is not exclusive to tragedy.  
In Chapter Four I will argue that Aeschylus employs these various applications of truth 
and falsehood to reinforce the major themes of his tragedy, primarily the theme of 
reciprocal or retributive violence.  While truth-telling is valued by individual characters, 
the presiding force over the tragedies is the perpetuating cycle of retribution.  Truth and 
falsehood thus reinforce this cycle so that characters may suffer no direct or immediate 
consequences for individual acts of deception or truthfulness, but are instead subject to 
experiences in accordance with what the plot of retribution demands. 
 
PINDAR 
TRUTH  
On the whole Pindar uses FλHθεια/FληθHς and Mτυµος much more narrowly than 
Aeschylus.  The main word for truth in Pindar, FλHθεια (Doric FλUθεια), Slater defines 
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simply as “truth,” without further elaboration than to note its various instances in Pindar 
and its personification in Olympian 10 and Fragment 205.  Komornicka has written 
several detailed studies of terms for truth and falsehood in Pindar, which list the various 
terms designating truth and falsehood and elucidate the range of applications for these 
terms.61 Race provides the most lucid starting point for a discussion of truth in Pindar 
with his brief yet precise statement, apropos of the invocation to Olympia as a mistress of 
truth in Olympian 8 (Οupsilonpsiliλυµπoα, | δzσποιν’ Fλαθεoας, 2-3), that “this FλUθεια denotes 
‘how something actually turns out to be,’ a sense it always has in Pindar.”62 
 I agree with Race, and add that this sense of FλHθεια, however obvious it may 
seem, reflects a marked departure from Homer and Aeschylus.  A key difference between 
Pindaric and Homeric or Aeschylean FλHθεια is the manner in which Pindar articulates 
the relationship between FλHθεια and verbal statements.  As I have noted, Homer uses 
FλHθεια and the substantive neuter plural Fληθzα interchangeably as objects of verbs of 
speaking, thus applying these terms to the accuracy of an utterance, while Aeschylus 
likewise retains the close connection between FλHθεια and what is said (e.g., Ag. 613, 
Ag. 1567), thus emphasizing verbal accuracy as the defining feature of FλHθεια.   
Pindar preserves this connection between FλHθεια (“how something actually turns 
out to be”) and statements reflecting it, but makes clear that the two are distinct: 
τελεupsilonoxiaταθεν δj λXγων κορυφαo 
Sν Fλαθεo­ πετοσαι.  (Ol. 7.61-69) 
 
The chief points of the words fell in with truth and were brought to 
completion.   
 
νupsilonperispν δ Sφoητι <τs> τ¸ργεoου φυλUξαι  
                                                 
61 Komornicka 1972, 1979, and 1981. 
 
62 Race 1990, 144.  Cf. Adkins 1972, who argues in part that Homeric aletheia is not very different from a 
modern conception of truth. 
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µ Fλαθεoας < ˘ – > γχιστα βανον,  
“χρHµατα, χρHµατ FνHρ” Áς φ κτεUνων θ µα λειφθες κα φoλων.  (Isth. 
2.9-11) 
 
And now she bids us to guard the Argive’s saying which comes closest to 
truth:  “Money, money is man,” says he who is bereft of both possessions 
and friends.63   
 
While the contextual differences between the two passages are many—the first refers to a 
specific event, Rhodes’ emergence from the sea, while the second refers to a saying that 
describes the general tendency of human nature—Pindar’s phrasing in both passages is 
strikingly similar in that each passage uses FλHθεια to refer directly to “what happens” 
without speaking of verbal communication as an intermediary step between an event and 
its perception.  By using FλHθεια thus, Pindar proposes the existence of an objective 
reality that is antecedent to the words describing or relaying that reality. 
 Pindar also, unlike Homer and Aeschylus, uses FλHθεια to convey reality itself.  
In such passages as Pythian 3.103 and Nemean 7.25 Pindar does not explicitly articulate a 
verbal aspect of FλHθεια, instead using the term to represent directly “what happens” or 
“reality.”  By doing so, he asserts his superior knowledge of what actually happens, either 
specifically or generally, and subtly removes any question of subjectivity.  Furthermore, 
he suggests that not all that appears to be FλHθεια can be assumed to be true: 
» τ’ Sξελzγχων µXνος 
FλUθειαν SτHτυµον 
ΧρXνος.  τs δj σαφανjς iν πXρσω κατzφρασεν…  (Ol. 10.53-55) 
 
Time alone puts genuine truth to the test.  As it progressed further, it 
openly declared what was clear…   
 
The passage refers to the first Olympic festival as established by Herakles, whose actions 
are detailed in the lines immediately following.  The application of Mτυµος to FλHθεια 
                                                 
63 Because of the circumscribed nature of this project, I unfortunately do not discuss the monetary language 
that pervades this ode, which is key to understanding it as a whole.  See Kurke 1991, 240-256, Nisetich 
1977, and Woodbury 1968.   
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can, with Krischer’s help, be understood as Pindar’s attempt to emphasize that for him, 
truth extends beyond the perspective of its speaker and reflects objective reality.  As I 
summarized above, Krischer convincingly identifies the distinction between FληθHς and 
Mτυµος as one of perspective:  the perspective of the speaker inheres in FληθHς but not in 
Mτυµος.  By describing FλHθεια as SτHτυµος and by using it to refer not to an accurate 
verbal account of an event, but rather to the event itself, Pindar doubly removes the 
subjectivity of a speaker in favor of the objective reality of the occurrence. 
 I do not mean to say, however, that Pindar completely dismisses verbal accuracy 
as an important application of FλHθεια.  Three of the five instances of FληθHς64 in Pindar 
mean “true” in the sense of accurate reporting.  When Pindar does combine FλHθεια with 
verbal manifestations of it, he often sheds light on his conception of epinician poetry as a 
genre and thus encompasses verbal and dispositional truth (accuracy and sincerity).  
Slater’s simple definition “true” cannot convey the genre-oriented sense of Pindar’s truth-
telling, which implicates FλHθεια in the poet’s relationship to his patron by incorporating 
FλHθεια/FληθHς in a system of reciprocal give and take, emblematized in principles of 
xenia, philia, and charis.  The relationship Pindar constructs with his patron, as many 
have noted, is one of friendship, devotion, loyalty, and obligation.65  Accordingly, the 
adjective FληθHς describes both statements (or metaphors for statements) and speakers’ 
dispositions, thus meaning both “true” and “truthful.”  Pindar applies the adjective once 
to the herald’s shout as a “true witness” (FλαθHς τz µοι | Mξορκος Sπzσσεται ¾ξηκοντUκι 
                                                 
64 Slater lists a dubious sixth instance of alethes in Fr. 30.6, where Boeckh conjectures a reading of Fλαθzας 
Èρας  based on a fragment of Hesychius; an alternate reading posits Fγαθ σωτρας.  Even if Boeckh’s 
reading is correct, the fragmentary nature of this passage prohibits its inclusion in a consideration of 
FληθHς in Pindar. 
 
65 Cf. Bowra 1964, 387-388.  In using the name “Pindar,” I refer, of course, to the persona of the epinician 
poet presented in the odes, and not to the historical author.  See Lefkowitz 1991 for a comprehensive 
discussion of this persona. 
 41 
δr Fµφοτzρωθεν | Éδupsilonoxiaγλωσσος βο κUρυκος Sσλοupsilonperisp, “the sweet-tongued shout of the 
good herald, indeed heard sixty times from both places, as a true witness under oath will 
lend weight to me,”66 Ol. 13.98-100), which demonstrates the first application of FληθHς 
to the accuracy of a report.  By contrast, when Pindar describes his mind as FληθHς 
(Fλαθε νXl, Ol. 2.92), he applies FληθHς to his disposition rather than to his report.  
These two applications need not be mutually exclusive, for FληθHς tends to be used in 
quite personal contexts where Pindar claims to speak the truth, a usage pattern necessarily 
implies his disposition towards true reportage.  When Pindar expresses his hope in that 
his “true words” will aid his evasion of Boeotian stereotype (Fρχαον νειδος Fλαθzσιν | 
λXγοις εi φεupsilonoxiaγοµεν, Βοιωτoαν upsilondasiaperispν, Ol. 6.89-90), he thus claims both that his words are true 
and, implicitly, that he as the one uttering those words is truthful. 
 The term FληθHς, then, as Pindar uses it contains within it a sense of accuracy as 
well as sincerity.  By “sincerity” I mean the poet’s self-conscious commitment to praising 
his laudandus in a way both loyal and accurate.  Part of Pindar’s credibility as a praise 
poet rests on conveying authenticity:  his praise appears accurate if it comes from a 
willing source.  The traditional approach to Pindar-patron relations has been to 
understand either implicitly or explicitly that Pindar’s priorities lie in praising his 
patron.67  As Pratt notes, Pindar and Bacchylides are concerned with truth only insofar as 
it affects the apportionment of praise.68  I would qualify Pratt’s assertion to argue that 
Pindar’s primary encomiastic purpose is reflected in his incorporation of FλHθεια into the 
                                                 
66 Following Slater 1969; alternatively, “vouches for” (Nisetich 1980) or “my true witness under oath shall 
be the noble herald’s…” (Race 1997). 
 
67 Cf. Bundy 1962, 3:  “There is no passage in Pindar and Bakkhulides that is not in its primary intent 
encomiastic—that is, designed to enhance the glory of a particular patron.” 
 
68 Pratt 1993, 115. 
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epinician genre, so that he may express an equal level of commitment to both praise and 
truth. 
 For example, the beginning of Olympian 8 reflects truth that both broadly means 
“what happens” as well as specifically points to an occasion suitable for Pindar’s poetry: 
Μτερ Ä χρυσοστεφUνων Fzθλων, Οupsilonpsiliλυµπoα, 
δzσποιν’ Fλαθεoας, Êνα µUντιες νδρες 
Sµπupsilonoxiaροις τεκµαιρXµενοι παραπειρnνται ∆ιsς Fργικεραupsilonoxiaνου, 
ε£ τιν’ Mχει λXγον Fνθρπων πzρι 
µαιοµzνων µεγUλαν 
Fρετν θυµ λαβεν, 
τnν δj µXχθων FµπνοUν· 
νεται δj πρsς χUριν εupsilonpsiliσεβoας Fνδρnν λιτας.  (Ο. 8.1-8) 
 
O mother of the golden-crowned games, Olympia, mistress of truth, where 
men who are seers examine burnt offerings and test Zeus of the bright 
thunderbolt, to see if he has any word concerning mortals who are striving 
in their hearts to gain a great success and respite from their toils; but men’s 
prayers are fulfilled in return for piety. 
 
The truth that seers seek at Olympia involves the outcome of athletic contests, which will 
be determined by Zeus.69  By identifying Olympia as a place of truth and qualifying this 
truth to be specifically concerned with athletic ability, the poet contextualizes FλHθεια 
and explains its relevance to his poetry.  He introduces his subject matter, the Olympic 
victory of his laudandus, as a matter of truth, thus aligning the story of the laudandus with 
truth and communicating his devotion to this truth simultaneously.  This passage 
demonstrates how Pindaric FλHθεια can be both objective and subjective, for the term 
here primarily designates reality, but is also colored by its specific context of athletic 
competition, which points to Pindar’s role as a poet of praise.  These generic 
considerations can help shed light on Pindar’s more unusual uses of FλHθεια, particularly 
in its personified forms in Olympian 10 and Fragment 205, which I will discuss in the 
                                                 
69 Cf. Komornicka 1972, 238 and Slater1969, s.v. “δzσποινα,” who posit that Olympia’s epithet stems from 
the function of Olympic games as the true proof of athletic ability. 
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next chapter.  Just what Pindar means when he appeals to Truth can be understood when 
we take into consideration how much generic awareness informs his use of terms for truth 
and falsehood. 
FALSEHOOD AND DECEPTION 
 Words for falsehood and deception in Pindar include ψεupsilonperispδος, FπUτα, and δXλος, 
along with their corresponding compounds and verbal forms.  Slater defines ψεupsilonperispδος as 
“lie, falsehood,” presumably providing these two definitions to indicate varying degrees 
of intention inherent in the word.  The term ψεupsilonperispδος has a narrower range than in 
Aeschylus and is largely used of intentional falsehood, particularly when the poet denies 
that he is lying,70 but the term, as in Aeschylus, is also used in instances where falsehood 
is not intentional and indeed, in several cases where no agent of ψεupsilonperispδος is even 
mentioned, as the focus is on the perceiver or receiver of the ψεupsilonperispδος rather than on any 
speaker or agent.   
This is particularly so in cases where ψεupsilonperispδος is used in a non-verbal sense.  In 
Fragment 124 and Olympian 12 Pindar uses a form of ψεupsilonperispδος to refer to some 
misunderstanding on the part of the perceiver rather than an intention to deceive on the 
part of the agent of the ψεupsilonperispδος.  In neither case is any agent named, the focus being on 
the failure of the perceiver to comprehend something correctly: 
  αÊ γε µjν Fνδρnν 
πXλλ’ νω, τ δ’ αupsilonpsiliperisp κUτω ψεupsilonoxiaδη µεταµνια τUµνοισαι κυλoνδοντ’  
         Sλπoδες.  (Ol. 12.5-6)71 
 
And the hopes of men often roll up, and then roll back again as they cleave 
vain falsehoods.   
 
πελUγει δ’ Sν πολυχρupsilonoxiaσοιο πλοupsilonoxiaτου 
                                                 
70 E.g., see Ol. 4.17, Nem. 1.18. 
 
71 See Crotty 1982, 9 for a discussion of the antithetical pairs that permeate the opening of Olympian 12. 
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πUντες £σ­ νzοµεν ψευδ πρsς FκτUν.  (Fr. 124ab.6-7) 
 
And we all alike sail on the sea of gold-rich wealth toward an unreal 
shore.   
 
In Olympian 12 Pindar uses ψεupsilonoxiaδη to refer to hopes that prove to be unfulfilled, while in 
Fragment 124 Pindar refers to the effects of alcohol brought on by Dionysus, which 
induce blissful delusions.  The word ψεupsilonperispδος in these cases thus designates something 
more along the lines of “delusion” or “misapprehension” than “lie.” 
 When Pindar refers to verbal ψεupsilonperispδος, however, intention comes to the fore, but 
his criticism is not unwaveringly decisive.  This is because some cases of verbal ψεupsilonperispδος 
reflect misdirection rather than outright lying and thus make the assignment of blame less 
clear, for such misdirection can occur even without any patent falsehood.  As Bernard 
Williams observes, patently true statements still have the potential to deceive by 
producing a disposition in the hearer that would lend itself to misapprehension.  Williams 
illustrates this point with the example of a person going through another’s mail, then 
claiming, “someone has been opening your mail.”  Such a statement is not a lie, for it 
does not convey patently false information, but it does mislead the listener into believing 
that the culprit is someone other than the speaker.72  Williams’ discussion calls attention 
to the unsavory tendency for a successful deception to elicit a certain receptiveness to 
being duped and thus to violate a tacit agreement of trust between speaker and listener. 
It is in this light that I view Pindar’s criticism of Homer: 
Sγ δj πλzον’ Mλποµαι 
λXγον Ëδυσσzος Ì πUθαν δι τsν Éδυεπ γενzσθ’ Íµηρον· 
Sπε ψεupsilonoxiaδεσo ο ποταν <τε> µαχαν 
σεµνsν Mπεστo τι· σοφoα δj κλzπτει παρUγοισα µupsilonoxiaθοις.  (Nem. 7.20-23) 
                                                 
72 Williams 2002, 96. 
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I expect that Odysseus’ story has become greater than his experience on account 
of sweet-talking Homer, since something holy lies upon his lies and his soaring 
resourcefulness.  Skill deceives, misleading with stories.   
 
Pindar praises Homer’s skill as a poet, but points out that the aesthetic quality of his 
poetry distracts the audience from the truth.  The language suggests misdirection rather 
than actual lying (κλzπτει, παρUγοισα), and the appearance of ψεupsilonperispδος in this context 
reinforces a notion of misapprehension rather than deception.  Similarly, the famous 
passage from Olympian 1 that introduces Pindar’s rendition of the Pelops myth presents 
the presence of ψεupsilonperispδος in accounts of the myth as the result of elaborate embellishment: 
 θαupsilonoxiaµατα πολλU, καo ποupsilonoxia τι κα βροτnν φUτις upsilondasiaπjρ τsν Fλαθ λXγον   
δεδαιδαλµzνοι ψεupsilonoxiaδεσι ποικoλοις Sξαπατnντι µupsilonperispθοι.  (Ol. 1.28-9) 
 
Indeed, there are many wonders, and somehow the speeches of mortals, 
stories, have been embellished beyond the true account and deceive with 
intricate falsities.   
 
Pindar’s later characterization of his own poetic activity as embellishment 
(δαιδαλωσzµεν, 105) makes clear that embellished poetry itself does not lie.  Rather, 
Pindar points out the potential for embellishment to produce a misperception,73 and 
subsequently attributes this misperception to the power of Charis,74 which can make 
incredible things believable.  I would argue that this statement is as much a general 
explanation about human credulity as it is a criticism of deceptive poetry.  Like the non-
verbal instances of ψεupsilonperispδος, these statements about poetry and ψεupsilonperispδος focalize at least 
partly through the perceiver.  Pindar refers to the use of language that the audience 
understands incorrectly. 
                                                 
73 I should note that Pindar attributes the false Pelops myth to two distinct parties:  here he faults his poetic 
predecessors for embellishment to the point of falsehood, which I argue is not necessarily intentional; later, 
however, Pindar does charge intentional falsehood, but this time on the part of Pelops’ envious neighbors 
(46ff.).   
 
74 I will discuss these passages at greater length in the next chapter. 
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In contrast with Aeschylus Pindar’s other words for deception show varying 
degrees of agency and intention.75  In addition to the Olympian 1 passage above, the one 
instance of the verb FπατUω appears as a passive form that Slater defines as “be 
mistaken,” for it refers to a misapprehension rather than an intentional act of deception:  
Ä πXποι, οÎ’ Fπατται φροντς Sπαµερoων οupsilonpsiliκ iδυα (“Alas, how the mind of those who 
live day by day is deceived when it does not know,” Fr. 182).  Likewise, three times does 
a form of δXλος reflect the error of the person deceived rather than an action taken by a 
deceptive agent (Isth. 8.14, Pyth. 1.92, Pyth. 4.140), and two of these times the source of 
deception is imputed to gain, thus indicating a dispositional flaw in the perceiver: µr 
δολωθÏς, | Ä φoλε, κzρδεσιν Sντραπzλοις (“Friend, do not be deceived by shameful 
gains,” Pyth. 1.91-92); Sντ µjν θνατnν φρzνες ¸κupsilonoxiaτεραι | κzρδος αiνσαι πρs δoκας 
δXλιον τραχεαν ¾ρπXντων πρsς Mπιβδαν »µως (“The minds of mortals are rather quick to 
praise tricky gain before justice, despite that mortals creep toward a rough reckoning the 
next day,” Pyth. 4.139-140). 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Pindar’s use of aletheia reflects a truth that exists prior to and independently of 
verbal statements, a truth which he incorporates in his overall conception of poetry.  This 
conception views poetry as a system of reciprocity between poet and laudandus but also 
implicitly between poet and audience and incorporates truth into these relationships.  The 
principle of FλHθεια thus characterizes both an objective reality as well as a personal 
agreement between two parties.  This agreement entails the poet’s duty to the laudandus, 
which involves both accuracy and truthfulness in his praise, a praise that flatters, but 
                                                 
75 Pace Rosenmeyer 1955, 228 n. 9, where he discusses the difference between apate and pseudos in Pindar, 
arguing that “roughly, the following distinction might be hazarded:  apate involves active 
distortion,…whereas pseudos designates objective falseness, regardless of whether it is due to error or 
lying.” 
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believably so.  The varied focalizations of ψεupsilonperispδος and other terms for deception, I 
surmise, reflect the reciprocity of this relationship involving both the speaker’s violation 
of trust, as well as the listener’s propensity towards being deceived.  I do not mean to say 
that Pindar faults the listener for being deceived; rather, the dual or ambiguous 
focalization of some of these terms illuminates the violation of these contractual 
relationships on both sides of a communication.  I will discuss the interplay between 
truth, falsehood, and relationships of reciprocity in the next chapter.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  TRUTH, FALSEHOOD, AND XENIA IN PINDAR 
PART ONE:  TRUTH AND XENIA 
In the first half of this chapter I will argue that the relationship between praise and 
FλHθεια in Pindar is connected to principles of friendship and obligation such as ξενoα 
and φιλoα and that the poet negotiates the potentially contradictory forces of truth and 
obligatory praise by defining truth in terms of poetic obligation to his laudandus.  
Furthermore, Pindar conveys the impression that his commitment to praising the victor 
will yield a truthful account in the traditional sense of an accurate representation of 
events and that the commitment to the laudandus is part of a greater commitment to the 
truth.  The problem with Pindar’s conception of truth is that its two main aspects, 
accuracy and sincerity, are potentially contradictory.  As I noted in the previous chapter, 
Pindar, unlike his predecessors and contemporaries, speaks of truth outside of contexts of 
verbal accuracy, thus proposing a reality antecedent and external to its verbal accounts 
and removing some of the subjectivity that inheres in the word FλHθεια (cf. Krischer 
1965).  Secondly, Pindar uses the adjective FληθHς to convey accuracy but in some 
contexts also to convey sincerity, i.e., a speaker’s assertion that what he expresses is what 
he believes.  The aspect of sincerity inherent in some contexts of truth presents a 
subjectivity problematic in light of the objectivity conveyed by FλHθεια.  But these two 
applications of FληθHς do not have to be at odds with one another.  In his book Truth and 
Truthfulness Williams identifies sincerity and accuracy as the two main “virtues” of 
truth, referring to the former as the tendency of a speaker to express what he believes, 
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whereas accuracy aims directly at truth.76  He effectively demonstrates that truth-telling 
requires both of these virtues, the intention to represent accurately and the ability to do 
so.   
Pindar’s use of FληθHς likewise demonstrates that the potential conflict between 
the two applications of the word can be reconciled when considered within a generic 
framework:  as an epinician poet, Pindar’s first and foremost concern is to praise his 
laudandus; thus every abstract concept he speaks about—FρετU, glory, athleticism, and 
truth—must be understood in reference to this laudatory purpose.  Pindar’s praise 
narrative develops around a personal relationship between the poet and his laudandus, 
which is conveyed by references to the laudandus or to the poet himself as a guest-friend 
(ξενος; cf. Pyth. 6.48) or at times more closely as a friend (φoλος; cf. Ol. 1.92) and by the 
use of terms designating reciprocity such as charis, which is variously used to convey 
reciprocal exchange.77  As Bundy observes, the athlete’s FρετU represents a contribution 
that must be repaid, and the epinician ode is a reciprocal return for this contribution.78  
The ode itself forms part of a reciprocal exchange between poet and laudandus.   
Pindar incorporates FλHθεια into this type of poet-victor relationship, a ritualized 
friendship governed by certain expectations of reciprocity.  For a working definition of 
guest-friendship or xenia, I rely on the work of Herman: 
For analytical purposes ritualised friendship [i.e., xenia] is here defined as a bond 
of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between 
individuals originating from separate social units.  This definition encompasses 
the most distinctive features of the institution and supplies criteria for postulating 
its existence even if it is not named explicitly in the evidence…Excluded are 
relationships between strangers that involve payments for goods and services—as, 
                                                 
76 Cf. Williams 2003, 84-148. 
 
77 Cf. Kurke 1993, 67; MacLachlan 1993, 87-123. 
 
78 Bundy 1986, 57:  “…FρετU creates a debt that must be paid in the true coin of praise.” 
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for example, those between merchants and their customers, or mercenary soldiers 
and their employers.  People trading specific goods and services for payments 
would hardly classify their relationship as one of friendship.79  (Herman 1987, 10) 
 
As Slater notes, when Pindar claims to be a guest-friend of the victor, he agrees to the 
obligation “a) not to be envious of his xenos and b) to speak well of him.  The 
argumentation is:  Xenia excludes envy, I am a xenos, therefore I am not envious and 
consequently praise honestly.”80  To demonstrate the role of FλHθεια within such a 
relationship, I will examine Olympian 1, Olympian 10, and Nemean 7 as odes that reveal 
the intricate connections between truth and poetic obligation. 
TRUTH AND PRAISE:  OLYMPIAN 1  
In his treatment of the Pelops myth in Olympian 1 Pindar makes perhaps his most 
famous statements about truth and poetry.  He presents the usual rendition—that Tantalos 
slaughtered his son and fed him to the gods—but claims that this version is untrue, and 
that Pelops’ disappearance is actually attributable to Poseidon’s love for him.  Pindar’s 
defense of his version rests on a claim that previous false versions are shaped by a mortal 
tendency to believe what is pleasant: 
 θαupsilonoxiaµατα πολλU, καo ποupsilonoxia τι κα βροτnν φUτις upsilondasiaπjρ τsν Fλαθ λXγον   
δεδαιδαλµzνοι ψεupsilonoxiaδεσι ποικoλοις Sξαπατnντι µupsilonperispθοι·  
ΧUρις δ, περ παντα τεupsilonoxiaχει τ µεoλιχα θνατος, 
Sπιφzροισα τιµν κα πιστον SµHσατο πιστsν 
Mµµεναι τs πολλUκις· 
Éµzραι δ’ Sπoλοιποι 
µUρτυρες σοφτατοι.  (Ol. 1.28-34) 
 
Indeed, there are many wonders, and somehow the speeches of mortals, 
stories, have been embellished beyond the true account and deceive with 
intricate falsehoods; for Charis, who provides mortals with all pleasant 
                                                 
79 Herman’s work is on the actual practice of xenia in the ancient Greek world.  See also Kurke 
1991, 135-159, who focuses on the metaphorical xenia that pervades Pindar’s poetry. 
 
80 Slater 1979, 80.  On the convention of guest-friendship in Pindar, see Bundy 1986, 24-26; Race 1986, 
90-91; Hubbard 1985, 156-162; and Kurke 1991, 135-159. 
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things, often renders the incredible credible by bringing honor.  But days 
to come are the wisest witnesses.   
 
The contrast here is between mortal communications and the “true account,” a contrast 
underscored by the plurality of falsehoods as opposed to the singularity of truth.  Mortals 
falsify the truth through embellishment, a tendency that stems from charis, which seems 
to represent poetry’s charms.81  Pindar implies that he himself has access to the “true 
account,” which, coupled with his awareness of embellishment’s risks, ensures the 
tuthfulness of his own account.  The tendency both to generate falsehood and to believe it 
is depicted as a mortal problem (βροτnν, 28; θνατος, 30).  The reason for this becomes 
clear when Pindar explains the role of poetry.   
These lines have been taken to refer to poetry and even as statements of praise for 
the capacity of well-crafted poetry, including Pindar’s, to persuade.82  The ambiguity of 
his attitude toward persuasion and aestheticism prompts the question of how his poetry is 
fundamentally different from that of others.  The next sentence provides a possible 
answer:  Mστι δ’ Fνδρ φUµεν Sοικsς Fµφ δαιµXνων καλU· µεoων γρ αiτoα (“It is fitting 
for a man to say good things about the gods, for the blame is less,” Ol. 1.35).  Pindar 
suggests that his proper function is to portray the gods favorably and expresses concern 
that he might incur blame from an unfavorable portrayal.  The aphorism about the 
revelatory effects of time connects the two concerns shaping his account, piety and truth, 
                                                 
81 Cf. Gildersleeve 1885, 132 ad 30:  “ΧUρις:  The charm of poetry;” Kirkwood 1982, 52:  “Here the 
context indicates that χUρις is specifically the charm of song, as it often is in Pindar;” Instone 1996, 101 ad 
30:  “The charm or grace that makes poetry sweet;” Verdenius 1988, 20 ad 30:  “ΧUρις:  ‘Charm’ is an 
indispensable but ambivalent element in poetry.”  This, like Socrates’ alleged ability to make the weaker 
argument stronger, may not necessarily be a negative quality of charis.  Cf. Gerber 1982, 59: “Even though 
Pindar is critical of the false tales recorded by earlier poets, he is at the same time praising the power of 
poetry to make ‘the unbelievable believable.’”  Kurke’s assertion that charis always designates a willing, 
reciprocal exchange (1993, 67) is complementary to this particular instance of charis:  its charms are part of 
a poem’s gift to its subject and its audience. 
 
82 Pratt 1993, 124 and Gerber 1982, 59-60.  Cf. Ol. 1.105 where Pindar refers to his own poetry as 
embellishment (δαιδαλωσzµεν). 
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and suggests that the two may complement one another.  Furthermore, the conjoining of 
these two concerns has a number of implications, the foremost of which is that a true 
account is ultimately controlled by the gods it portrays, for an account favoring the gods 
is more likely to be true.  The details of an account are thus of slight importance in the 
overall assessment of its truth-value.83  This line has been interpreted as Pindar’s 
unwillingness to privilege truth-telling above piety,84 but his criticism of inaccuracy in 
other poetry makes it unlikely that he would risk such a criticism of his own.  Rather, he 
asserts that his own account is both true and pious, thus implying that truth coincides with 
what is appropriate to say about the gods.  Pindar quite pragmatically suggests that while 
his favorable portrayal of the gods protects him from charges of blame, truth and 
appeasement of the gods need not be mutually exclusive. 
Inherent in Pindar’s criticism of inaccuracy is the implication that he is privy to 
the true account about the gods, yet he does not here cite direct communication with them 
as the basis for this knowledge. 85  Instead, the source of authority for Pindar’s version of 
this myth lies in his implications about true accounts.  By suggesting that the true account 
                                                 
83 Such a definition, of course, may not satisfy a modern sensibility of truth, which, at a minimum should 
be “(1) independent of belief; (2) immutable; and (3) public” (Kleiman and Lewis 1992, 92).  Pindar’s 
account, particularly juxtaposed against his expressed fears of retribution, does not draw authority from any 
source other than his own belief, nor is it publicly acknowledged as truth. 
However, Pindar’s assertions in Olympian 1 could arguably conform to the second criterion.  A 
statement that is true for only a particular context can be considered immutable, if it is stipulated that the 
statement must be understood within its context.  Thus, however much wiggle room Pindar allows himself 
to change his account elsewhere, its iteration here is considered immutably true for the context in which it 
appears. 
 
84 Pratt 1993, 126:  “Here again Pindar does not justify his refusal to speak ill of the gods by appealing to 
the truth or to what the gods deserve.” 
 
85 Cf. Scodel 2001, 123:  “[Pindar] never cites [the Muses] as an authority for his versions of a story, or for 
any other point of truth.  Instead, they render songs beautiful and appropriate.”  The Muses are by no means 
absent from his poetry, but his later reference to the Muses suggests corroboration with, rather than 
subordination to, them:  Sµο µjν Äν | Μοσα καρτερτατον βzλος Fλκ τρzφει (“And so the Muse tends a 
most mighty missile in strength for me,” Ol. 1.111-112).  Cf. Ol. 13.97 where Pindar claims to be an ally of 
the Muse and the Olgeithidai. 
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coincides with the pious one, Pindar creates room for fabrication of a myth whose 
accuracy of particulars does not matter so long as the depiction generally favors the gods.  
His subsequent rejection of slander is superficially motivated by self-interest (Sµο δ’ 
πορα γαστρoµαργον µακUρων τιν’ εiπεν· Fφoσταµαι· | Fκzρδεια λzλογχεν θαµιν 
κακαγXρους, “It is useless for me to say one of the blessed gods is gluttonous—I stand 
aloof.  Lack of gain is often allotted to slanderers,” Ol. 1.52-53), but must be read in light 
of this earlier passage conjoining truth and praise.  Pindar alleviates potential tension 
between truth-telling and piety by suggesting that the two complement one another.86 
He thus constructs a framework of credibility for his favorable depiction of the 
laudandus, for he establishes that a loyal account is also a true one.  According to 
Olympian 1.28-34, telling the truth is not only fitting but also practical since Pindar’s true 
account happens to depict the gods more favorably than false accounts.  Furthermore, his 
observations about Charis, ψεupsilonperispδος, and embellishment reflect an awareness of poetry’s 
persuasiveness and express an assurance that the present poem will not employ charis and 
embellishment to the same effect.  Pindar is consequently able to characterize his own 
ode as an embellishment of Hieron’s qualities without sounding disingenuous:   
Sµj δj στεφανnσαι 
κενον ππol νXµl 
Αiοληoδι µολπ 
χρH· πzποιθα δj ξzνον 
µH τιν’ FµφXτερα καλnν τε £δριν µα κα δupsilonoxiaναµιν κυριτερον 
τnν γε νupsilonperispν κλυτασι δαιδαλωσzµεν upsilondasiaoxiaµνων πτυχας.  (Ol. 1.100-105) 
 
                                                 
86 Pace Pratt 1993, 126-127 who cites this passage as well as Ol. 9.35-41 and Nem. 5.14-17 as further 
evidence that Pindar values tact and appropriateness above truth.  I would argue that Pindar’s assertion in 
Ol. 9.35-41 that to slander the gods is hateful and inappropriate (παρ καιρXν, Ol. 9.38) reinforces my 
interpretation of Ol. 1.28-35 that Pindar construes piety and truth-telling as complementary and uses the 
language of tact (SοικXς, καιρXς) to bridge the potential gap between the two.  As for Nem. 5.14-17 where 
Pindar ostensibly shies from telling the “exact truth” (FλUθει’ Fτρεκzς, Nem. 5.17) about Peleus and 
Telamon’s murder of Phokos, his allusions to this deed are sufficiently clear to recall the story without 
providing full narration; thus, in this passage too the poet makes a show of tactfulness while still 
communicating discomforting truths. 
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I must crown that man with a horse-tune in Aeolic song.  I trust that there 
is no host alive today to embellish with glorious folds of songs, who is 
both acquainted with good things and more authoritative in power.   
 
The language of embellishment recalls his similar characterization of deceptive stories 
(δαιδαλωσzµεν, 105; δεδαιδαλµzνοι, 28) and points up a similarity between his own 
poetry and stories that ultimately prove to be false.  The difference is that the accounts 
Pindar has earlier criticized are perpetuated by those with no loyalty to the subjects they 
depict.  Pindar, by contrast, openly expresses his obligation to his patron Hieron (χρH, 
103; ξzνον, 103) and to the gods (Mστι δ’ Fνδρ φUµεν Sοικsς Fµφ δαιµXνων καλU· µεoων 
γρ αiτoα, 35).  The latter statement of obligation occurs after a claim that other accounts 
to the contrary are untrue (28).  The juxtaposition of these two claims of truth and loyalty 
has implications for Pindar’s similar declaration of loyalty to Hieron, for it suggests that 
loyalty to one’s subjects provides a basis for a true account.  This insinuation about “true” 
accounts may not be altogether believable or satisfactory to us,87 but it is one that allows 
for poetic obligation to coincide with truthful reporting. 
 The passage from Olympian 1 gives us insight into the character of epinician 
poetry and how it relates to FλHθεια, which forms part of the poet’s duty to his patron.  I 
argue that FλHθεια is part of the poet’s duty to his subject matter, and that his statements 
about poetry suggest a relationship between truth and obligation.  My interpretation of 
Olympian 1 has presented a Pindaric notion of truthfulness that balances an external, 
objective truth with internal, subjective concerns by claiming that a truthful account takes 
into consideration one’s obligation to his subject.  These two aspects of epinician truth-
                                                 
87 Indeed, Pratt discusses the problems of Pindar’s claims in Olympian 1 and argues, along with Gerber 
(1982, 59-60) that Pindar’s praise of poetry’s power to persuade, albeit by deception (Ol. 1.28-32) suggests 
that his own poetry could be persuasive, but untrue.  I interpret the passage differently, however, for I do 
not think that Pindar questions the accuracy of his own poetry here, instead creating a context in which 
truth and praise can coexist. 
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telling, reality and obligation, are combined by Pindar as part of his program of praise.  
By combining these two aspects of truth, the poet lends authority to his praise poetry, for 
he declares his devotion to the patron while mitigating his bias, encompassing both 
devotion and objectivity in his poetic program.   
TRUTH PERSONIFIED  
Pindar especially combines reality and obligation in his personifications of 
FλHθεια.  Two passages explicitly connect FλHθεια with obligation, each showcasing 
FλHθεια personified and thus providing insight as to how Pindar envisions and defines it.  
The first I will consider is a fragment, quoted by Stobaeus:88 
bρχ µεγUλας Fρετς,  
Ñνασσ’ bλUθεια, µr πταoσ¨ς SµUν 
σupsilonoxiaνθεσιν τραχε ποτ ψεupsilonoxiaδει.  (Fr. 205) 
 
Beginning of great excellence, Queen Truth, do not cause my good faith to 
stumble against rough falsehood.   
 
By personifying and invoking Truth, Pindar suggests that this passage has been 
composed with the aid of, and thus in obligation to, divine Truth.89  He does not claim 
that the words are spoken by the divinity herself, but he does adopt the stance of a truth-
teller by expressing reverence for a goddess who embodies truth and will therefore aid his 
truthfulness.   
He explains his choice to invoke Alatheia by claiming that she is the beginning of 
great achievement.  The meaning of µεγUλας Fρετς is unclear without context,90 but 
FρετU probably refers to athletic achievement and its subsequent poetic praise or to some 
                                                 
88 Stob. ecl. 3.11.18 (3.432 Wachsmuth-Henze). 
 
89 Cf. MacLachlan 1993, 101:  “As alatheia served the sovereign Olympia in proving/revealing victors (Ol. 
8.1-2), so the poet serves the queen Alatheia in giving an accurate testimony of the victory event.” 
 
90 MacLachlan 1993, 101 glosses simply “great deeds of excellence.” 
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mythical event associated with athletic achievement.91  The term σupsilonoxiaνθεσις presents a 
problem of clarity.  Slater translates σupsilonoxiaνθεσις in this passage as “my good faith”;92 
Farnell translates “pledge”;93 MacLachlan and Gentili interpret σupsilonoxiaνθεσις as a reference to 
the poet’s commission for composing a victory ode.94  These various translations point to 
at least two possible meanings of σupsilonoxiaνθεσις:  it refers either to the poet’s promise to 
produce an ode95 or to the ode itself as a particular object of pledge.  Even with more 
context the referent of σupsilonoxiaνθεσις might not be certain, but it is possible to read it as 
referring to both the original agreement to compose an ode and to the ode itself.  This 
type of ambiguity would not be surprising in Pindar, whose poetry’s many qualities do 
not usually include superficial clarity.96  If σupsilonoxiaνθεσις can have this double meaning,97 then 
Alatheia is both a testament to the poet’s reliability in keeping obligations as well as 
assurance that the words of the poem are true.  Alatheia works on two levels, to ensure 
                                                 
91 Cf. similar language in Olympian 8.6-7 (µεγUλαν Fρετν) and Nemean 1.8-9 (Fρχα δj βzβληνται θεnν | 
κεoνου σupsilonvariaν Fνδρsς δαιµονoαις Fρετας).  The latter passage has drawn much attention from commentators.  
Fennell 1899, 7 translates, “Its [i.e., the chariot of Chromios and Nemea] first courses are laid with gods 
(for stones).”  Bury 1890, 11 prescribes this translation:  “First hymning the gods, and withal the heroic 
excellences of that man (Chromius), I have laid a foundation for my song.”  Kirkwood 1982, 251 opts for 
“The foundations of my song, which lie in the gods, are set down with the aid of….” 
 On areta and poetry, see Norwood 1945, 49:  “[Pindar] uses [FρετU] both of excellence and of the 
success won thereby.”  Cf. Race 1986, 64:  “[S]ong needs deeds to celebrate, and success needs song to 
make the FρετU last.” 
 
92 Slater 1969, 480 s.v. σupsilonoxiaνθεσις. 
 
93 Farnell 1932, 452. 
 
94 MacLachlan 1993, 101; Gentili 1981, 219-220. 
 
95 Cf. the opening of Olympian 10. 
 
96 On ambiguity in Pindar, see Stanford 1939, 129-136. 
 
97 Pindar’s poetry certainly does not preclude the possibility for double meaning, particularly through his 
use of gnomes.  For example, see Nem. 10.54, where the gnome (κα µν θεnν πιστsν γzνος, “And indeed, 
the race of gods is trusty”) refers both to the preceding lines about the Tyndaridai’s consistently favorable 
position toward the victor’s family, while also looking forward to the themes of loyalty that pervade the 
rest of the poem. 
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the composition of the promised poem and to guarantee its veracity.  Pindar’s poem thus 
represents an obligation, and part of that obligation involves telling the truth. 
Moreover, Pindar, in requesting protection from Alatheia against falsehood 
(ψεupsilonoxiaδει), ascribes agency to her and emphasizes the power she wields over his σupsilonoxiaνθεσις.  
By personifying FλHθεια and constructing her as an active agent, Pindar situates truth as 
his master; it is controlled by neither the poet nor the Muses, unlike in Hesiod, Theog. 
26-28.  Attribution of agency to concepts that might otherwise be thought of as passive is 
well attested in Pindar98 and illuminates the striking degree to which Pindar differs from 
others poets previous or contemporary, of whom only Parmenides and Bacchylides also 
personify FλHθεια.  In the Parmenidean example Aletheia is not a personification on the 
same level as Pindar’s Alatheia, for it is a passive rather than active entity:99 
    χρε δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
µjν bληθείης εupsilonpsiliκυκλέος Fτρεµjς τορ 
δj βροτnν δόξας, τας οupsilonpsiliκ Mνι πίστις Fληθής.  (Fr. 1.28-30) 
 
It is proper that you should learn all things, both the unshaken heart of 
well-rounded Truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true 
reliance.   
 
                                                 
98 For example, Pindar makes chronos the active subject of a verb in Nem. 1.46, Pae. 2.27, Ol. 10.8, Ol. 
6.97, Nem. 4.43, and Fr. 159.  For further discussion see Gerber 1962. 
 
99 Parmenides’ conception of FλHθεια is not completely divergent from Pindar’s and indeed shares some 
similarities with Pindar’s ideas of truth.  For example, Parmenides’ distinction between FλHθεια and mortal 
opinion (βροτnν δόξας) resembles Pindar’s opposition between “the true account” and the utterances of 
mortals in Olympian 1.28 ( θαupsilonoxiaµατα πολλU, καo ποupsilonoxia τι κα βροτnν φUτις upsilondasiaπjρ τsν Fλαθ λXγον 
δεδαιδαλµzνοι ψεupsilonoxiaδεσι ποικoλοις Sξαπατnντι µupsilonperispθοι).  Both Parmenides and Pindar express a distrust of 
mortal opinion or utterance and claim a preference for FλHθεια.   
Parmenides’ instructions to his addressee, however, differ slightly from Pindar’s proclaimed 
stance in relation to truth in that Parmenides prescribes knowledge of both FλHθεια and δXξα, although 
criticizing the latter, while Pindar does not assert the necessity of obtaining mortal knowledge.  
Furthermore, the heart of Parmenides’ Aletheia is “unmoved” or “calm” (Fτρεµzς), an epithet that implies 
stationary stability as an immovable reference point that will not change.  Pindar’s “true account” in 
Olympian 1.28 is defined in accordance with favorable depiction of the gods (Ol. 1.35), which does not 
strongly preclude variability.  Pindar diverges from the Parmenidean position by demonstrating knowledge 
of mortal utterances, but denouncing them as untrue for their unfavorable depiction of the gods. 
For further discussion on the term δόξα in the Parmenides fragment, see Papadis 2005. 
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Although Aletheia’s possession of a heart (τορ) qualifies her as a personification, she is 
something to be handled.  She does not instigate learning herself; instead, she, along with 
δXξα, is what should be learned by the addressee of Parmenides’ poem.  Pindar, by 
contrast, calls upon Alatheia to take an active role in his poetry.  This difference could be 
attributed to a difference in purposes prescribed by differing poetic genres, but 
Bacchylides, whose genres parallel Pindar’s, demonstrates a similar disengagement from 
truth as a poetic obligation. 
 Personified FλHθεια is a more active entity in Bacchylides than in Parmenides, but 
still critically differs from Pindar’s Alatheia:  bλUθεια θεnν pµXπολις | µXνα θεος 
συνδιαιτωµzνα (“Truth alone inhabits the same city as the gods,” Fr. 57).  Alatheia’s 
association with the gods is expressed with a metaphor of inhabitation rather than a full-
scale, active personification of the type seen in Pindar, Fragment 205.  The Bacchylidean 
Alatheia here has no direct connection with poetry or poetic obligation.  Of course, the 
absence of context allows us to surmise that this Alatheia could have had such a 
connection in the original context, but even if that were the case, Bacchylides’ Alatheia 
still lacks the syntactical proximity to obligation that Pindar’s has in Fragment 205 and is 
thus, at the very least, much less closely associated with poetry and poetic obligation than 
Pindar’s Alatheia. 
What this means is that Pindar defines truth in a new way as part and parcel of the 
contractual relationship between himself and his laudandus or subject matter.  My 
interpretation of Fragment 205 has been hindered by its fragmentary nature and has 
required frequent supposition or assumption about the original context, but the other 
Pindaric personification of FλHθεια confirms what Fragment 205 suggests and fortunately 
appears in a complete ode:  
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Τsν Ëλυµπιονoκαν FνUγνωτz µοι 
bρχεστρUτου παδα, πXθι φρενXς  
Sµς γzγραπται· γλυκupsilonvaria γρ αupsilonpsiliτ µzλος φεoλων Sπιλzλαθ’· Ä Μοσ’,  
Fλλ σupsilonvaria κα θυγUτηρ 
bλUθεια ∆ιXς, ρθ χερo  
Sρupsilonoxiaκετον ψευδzων   
Sνιπν FλιτXξενον.  (Ol. 10.1-6) 
 
Read me the name of the Olympic victor, the son of Archestratos, where it 
has been written in my mind, for owing him a sweet song, I have 
forgotten.  O Muse, you and the daughter of Zeus, Truth, with a correcting 
hand ward off from me the charge that I harm a guest-friend with broken 
promises. 
 
These lines are usually taken to refer to the poet’s composition of Olympians 1, 2, and 3, 
which has taken priority over this ode and ostensibly caused him to neglect his duties to 
the present victor Hagesidamos.  Immediately after confessing his negligence, the poet 
invokes the Muse and Alatheia for help.  Whether or not they are the addressees of the 
imperative FνUγνωτε,100 they have at least been invoked in connection with the poet’s 
need for a reminder and his manifold request to protect his reputation from reproach 
(SνιπUν) and to prove that he neither harms his friends (FλιτXξενον) nor tells lies 
(ψευδzων).101  
The first opposition between the Muse and Alatheia on the one hand and 
forgetfulness on the other is highlighted by the wordplay between Sπιλzλαθ’ and 
bλUθεια, but here a distinction between the Muse and Alatheia may be drawn, for the 
Muse more than Alatheia is appropriate to the task of remembrance.  Although it is not 
                                                 
100 Verdenius 1988, 55 collects the various scholarly conjectures as to the addressee of FνUγνωτε, 
concluding that “the imperative is used ‘absolutely’ and has rhetorical force.”  Cf. Hubbard 1985, 67, who 
says the imperative is addressed to the audience, and Kromer 1976, 423, who speculates the addressee to be 
“someone else.”  As I have intimated above, identifying the addressee of FνUγνωτε matters less than 
recognizing the conceit of forgetfulness that the imperative helps to construct.  
 
101 The pseudea here are usually taken to refer to promises (i.e., by the poet to produce an ode) that, when 
broken, have the appearance of falsehood.   See Gildersleeve 1885, 214, Kromer 1976, 422, and Pratt 1993, 
119-120. 
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altogether possible to isolate the one from the other,102 it is possible to surmise the role of 
the Muse in light of her role in other odes where she is the daughter of Mnemosyne (Isth. 
6.74-75)103 and “loves to remind” (Nemean 1.12; cf. Pae. 14.35).  If the Muse is, then, 
more responsible for the task of remembrance, the connection between Alatheia and 
memory is at best a weak one, especially in light of the number of other charges the two 
goddesses have been asked to forestall.104  Furthermore, the poet’s own purported 
forgetfulness is not entirely believable since the request to read something that has been 
written on his heart suggests that he has not really been forgetful so much as inattentive.  
If there is such a connection between Alatheia and memory here, it is the poet’s own 
memory,105 rather than public consciousness, so the current discussion about truth and 
memory would have to be enlarged beyond the poet’s role in shaping public memory.106 
                                                 
102 Although some scholars have tried, e.g., Gildersleeve 1885, 214:  “Memory is to find the place and 
Truth is to discharge the debt;” Nassen 1975, 223:  “While he invokes the Muse for inspiration, he will rely 
on Truth, who is the daughter of mighty Zeus, for endorsement of the claims which he is about to make 
regarding the victor and his city;” Verdenius 1988, 56:  “The help of the Muse sufficiently guarantees the 
poet’s truthfulness…, but in the present case, where sincerity of his promise to the victor might be doubted, 
the assistance of Aletheia provides extra security.” 
 
103 Cf. Gildersleeve 1885, 214 ad Μοσα:  “The eldest of the old three was ΜνHµη.” 
 
104 Cf. Pratt 1993, 119:  “Here Pindar clearly plays on a notion of aletheia as a kind of unforgetting.  But 
this passage does not make truth synonymous with memory, for Pindar also opposes lies (pseudea) to truth 
here.” 
 
105 Kromer argues that Alatheia refers to the subjective, experiential truth of the poet and is thus to be 
contrasted with Atrekeia in this poem:  “Alatheia…is to be contrasted with Atrekeia and therefore with the 
commercial aspect of the poet’s song.  Its function is suggested by its proximity to Sπιλzλαθ’ whose 
meaning indicates that the poet’s memory, his perception of past events, is faulty.  Alatheia is allied with 
the poet’s persona, with the self and with personal experience, and comes to represent the possibility of 
evaluating the song in non-economic terms” (Kromer 1976, 425). 
 
106 Detienne, who argues the most unwaveringly for an equivalence between truth and memory, focuses 
largely on the role of the poet in preserving public memory, although he does seem to specify two kinds of 
memory, individual and collective, in praise poetry:  “The ‘memory’ of a man is precisely ‘the eternal 
monument of the Muses,’ that is, the same religious reality as the speech of the poet, grafted on memory 
and actualized in praise.  At the level of sung speech, memory thus has two meanings.  First it is a gift of 
second sight allowing the poet to produce efficacious speech, to formulate sung speech.  Second, memory 
is sung speech itself, speech that will never cease to be and that is identified with the being of the man 
whom the speech celebrates” (Detienne 1995, 48-49). 
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 The more significant request is for the Muse and Alatheia to vindicate the poet 
against charges of guest-friendship violation.107  This concern about guest-friendship is a 
matter of convention, but also helps to define what Alatheia could mean and what her 
role is.108  Furthermore, her placement in an interpersonal relationship reflects an 
innovative idea that has only one near precedent, in Mimnermus (Fληθείη δj παρέστω | 
σο κα Sµοί, πάντων χρµα δικαιότατον, “Let the truth be present between you and me, 
the most just possession of all,” Fr. 8.1).  The poet’s incorporation of the Muse and 
Alatheia into a guest-friendship is unprecedented.  If we examine Alatheia in relation to 
xenia, the designation “daughter of Zeus” (θυγUτηρ bλUθεια ∆ιXς, 3-4) becomes clearer, 
for Zeus is the patron god of the guest-host relationship.  This formulation of xenia 
couples poetic obligation with poetic truth in a way that was hinted at in Fragment 205, 
but receives fuller explication here. 
 The language Pindar uses makes clear his obligation to the victor (φεoλων, 3; 
FλιτXξενον, 6; χρzος, 8; τXκος, 9), but he situates this obligation in a context of friendship 
by fusing it with a spirit of willingness.  He cites concern for friendly charis (φoλαν…Sς 
χUριν, 12) as one factor motivating his composition of the ode, thus bringing together 
obligation and friendship (φoλαν) with charis, a term that Leslie Kurke asserts “designates 
a willing and precious reciprocal exchange.”109  This emphasis on willingness amongst 
                                                 
107 Cf. Hubbard 1985, 67 n. 165, where he argues against the notion that the imperative FνUγνωτε is 
directed at the Muse and Alatheia and adduces as evidence the shift in addressee signaled by FλλU in line 3.  
If the conjunction FλλU does introduce a new topic, it is possible that the address to the Muse and Alatheia 
has little or no connection with the admission of forgetfulness that opens the ode (1-3). 
 
108 Kromer 1976, 422 expresses the role of Alatheia succinctly:  “At the end of the strophe the poet calls 
upon the Muse and Alatheia, who, by helping him to compose the song, will bring about the realization of 
the action prescribed by the contract.  If the poet keeps his promise he will be freed from ‘the reproach of 
lying’, for his pledge will be seen in retrospect to have predicted a real event.  It will become ‘true.’” 
 
109 Kurke 1993, 67.  For a discussion of epinician charis, see MacLachlan 1993, 87-123, where she 
discusses charis in epinician poetry as the gratification of the victor. 
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parties in a relationship of obligation recurs later in the ode where Pindar reminds his 
victor Hagesidamos to give thanks to his trainer (χUριν, 17), just as Patroklos did to 
Achilles.110  By merging obligation with friendship and asking Alatheia to guide these 
relationships, Pindar constructs a truth-goddess who informs his relationship to his patron 
along with his rhetoric.111   
This model of contractual relationships is mirrored in the mythical exemplum of 
Herakles and Augeas.  Pindar presents their story as a point of origin for the Olympic 
games, which are founded (in this version) after Herakles prevails over Augeas.  This 
story serves as a mythical exemplum of the guest-host relationship.  While the opening 
invocation depicts a guest-host relationship based on promised payment and follow-
through of that promise, line 12 suggests that a spirit of willingness should also 
accompany the obligation.  Herakles and Augeas represent positive and negative models 
of the xeinos, as determined by how well they exhibit the willingness and reliability that 
characterize xenia.  Pindar depicts Augeas as someone who undermines the guest-host 
relationship by refusing Herakles his promised fee for cleaning the stables.  Olympian 10 
does not include a full account of this myth, but alludes to Augeas’ failure to pay 
(λUτριον…µισθXν, 29) and consequently dubs Augeas a guest-cheater (ξεναπUτας, 34) 
with a term that recalls the earlier charge against the poet (FλιτXξενον, 6); the poet thus 
                                                 
110 Cf. Nicholson 1998, 28, who similarly notes the personal tone of Pindar’s truth-telling rhetoric, focusing 
on the pederastic imagery of the odes:  “…any suggestion…that this truth is the production of a 
disinterested eyewitness is belied by the strongly pederastic flavor of Pindar’s epinician poetry…[In Ol. 
10.99-105] Pindar’s testimony is, as Pratt observes, valideated by his status as an eyewitness (eidon, “I 
saw”), but this is not the testimony of a dispassionate observer.  Far from being the truth of a modern court, 
Pindar’s truth is implicated in his adoption of a pederastic persona.” 
 
111 Cf. Adkins 1972, 17 on truth-telling in Homer:  “Truth-telling—the telling of desired, useful truths, at 
all events—is to be expected only from φoλοι, those who are for one reason or another within the same co-
operative group; and even there it is only to be told when FρετH and status-considerations do not forbid it. 
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uses Augeas as a negative example for his own character.  Like the poet-patron 
relationship, this relationship of payment for service is labeled guest-friendship.   
Fulfillment of this obligation, however, is insufficient evidence of good guest-
friendship, for Pindar also faults Augeas for his unwillingness to pay, which is in stark 
contrast to Herakles’ willingness to perform the task:  ¶ς Αupsilonpsiliγzαν λUτριον | Fzκονθ’ ¾κν 
µισθsν upsilondasiaπzρβιον | πρUσσοιτο (“so that he [Herakles], as a willing man, might exact his 
payment for service from powerful Augeas, an unwilling man,” 28-30).  The adjective 
upsilondasiaπzρβιον, here describing Augeas, echoes the description of Herakles at line 15, an echo 
that emphasizes the symmetrical nature of the guest-host relationship and further indicts 
Augeas for his maltreatment of an equal.112  Furthermore, the wordplay in Fzκονθ’ ¾κν 
underscores the expected parity and the actual disparity between Herakles’ and Augeas’ 
dispositions and echoes similar verbal emphases on reciprocal exchange in Pindar (e.g., 
φιλzων φιλzοντ’, γων γοντα προφρXνως, Pyth. 10.66; ο£κοθεν ο£καδε, Ol. 7.4).  
Pindar’s slight variation of such phrases serves simultaneously to elucidate the symmetry 
and reciprocity expected of a guest and host and the failure of Augeas to fulfill this 
expectation. 
With the myth of Herakles and Augeas, Pindar reinforces his portrayal of poet-
patron relations in lines 1-12, which similarly couple obligation with friendship and 
willingness.  Through the figure of Augeas Pindar illustrates what it means to be a bad 
guest-friend—failure and unwillingness to keep promises to a friend of equal stature—
and expresses hope not to seem such a figure himself.  By portraying his attitude toward 
                                                 
112 Note also that upsilondasiaπzρβιος appears in the odes only in Olympian 10. 
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the victor as one of willing obligation and reinforcing this stance with an illustrative 
example from myth, Pindar claims that he is not only reliable, he is also sincere. 
Having outlined the terms of poetic obligation, the poet opens another question:  
obligation to whom?  While the system of debt and repayment he has set forth ostensibly 
centers on the patron, his invocation to the goddess at least implies an obligation partly to 
her, thus opening the possibility of obligations other than to the laudandus.113  Later in 
the ode the poet speaks of his decision to sing of this contest and claims this decision is 
impelled by the ordinances of Zeus:  Fγnνα δ’ Sξαoρετον Fεσαι θzµιτες Äρσαν ∆ιXς 
(“The ordinances of Zeus prompt me to sing the choice contest,” 24).114  He refers to his 
obligation to the patron as a divine rule (θzµιτες) that is governed by Zeus himself, 
therefore suggesting that his relationship with his patron is part of a structure of 
obligation that involves more than only himself and the laudandus, for failure to uphold 
this obligation is tantamount to a defiance of Zeus.  Moreover, this structure of obligation 
relates to the opening of the ode where Pindar calls on the Muse and Alatheia, calling the 
latter the daughter of Zeus.  Pindar recalls Alatheia’s association with Zeus with this 
explicit reference to obligations mandated by Zeus.   
                                                 
113 Cf. MacLachlan 1993, 101, who senses a similar servile tone toward Alatheia in Fragment 205:  “As 
alatheia served the sovereign Olympia in proving/revealing victors (Ol. 8.1-2), so the poet serves the queen 
Alatheia in giving an accurate testimony of the victory event.” 
 
114 Olympian 8.21-30 lays out the specific relationships between Zeus, xenia, and themis:  Mνθα 
στειρα | ∆ιsς ξενoου | πUρεδρος Fσκεται Θzµις | Sξοχ’ Fνθρπων.  » τι γρ πολupsilonvaria κα πολλ 
zπ¨, | ρθ διακρναι φρεν µr παρ καιρXν | δυσπαλzς· τεθµsς δz τις FθανUτων κα τUνδ’ 
Éλιερκzα χραν | παντοδαποσιν upsilondasiaπzστασε ξzνοις | κoονα δαιµονoαν – | p δ’ Sπαντzλλων χρXνος | 
τοupsilonperispτο πρUσσων µr κUµοι – | ∆ωριε λα ταµιευοµzναν Sξ Αiακοupsilonperisp (“[Aigina,] where Savior 
Themis, the partner of Zeus Xenios is honored more than among other men.  For when much 
swings in the balance in many directions, it is difficult to judge appropriately with a straight mind.  
Some ordinance of the gods set even this sea-girt land beneath strangers of all kinds as a divine 
pillar—and may time as it rises up not weary of doing this— a land kept in trust for the Dorian 
people from the time of Aiakos”).  Themis personified is the associate of Zeus Xenios.  These 
lines highlight the duality of xenia as a system instituted by gods for men, whose careful 
observation of xenia-relationships constitutes service to the gods Themis and Zeus. 
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The significance of xenia as a sacred system of hospitality, whose participants are 
obligated not only to one another but also to the gods who govern this system, cannot be 
underestimated.  Disregard of xenia, exemplified by Augeas in Olympian 10, flouts not 
only the luckless strangers who may encounter a corrupt host, but also the very gods who 
implemented the system of xenia in the first place.  The extreme ramifications for one 
who violates xenia are clear:  Augeas suffers the destruction of his homeland and death at 
the hands of Herakles, the guest whom he has cheated (Ol. 10.34-42) and who later 
establishes a precinct for Zeus in Augeas’ former kingdom (43-45).  The establishment of 
this sacred precinct is the ultimate response to Augeas’ guest-cheating and signals the 
triumph not only of his cheated guest Herakles, but also of Zeus, the god of xenia whom 
Augeas’ maltreatment of Herakles also offends. 
REALITY AND POETRY:  NEMEAN 7 
 I argue that this sense of overarching duty is one way the poet validates his truth-
telling claims, for he may avoid ostensible bias if he can establish that his obligation to 
the victor stems from a greater one to represent the truth.  In this section I examine 
Nemean 7 as an ode expressing dual obligations to represent deeds accurately and to 
praise the victor, which together form a truthful account.  The poet makes numerous 
claims to truth (68-69, 77-79), all the while openly expressing his own role as helper to 
the laudandus (33-34, 61, 75-76).  He is able to reconcile his obligation to the victor with 
his truth-telling rhetoric by making the case that an obligation to tell the truth should 
inform all poetry and by basing this argument on an examination of perception and reality 
which opens the ode. 
The truth-telling function of the epinician poet has been most succinctly 
summarized by Louise Pratt: 
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Pindar and Bacchylides, more explicitly than any of their poetic 
predecessors, make claims to truth in their poetry.  These claims are 
limited, however, to asserting the validity of the praises they sing.  They 
serve an encomiastic function and should not be taken as statements about 
the way all poetic narrative operates.  Aletheia becomes important when 
the poet’s responsibility for accurate representation becomes essential to 
the poet’s function as a poet of praise.  But neither these assertions of truth 
nor the frequent rejections of lies that complement them should be taken to 
imply that fictional elements should not enter into mythical narrative.  
Both poets are interested in aletheia only insofar as it means the accurate 
apportionment of praise, and they reject pseudea only when these entail 
the improper attribution of blame, that is, when slander and envy are 
involved.  (Pratt 1993, 115) 
 
Pratt correctly emphasizes the significance of truth to encomium, but elides the critical 
attitude Pindar takes to poets who do not tell the truth.  As I will endeavor to 
demonstrate, Pindar’s criticism of other poets seems to be partly based on an explicit 
contrast between epinician and other types of poetry.  More specifically, I will argue that 
Pindar criticizes Homer for composing poetry that irresponsibly privileges audience 
reaction over accurate praise.  I will also try to deepen and extend Pratt’s observations to 
include the sphere of obligation and how the aspect of obligation shapes Pindar’s truth-
telling.   
 Nemean 7 begins with an invocation to Eleithyia, detailing the integral role she 
plays in enabling human existence and articulating this existence with metaphors of light 
and darkness (νευ σzθεν | οupsilonpsili φUος, οupsilonpsili µzλαιναν δρακzντες εupsilonpsiliφρXναν | τεν Fδελφεν 
SλUχοµεν FγλαXγυιον Øβαν, “Without you, we do not look upon light nor black night, 
nor do we gain the lot of your beautiful-limbed sister Hebe,” 2-4).  This invocation works 
on two levels:  Eleithyia provides a suitable metaphor for an ode’s beginning, and a 
means for introducing the laudandus Sogenes, whose birth is mentioned in lines 7-8.115 
                                                 
115 See Young 1970 for the function of Eleithyia in Nemean 7.  Young argues that the opening of this ode is 
a typically Pindaric type whereby the poet introduces a universal human experience before moving to the 
specific case of the laudandus. 
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 The opening lines focus on all aspects of existence, light and dark, which are 
enabled by Eleithyia.  The poet then shifts the focus to light, which in this extended 
metaphor comes to represent existence that is made known through poetry:   
εi δj τupsilonoxiaχ¨ τις Mρδων, µελoφρον’ αiτoαν 
οασι Μοισν Sνzβαλε· τα µεγUλαι γρ Fλκαo 
σκXτον πολupsilonvariaν upsilondasiaoxiaµνων Mχοντι δεXµεναι· 
Mργοις δj καλος Mσοπτρον £σαµεν ¾ν σupsilonvariaν τρXπl, 
εi Μναµοσupsilonoxiaνας ¿κατι λιπαρUµπυκος  
εupsilondasiaoxiaρηται {τις} ποινα µXχθων κλυτας Sπzων Fοιδας.  (12-16) 
 
If someone happens to do well, he throws a honey-minded cause into the 
streams of the Muses, for great deeds of courage have much darkness 
when they lack songs.  We know of a mirror for good deeds in one way, if 
someone finds recompense for toils in the famous songs of poetry because 
of Mnemosyne with her bright headband.   
 
Pindar delineates familiar relationships between poetry, accomplishment, and memory 
when he describes athletic accomplishment’s reliance on poetry for its glorification.116  
By using imagery of darkness, he effectively equates poetry’s failure to memorialize a 
great deed with the obliteration of that deed.  He invokes the obligatory aspect of this 
memorialization when he refers to poetry as a recompense (ποινα, 16) afforded to 
athletes whose accomplishments are owed glorification.117  The opening lines 
acknowledge the objective reality of existence, which poetry then has the pivotal role of 
memorializing (or not) through accurate representation.  Later, Pindar describes blame as 
dark (σκοτεινXν, 61), thus implying that blame is tantamount to obfuscation.  In light of 
his earlier comments on the obligatory aspect of poetry (ποινα, 16), this reference to 
dark blame suggests that obfuscation ought have no role in poetry.  The invocation to 
Eleithyia and the image of a mirror amount to a dual conception of poetry, first as an act 
                                                 
116 Many scholars discuss the relationship between poetry and memory.  E.g., Bundy 1986, Kurke 1991, 
Detienne 1996, 48-49, and Pratt 1993, 115-129. 
 
117 Cf. Bundy 1986, 57:  “…FρετU creates a debt….”  For a discussion of ποινα, see Kurke 1991, 108-134 
and Finley 1981, 241. 
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of creation by the poet, but secondly, as an obligatory act of reflection on a deed already 
committed.118 
Pindar criticizes Homer’s failure to fulfill this dual function of poetry (creative 
and reflective) by pointing out his role in misrepresenting Odysseus and suggests that 
such misrepresentation, poetic or not, caused the injustice suffered by Ajax: 
Sγ δj πλzον’ Mλποµαι 
λXγον Ëδυσσzος Ì πUθαν δι τsν Éδυεπ γενzσθ’ Íµηρον· 
Sπε ψεupsilonoxiaδεσo ο ποταν <τε> µαχαν 
σεµνsν Mπεστo τι· σοφoα δj κλzπτει παρUγοισα µupsilonoxiaθοις.  τυφλsν δ’ Mχει 
τορ »µιλος Fνδρnν p πλεστος.  εi γρ ν 
Û τν FλUθειαν iδzµεν, οupsilonpsilioxia κεν »πλων χολωθεoς  
p καρτερsς Α£ας Mπαξε δι φρενnν  
λευρsν ξoφος.  (Nem. 7.20-27) 
 
I expect that Odysseus’ story has become greater than his experience on 
account of sweet-talking Homer, since something majestic lies upon his 
lies and his soaring resourcefulness.  Skill deceives, misleading with 
stories.  The majority of men have a blind heart, for if they had been able 
to see the truth, mighty Ajax, angered over the arms, would not have fixed 
a smooth sword through his heart.   
 
Although Pindar acknowledges and praises Homer’s skill as a poet (Éδυεπ, 21; ποταν 
τε µαχαν, 22; σεµνXν, 23),119 he faults Homer for his inaccurate representation of 
Odysseus as disproportionate to Odysseus’ actual experiences (πλzον’…λXγον Ëδυσσzος 
                                                 
118 The implication here that poetry, as something at once new and a representation of something old, must 
balance its newness with its accuracy, becomes explicit in Nemean 8:  πολλ γρ πολλ λzλεκται, νεαρ δ’ 
SξευρXντα δXµεν βασUνl | Sς Mλεγχον, πας κoνδυνος· ψον δj λXγοι φθονεροσιν, | πτεται δ’ Sσλnν Fεo, 
χειρXνεσσι δ’ οupsilonpsiliκ Sρoζει (“For many things have been said in many ways, and discovering new things to 
put to the touchstone for testing is wholly dangerous, since words are relish to the envious, and envy 
always grabs hold of good men, but does not contend with lesser men,” Nem. 8.20-22).  As he suggests in 
Nemean 7, the poet here expresses concern that newness can run the risk of compromising accuracy, this 
time using the image of the touchstone rather than the mirror.  The metaphor of the touchstone implies that 
his praise is verifiable.  The passage from Nemean 8 presents accurate reporting in terms of risk, rather than 
obligation, and underscores the laudability of the victor by suggesting that his susceptibility to attack by 
envious people marks his membership among the good (Sσλnν, 22).  Pindar thus constructs a situation in 
which praise and truthful rhetoric are synonymous, for if envy comes only to men who are esloi, the attacks 
of envy, while loathsome, are actually proof of a man’s laudability.  For a discussion of the touchstone 
metaphor in Greek literature, see duBois 1991, 9-34. 
 
119 Cf. Pratt 1993, 127 who entertains the possibility that “Pindar here slyly praises Homer’s ability to 
confer more fame on Odysseus than he deserved as a positive attribute of poetry, a quality that a patron 
might well appreciate.” 
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Ì πUθαν, 21).  The opposition between speech and sight (λXγον, Éδυεπ, 21; τυφλXν, 23; 
iδzµεν, 25) points up the discrepancies between Homer’s account and the truth.  
Similarly, the comparison between an experience and its account recalls the prescribed 
symmetry between deeds and their reportage evoked by the image of the mirror (14).  
Pindar criticizes Homer for a lack of such symmetry, which he himself has just presented 
as poetry’s obligation.  He has indicated that poetry must combine its two functions of 
creation and representation in a way that Homer’s poetry does not. 
Pindar seems at first to distinguish between Odysseus’ account (λXγον Ëδυσσzος, 
21), which has been composed by Homer, and the truth (τν FλUθειαν, 25), thus pointing 
out an instance in which poetry has shaped memory falsely.  He continues the language 
of vision by lamenting the inability of most men to see (iδzµεν, 25) the truth.  His 
reflection on deceptive skill (σοφoα δj κλzπτει παρUγοισα µupsilonoxiaθοις, 23) seems initially to 
refer to poetry and to draw attention to the reception of poetic accounts (τυφλsν δ’ Mχει | 
τορ »µιλος Fνδρnν p πλεστος, 23-24), but the γUρ clause in line 24 indicates an 
audience internal to the works of Homer rather than Homer’s own audience.  At this point 
Pindar has merged audiences, for he has described poetry in terms that liken it to a visual 
remembrance of noble deeds, and he has impugned Homer’s poetry for being deceptive; 
the observation on the blind hearts of men acts as a pivot between Homer’s audience and 
Ajax’s.120  Pindar thus widens the sphere of relevance for his assertions about 
truthfulness, pointing out the consequences of falsehood within the myth as well as 
outside of it. 
                                                 
120 Cf. Pratt 1993, 128 who also makes this observation.  Pratt notes the ambiguity of the pronoun ο in line 
22, taking it, as I do, as a reference to Homer rather than Odysseus.  Cf. also Segal 1967, 442 and Most 
1985, 150-151   for discussion of the close association between Homer and Odysseus in these lines. 
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The consequence of this blindness is Ajax’s suicide.  Nemean 8.24-34 provides a 
more elaborate account, citing the preference of the Danaans for Odysseus rather than 
Ajax and similarly faulting deception as the cause of Ajax’s downfall: 
 τιν’ γλωσσον µzν, τορ δ’ λκιµον, λUθα κατzχει 
Sν λυγρ νεoκει· µzγιστον δ’ αiXλl ψεupsilonoxiaδει γzρας Fντzταται. 
κρυφoαισι γρ Sν ψUφοις Ëδυσσ ∆αναο θερUπευσαν· 
χρυσzων δ’ Α£ας στερηθες »πλων φXνl πUλαισεν. 
 µν FνXµοιU γε δÜοισιν Sν θερµ χροo  
¿λκεα ξαν πελεµιζXµενοι 
upsilondasiaπ’ FλεξιµβρXτl λXγχ­, τ µzν Fµφ’ bχιλε νεοκτXνl, 
λλων τε µXχθων Sν πολυφθXροις  
Éµzραις.  Sχθρ δ’ ρα πUρφασις ν κα πUλαι,  
αµupsilonoxiaλων µupsilonoxiaθων pµXφοιτος, δολοφραδHς, κακοποιsν νειδος· 
¥ τs µjν λαµπρsν βιται, τnν δ’ FφUντων κupsilonperispδος Fντεoνει σαθρXν.  (Nem. 
8.24-34) 
 
Yes, oblivion takes hold of someone tongueless but valiant of heart in 
deadly strife, and the greatest honor is held up to shifty falsehood.  For the 
Danaans devoted themselves to Odysseus in secret ballots, but Ajax, 
robbed of the golden weapons, wrestled with death.  Truly they did not 
equally strike wounds in the warm bodies of the enemy, as they drove 
them back with man-assisting spears, both over newly-slain Achilles and 
in the much-destroying days of other toils.  Indeed, there was hateful 
deception even long ago, the fellow traveler of flattering stories, with 
treacherous thoughts, a maleficent disgrace, which violates the luminous 
and upholds the unwholesome renown of those who should not be seen.   
 
These lines provide an explanation of the Odysseus-Ajax proximity in Nemean 7.20-27:  
while Odysseus represents inferiority with compensatory mendacity, Ajax embodies 
valor lacking adequate verbal glorification.  The generally accepted interpretation is that 
these lines describe Odysseus’ willful deception and manipulation of the Greeks, who 
subsequently express preference for him over the militarily superior Ajax.121  In neither 
                                                 
121 E.g., Carey 1976, 31, who points out that this is a Pindaric innovation; Miller 1982, 118; Nisetich 1989, 
22.  For a list of the different accounts about the awarding of Achilles’ arms to Odysseus, see Most 1985, 
153.   
Most 1985, 150 has an interesting interpretation of the Odysseus passage from Nemean 7.20-23.  
He diverges from the traditional view that these lines about Odysseus refer to the judgment on Achilles’ 
arms, arguing instead that “Pindar may be suggesting that Homer, instead of inquiring whether Odysseus’ 
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this passage nor the one from Nemean 7, however, does Pindar explicitly fault Odysseus’ 
mendacity for Ajax’s suicide.122  Instead, he describes falsehood and deception in terms 
focusing on faulty perception, perhaps caused by envy, to which he alludes in earlier lines 
(8.20-22).  Despite clear evidence to the contrary, the Greeks misjudge the relative merits 
of Ajax and Odysseus and inappropriately award Achilles’ arms to the latter.  Pindar 
again employs light and dark imagery, here to emphasize the blatant difference between 
Ajax, “the luminous” (τs µjν λαµπρsν, 34), and inferior men like Odysseus who are “the 
invisible” (τnν δ’ FφUντων, 34).  While the terms ψεupsilonperispδος and πUρφασις must refer to 
Odysseus’ misleading rhetoric, the lack of a clear agent of πUρφασις in lines 32-34 shifts 
focus from Odysseus123 to the result of his deception, i.e., inappropriate bestowal of 
praise and blame.124  Pindar thereby points out the destructiveness of an audience 
receptive to deception and the poet’s responsibility to be aware of his audience’s 
tendencies. 
Nemean 7 similarly points to the importance of aligning perception with reality.  
Pindar contrasts perception with truth by citing the example of how Ajax was perceived 
by the majority as opposed to what he actually did, terming the latter situation “the truth” 
(τν FλUθειαν, Nem. 7.25).  The prior lines highlight the difference between existence 
                                                                                                                                                 
narrative was truthful or not, simply repeated Odysseus’ report in his own words.”  Although I do not go as 
far as Most does, I do see merit in his idea that Pindar merges Homer’s and Odysseus’ characteristics here. 
 
122 Cf. Most 1985, 152:  “Pindar is careful here [in Nem. 7] and elsewhere to avoid making the explicity 
claim that Achilles’ arms were awarded to Odysseus only because Odysseus deceived and cheated the 
Greeks.” 
 
123 Cf. Most 1985, 152 n. 78:  “Only in two other places [other than Nem. 7.23-27] does Pindar allude to the 
»πλων κρoσις.  In I. 4.35-36, the blame is explicitly given to the entire Greek army rather than to one 
individual.  In N. 8, Ajax’s defeat is attributed to the envious, who grasp the noble but have no quarrel with 
the ignoble (21-22):  as the subsequent comparison between Odysseus and Ajax makes clear (28-32), these 
enviers cannot be Odysseus (for Pindar nowhere refers to someone who was χεoρων than Odysseus) but 
instead only the Greek army, who grasped the noble Ajax but had no quarrel with the lesser Odysseus.” 
 
124 By contrast, similar terms are used of Hippolyta in Nem. 5.29-32, but she is explicitly the agent of 
deception in those lines.  See my discussion in the following chapter. 
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and knowledge with the figure of Eleithyia, who effects both light and drkness, and the 
mirror of poetry, which alone can publicize a deed; the significance of this difference is 
demonstrated by Ajax’s suicide, the morbid consequence of perception incongruent with 
reality.  Moreover, the ambiguity of Pindar’s observation of men’s blindness—does he 
refer to Homer’s audience or to Odysseus and Ajax’s?—places some responsibility for 
proper perception of truth on poets. 
These lines are quite significant for what they suggest about how Pindar 
conceives of his poetic duty.  With Eleithyia, Pindar highlights the whole of existence, 
then he narrows the focus to those aspects of existence involving knowledge and 
perception and what the poet’s role should be in relation to these two concepts.  He 
suggests that part of poetic obligation stems from the function of poetry as the sole means 
for knowledge of great deeds (Mργοις δj καλος Mσοπτρον £σαµεν ¾ν σupsilonvariaν τρXπl, 14).  
This conception of poetry as the only such source of knowledge contains a dual 
obligation, one to glorify the agent of great deeds (ποινα, 16), the other to propagate the 
knowledge of these deeds. 
Although Pindar here criticizes Homer as the counter example for his own poetry, 
impugning his misleading falsehoods, in Isthmian 4.37-39 he lauds Homer for duly 
glorifying Ajax.125  This contradiction begs consideration of what constitutes truth and 
falsehood for Pindar and what his poetic relationship to these two concepts is.  The image 
of the mirror suggests that poetry and reality should have a symmetrical relationship to 
one another, and Pindar further suggests that Homer’s poetry has somehow failed to 
preserve this symmetry.  In contrast to Homer’s exaggeration of Odysseus’ deeds, Pindar 
                                                 
125 In Isthmian 4.37-39, Pindar lauds Homer for duly glorifying Ajax.  See Fitch 1924 for an explanation of 
the body of texts encapsulated by Pindar’s use of the name “Homer.”  See also Nisetich 1989. 
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sets out to accomplish what Homer has not.  His praise of Homer in Isthmian 4 suggests 
that Homer duly glorifies Ajax (it is Odysseus’ audience, not Homer’s, that fails to see 
the truth about Ajax), but over-glorifies Odysseus.126 
What Pindar’s criticism of Homer implies about poetry becomes explicit when he 
specifically defines his poetry as part of a guest-host friendship: 
ξενXς εiµι· σκοτεινsν Fπzχων ψXγον, 
upsilondasiaoxiaδατος τε ος φoλον Sς νδρ’ γων 
κλzος SτHτυµον αiνzσω· ποτoφορος δ’ Fγαθοσι µισθsς οupsilondasiaperispτος. 
Sν δ’ Sγγupsilonvariaς bχαιsς οupsilonpsili µzµψεταo µ’ FνHρ 
Ýονoας upsilondasiaπjρ Éλsς οiκzων, κα προξενo­ πzποιθ’, Mν τε δαµXταις  
µµατι δzρκοµαι λαµπρXν, οupsilonpsiliχ upsilondasiaπερβαλν, 
βoαια πUντ’ Sκ ποδsς Sρupsilonoxiaσαις.  (Nem. 7.61-67) 
 
I am a guest-friend.  Holding off dark blame, I will praise, leading genuine 
fame like streams of water to a man who is my friend, for this is suitable 
payment for good men.  An Achaian man being nearby, dwelling over the 
Ionian Sea, will not blame me, and I trust in hospitality, and among 
townsmen my gaze is bright since I do not overstep the mark and I have 
removed all things forced from my path.   
 
As in Olympian 10.3-12, Pindar borrows imagery from the various spheres of guest-host 
obligation, friendship, and monetary exchange (µισθXς, 63) to characterize his 
relationship to his patron.  The poet praises his patron (here, the victor’s father Thearion) 
as his friend (φoλον, 62) and also someone to whom he is beholden in accordance with a 
systematic relationship between guests and hosts (ξενος, 61; προξενo­, 65127), which, in 
terms of praise poetry, involves protection from blame (Fπzχων ψXγον, 61).  Yet these 
obligations to his patron do not preclude the accuracy of his praise,128 for the poet 
                                                 
126 Nisetich 1989, 9-23 argues that Pindar’s varying attitudes towards Homer stem from the varying 
contexts and occasions in which the various odes were composed.  Perhaps so, but I would also add that 
Pindar finds certain aspects of Homer more laudable than others. 
 
127 Cf. Pyth. 10.64 (πzποιθα ξενo­) and Ol. 1.103 (πzποιθα δj ξzνον). 
 
128 Cf. Kurke 1991, 136 (citing Slater 1979, 80) who argues that “The bond of xenia authenticates the 
poet’s encomium, but it also participates in a precise social context.” 
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qualifies the fame that he brings to his host as “genuine” (SτHτυµον), which creates the 
impression of sincerity and authenticity, rather than blind praise,129 and this genuine fame 
constitutes payment in the guest-host relationship between poet and laudandus.130   
 An explicit difference between Pindar and Homer, then, is that Pindar’s poetry 
reflects an obligation to his subject comparable to the stance of piety he takes toward the 
gods in Olympian 1.28-35.  Furthermore, he has suggested in Nemean 7.14 that his 
poetry must accurately reflect noble deeds.  Taken together, these statements suggest that 
a truthful account stems from a relationship of obligation between poet and patron, absent 
in Homer’s poetry, and adheres to praise that accurately reflects the kleos of the 
laudandus.  Leslie Kurke has argued that Pindar’s description of guest-friendship between 
poet and patron involves reciprocity tantamount to equality;131 in the context of Nemean 
7 I would argue that this equality between poet and patron is meant to reflect the parity 
between poetry and its subject matter, for each relationship is governed by obligation.  At 
least two levels of obligation are outlined in Nemean 7:  there is an obligation to reflect 
deeds accurately since poetry is their only “mirror,” and there is the obligation that the 
poet has to his patron-host.  Pindar even addresses the possibility of excessive praise in 
his assurance that he does not “overstep the mark” (upsilondasiaπερβαλν, 66), thus recalling the 
contrasting example of Homer, who presents a λXγος that exceeds Odysseus’ πUθα. 
                                                 
129 Cf. Carey 1981, 159 ad κλzος SτHτυµον:  “SτHτυµον emphasizes the truth of Pindar’s words (in contrast 
to Homer and »µιλος Fνδρnν p πλεστος).   
 
130 Kurke 1991, 93 can be helpful here.  Kurke, following Bourdieu, has argued that this metaphor of 
payment does not suggest an impersonal monetary exchange; rather, the values of the archaic guest-host 
relationship continue in Pindar’s time, even though the language has broadened to reflect the increased use 
of real, rather than symbolic, currency. 
 
131 See Kurke 1991, 140-141, where she discusses Ol. 1.103-105 and Pyth. 10.63-65.  Both passages 
mention guest-friendship in a way similar to Nem. 7.65 (προξενo­ πzποιθ’). 
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 There is also a subtle implication that these relationships of reciprocity between 
guest and host and of symmetry between experience and account should be preserved 
because of some duty to someone other than the patron.  When Pindar points out a flawed 
relationship between the poet and the person he praises, the victim of this flaw is 
someone other than the object of praise.  Homer’s excessive praise of Odysseus is 
associated with the blindness of Odysseus and Ajax’s peers, for Nem. 7.24 refers 
ambiguously to either Homer’s or Odysseus’ audience, and Pindar’s characterization of 
Homer’s poetry as deceptive (ψεupsilonoxiaδεσι, 22; κλzπτει παρUγοισα µupsilonoxiaθοις, 23) echoes his 
characterization of Odysseus’ deceptiveness in Nemean 8 (ψεupsilonoxiaδει, 25; πUρφασις, 32; 
αµupsilonoxiaλων µupsilonoxiaθων, 33).  Excessive praise of Odysseus is tantamount to falsehood that is 
harmful not to Odysseus but to Ajax.  In light of Ajax’ fate Pindar’s assurance that he 
avoids excessive praise of Thearion (66) not only validates the accuracy of his praises, 
but also reassures his audience that no one could be harmed by excessive praise the way 
Ajax was harmed by hyperbolic praise of Odysseus.  Such an assurance thus implies a 
consideration for the welfare of others besides the patron. 
 What I have examined in this section is the relationship between truth and poetic 
obligation, and I have argued that Pindar presents his obligation to the victor as certifying 
a true account.  Furthermore, I have argued that part of the poet’s obligation is to relay 
the truth.  My study of Alatheia in Fragment 205 and Olympian 10 focused on the 
connection between Alatheia and obligation, while my examination of Nemeans 7 and 8 
focused on Pindar’s criticism of poets who are not bound to a program of accurate 
representation.  The primary contrast that Pindar points up between himself and Homer is 
one of xenia:  he, as a guest-friend to the laudandus, is able to provide a more accurate 
and balanced account than a poet who does not observe such constraints of obligation.  
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What Pindar’s criticism of Homer and self-portrayed contrast with Homer suggest is that 
a poet’s obligation, often articulated in terms of xenia, must be associated with truth and 
vice versa, and that poetry composed outside the bounds of xenia potentially yields 
falsehood and deception.  A question then arises as to how deception and falsehood relate 
to relationships of xenia, a topic to which I now turn. 
 
PART TWO:  FALSEHOOD, DECEPTION, AND XENIA 
The negativity with which we view ψεupsilonperispδος might stem from an intuitive reaction 
against falsehood or deception of any sort, and Pindar’s use of ψεupsilonperispδος by and large falls 
in line with this modern sensibility.132  Pindar frequently denies that there is ψεupsilonperispδος in his 
poetry as part of his truth-telling rhetoric,133 a rhetoric necessitated by the conventions of 
his genre, which casts his relationship with his patron as a friendship or guest-friendship 
in which he is obligated to speak the truth.  Each instance of Pindar’s refusal to tell a 
ψεupsilonperispδος about his laudandus occurs in an ode where he has also portrayed his relationship 
to the victor as one of guest-friendship or lauded the patron as a good host.134  I argue that 
these disavowals of ψεupsilonperispδος are to be understood within a larger system comprising 
aletheia and xenia and excluding pseudos and deception. 
I have observed that several depictions of deception, concealment, or distortion 
occur in Pindar’s mythical digressions and, like his denials of falsehood, take place in 
contexts of perversion or violation of guest-friendship.  Because Pindar’s myths often 
provide a framework for studying the complicated relationship between pseudos and 
                                                 
132 Indeed, I cannot agree with Hubbard’s assertion that “Pindar recognizes…that falsehood is not an 
absolute evil” (1985, 102). 
 
133 Cf. Ol. 4.17, Ol. 10.5, Ol. 13.52, Nem. 1.18, Nem. 7.49,  Fr. 11, and Fr. 205. 
 
134 See Ol. 4.4, Ol. 10.6, Ol. 13.3, Nem. 1.20, Nem. 7.61. 
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xenia, I have chosen to examine examples of interaction between pseudos and xenia in 
the myths with the aim of understanding how pseudos affects the xenia between poet and 
patron.  The numerous connections between Pindar’s encomiastic material and his inlaid 
mythical digressions have long been acknowledged.  Furthermore, Pindar himself does 
not always delineate clear boundaries between his mythical comparanda and the outer 
praise narrative, for example in Nemean 7.23-24 or in Olympian 1, where Pindar 
attributes false Pelops stories both to poets (1.37) and to Pelops’ own neighbors (1.47).  
His deft and seamless maneuvering between myth and non-myth suggests that his 
attitudes toward truth, poetry, and obligation are not confined to statements explicitly 
about poetry, but can be elucidated by his presentations of myth as well.  I will examine 
the Tantalos myth of Olympian 1, the Ixion myth of Pythian 2, the Koronis myth of 
Pythian 3, and the Peleus and Hippolyta myth of Nemeans 4 and 5, each of which 
demonstrates the incongruity of deception with ritualized sacred relationships such as 
xenia and marriage.135     
PSEUDOS AND XENIA:  THREE TYPES OF OPPOSITION  
1.  The Interweaving of Poetic Obligation and Myth in Olympian 1 
 Pindar’s reformulation of the Tantalos and Pelops myth is well-known, and I have 
already discussed it in some detail.  In sum, Pindar dismisses the traditional accounts of 
Pelops’ disappearance as stories that “deceive with elaborate falsehoods” (ψεupsilonoxiaδεσι 
ποικoλοις Sξαπατnντι, Ol. 1.29), presents his own version (36-45), recounts the traditional 
version that he has debunked (46-51), and provides his own explanation for Tantalos’ 
punishment (54-66).  Tantalos’ crime in the traditional myth is serving up his son Pelops 
                                                 
135 Hubbard has identified several mythical distortions or perversions of xenia that occur in Pindar, which 
include the stories of Tantalos in Olympian 1, Ixion in Pythian 2, and Ischys in Pythian 3. For Hubbard’s 
complete list and a discussion of xenia in Pindar, see Hubbard 1985, 156-158. 
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as a meal for the gods.  Pindar finds this account unacceptable, asserting that he cannot 
depict the gods as gluttons (Sµο δ’ πορα γαστρoµαργον µακUρων τιν’ εiπεν, 52), and 
posits that Tantalos’ true crime is his failure to recognize great fortune (µzγαν λβον, 56) 
and stealing and sharing the gods’ nectar and ambrosia as a result (60-64). 
Scholarly focus on Pindar’s variation of this myth tends to be on the fate of 
Pelops,136 but I would like to examine some of the other differences between Pindar’s 
rendition and the way he presents the traditional version.  To reformulate the popular 
myth he changes key details concerning not only the fate of Pelops, but also the setting of 
interaction between Pelops and the gods.  According to Pindar the traditional account of 
Pelops and Tantalos incorrectly portrays a gross perversion of the guest-host relationship 
involving the slaughter and consumption of Pelops by the gluttonous gods: 
upsilondasiaoxiaδατος »τι τε πυρ ζzοισαν εiς FκµUν 
µαχαoρ­ τUµον κατ µzλη, 
τραπzζαισo τ’ Fµφ δεupsilonoxiaτατα κρεnν  
σzθεν διεδUσαντο κα φUγον. 
Sµο δ’ πορα γαστρoµαργον µακUρων τιν’ εiπεν· Fφoσταµαι.  (48-52) 
 
[One of the envious neighbors said] that they cut your limbs with a sword 
and threw you into the boiling height of the fire, and at the end of the meal 
around the tables, they divided up your flesh and ate it.  It is useless for me 
to say one of the blessed gods is gluttonous—I stand aloof.   
 
The details of cutting, boiling, and devouring are vividly and grotesquely violent.  
Moreover, it is grammatically ambiguous who performs the butchering, for the subject of 
τUµον and διεδUσαντο is unstated, thus leading us to assume the same subject as for 
φUγον, i.e., the gods.137  Pindar’s report of what others say about this myth makes it 
unclear who is ultimately at fault for the murder and consumption of Pelops and thus 
suggests that the gods are culpable for knowingly partaking in cannibalism.  This 
                                                 
136 See, e.g., Köhnken, 1974; Griffith 1990, 200. 
 
137 Cf. Gerber 1982, 85. 
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implication of culpability on the gods’ part is a distortion of the traditional account and is 
not attested in any other known version of this myth.138   
Pindar presents Tantalos’ meal as the pinnacle of proper guest-host hospitality in 
stark contrast to this image of the disordered, gluttonous, and willingly cannibalistic 
gods.  Tantalos invites the gods to a meal to repay them for a similarly hospitable gesture 
on their part: 
pπXτ’ SκUλεσε πατrρ τsν εupsilonpsiliνοµτατον 
Sς Mρανον φoλαν τε Σoπυλον, 
Fµοιβαα θεοσι δεπνα παρzχων.  (Ol. 1.37-39) 
 
When [Pelops’] father called them to his most well-ordered feast and to 
friendly Sipylos, providing a meal for the gods in return for theirs….   
 
The language emphasizes the friendliness of Tantalos’ invitation (φoλαν, 38), the 
attention to good order (εupsilonpsiliνοµτατον, 37), and the participation in feasting (Mρανος, 38, 
here translated as “feast,” is more literally rendered “contribution to a feast”139).  Pindar 
recasts this interaction as a well-ordered, convivial, and respectfully hospitable event 
between gods and mortals, an event instigated by the gods’ prior hospitality toward 
Tantalos (Fµοιβαα θεοσι δεπνα, 39).  It is in this context that Poseidon becomes smitten 
with Pelops and abducts him (40-42).  The Pindaric version thus casts the gods as 
proponents of the guest-host relationship in contrast to the popular version where the 
gods themselves violate xenia.  In Pindar’s version Tantalos alone is to blame for 
violating xenia when he steals the nectar and ambrosia of the gods to give to his friends. 
Pindar attributes the false version of this myth to two parties.  Within the myth 
itself an envious neighbor is responsible for propagating the false story of Pelops’ 
                                                 
138 Gerber 1982, 85. 
 
139 According to Gerber 1982, 74, citing Vondeling 1961, 262, reciprocity is implied in this word.  
Alternatively, the word could suggest contribution; Tantalos’ contribution would be his son Pelops. 
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consumption by the gods to the gossip of an envious neighbor:  ¶ς δ’ φαντος Mπελες, 
οupsilonpsiliδj µατρ πολλ µαιXµενοι φnτες γαγον, | Mννεπε κρυφ τις αupsilonpsiliτoκα φθονερnν 
γειτXνων (“When you disappeared and men, although much-striving, did not lead you to 
your mother, one of the envious neighbors immediately said secretly that…,” Ol. 1.46-
47).  But Pindar introduces the Pelops and Tantalos myth with a rumination on the mortal 
tendency toward exaggeration and falsehood (28-29) and later suggests that the external 
propagation of this myth is attributable to previous poets (σj δ’ Fντoα προτzρων 
φθzγξοµαι, 36).  The distinction between poets and mythical characters is unclear, for 
Pindar blurs this distinction and in so doing aligns envy with falsehood as dual causes of 
a misrepresentative story.  Falsehood and envy begin as corrupting forces within the 
myth, aimed specifically at distorting the careful hospitality that Tantalos provides to the 
gods in emulation of their own prior hospitality.  Pindar then interweaves poets’ 
motivations with those of Tantalos’ neighbors and makes falsehood a relevant aspect of 
each.  Falsehood becomes a key player within the myth of Tantalos as well as outside of 
it, for it is the envious neighbor who first starts the false tale that mischaracterizes the 
gods and the xenia in which they take part.  A similar conflation occurs in Nemean 7.20-
27, where Pindar moves seamlessly from criticism of Homer’s representation of 
Odysseus to Odysseus’ misrepresentation of Ajax, as I discussed in the first part of this 
chapter.  These passages demonstrate the interconnectedness between myth and poetry 
and the applicability of myth’s lessons to the obligation of the poet.   
Pindar thus uses the Tantalos digression to show violations of xenia on several 
different levels, internal and external to the myth.  Within the myth Tantalos violates 
xenia by failing to appreciate his extraordinary favor among the gods and misusing their 
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gifts to the point of betrayal, but he is not the only offender.140  A second perversion of 
xenia occurs outside of the myth by the poets who slander the gods by depicting their 
disregard for xenia.  In casting Tantalos as the sole violator of xenia, Pindar discredits the 
traditional version, which depicts a complete corruption of xenia by both gods and men.  
The two violations of xenia are interrelated, as this slander originates within the myth, by 
the envious neighbor of Tantalos (47), and continues without, by the poets who propagate 
this erroneous tale.  Thus, the internal and external elements of the myth work in 
conjunction with one another, as the poets who tell the false version are akin to the 
gossiping neighbors who start the rumor that Pelops has been eaten.  These poets’ 
pseudos stems from presenting a picture of godly behavior that is out of line with xenia 
and from propagating this lying myth. 
There are thus two issues of xenia at play here:  the xenia between the poet and 
the gods is external to the myth, while the xenia between the gods and Tantalos is internal 
to the myth.  The former is implied by the poet’s expressed fears of blame and 
impoverishment (αiτoα, 35; Fκzρδεια, 53).  When the poet attributes these to pseudos and 
deception (28-29), he is implying his participation in a relationship of reciprocal benefit 
wherein he escapes these consequences by providing a favorable account about the gods.  
This xenia between the poet and the gods is intricately tied to the depiction of xenia 
within the myth, so that the poet’s relationship with the gods is affected by how he 
portrays their relationship with Tantalos.  When the poet aligns “the true account” with 
the favorable one, as I discussed earlier, it follows that pseudos would be anything that 
would weaken a favorable depiction.  Moreover, Pindar implies that a reciprocal 
                                                 
140 Scholarship that notes the ode’s lessons of xenia (e.g., Hubbard 1985, 156) tends to focus on Tantalos 
rather than those who tell his story. 
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relationship between poet and subject embraces the true account (such as it is) and shuns 
deception and falsehood.  By interweaving the internal details of the myth with the 
external motivations of poetic composition, Pindar intertwines content and obligation.  
Consequently, Pindar revises the traditional version to depict a violation of xenia without 
harming his own xenia with the gods.  The other version, rife with falsehoods, distorts the 
very image of the gods’ preservation of xenia, thereby harming the teller’s own xenia 
with them.  The contrast between Pindar and other poets is not merely a contrast between 
the details of their respective accounts, it is also an implicit contrast between their 
respective relationships with the gods and reflects Pindar’s conception of poetic 
obligation and falsehood. 
2.  Pseudos as Punishment for Violating Xenia:  Ixion in Pythian 2 
The story of Ixion in Pythian 2 provides a variant on the occurrence of pseudos 
outside a guest-host relationship.  Pindar tells us the story of Ixion, a mortal man who, 
like Tantalos, has the rare privilege of living among the gods, but subsequently loses this 
privilege through his own error and suffers the torment of being permanently bound to a 
spinning wheel in the Underworld.141  He tells us of two specific crimes that result in 
Ixion’s eternal damnation:  the murder of a family member and the attempted seduction 
of Hera, in retaliation for which Zeus fashions a false Hera, a cloud bearing the 
appearance and sexual allure of the real one.  Ixion couples with this Hera-cloud under 
the misapprehension that she is real and begets Kentauros, who in turn becomes the 
eponymous forebear of the half-man, half-horse creatures familiar from mythology.   
Unlike his predecessors Pindar depicts the crime primarily as a violation of a 
special relationship between Ixion and Zeus.  Having been accorded every blessing and a 
                                                 
141 Perhaps coincidentally Pythian 2 and Olympian 1 are both to the same victor Hieron. 
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pleasurable life among the Olympian gods (εupsilonpsiliµενzσσι γρ παρ Κρονoδαις | γλυκupsilonvariaν ¾λν 
βoοτον, µακρsν οupsilonpsiliχ upsilondasiaπzµεινεν λβον, Pyth. 2.25-26), Ixion nevertheless squanders this 
life by overstepping the bounds of propriety and developing a lust for Hera.  In so doing 
he disturbs the delicate balance of his relationship with Zeus, which is essentially a guest-
host friendship in which the two participants are a god and a mortal.  Ixion’s lust is 
therefore a twofold offense since he has wronged both a host and a god.  Thus does 
Pindar tell us that one must observe one’s proper place among the gods (χρr δj κατ’ 
αupsilonpsiliτsν αiε παντsς pρν µzτρον, 34).  In response to Ixion’s violation, Zeus deceives him 
with the Hera-cloud, which formalizes the dissolution of xenia between himself and 
Ixion.  Since Ixion has behaved in a manner unsuitable for a xeinos, he effectively severs 
his relationship with Zeus, leaving Zeus free to enact a retributive deception.   
The usual story, as Glenn Most summarizes, is that Ixion has promised his father-
in-law gifts in exchange for the bride, but murders him when he attempts to collect the 
gifts.  Madness overcomes Ixion, whom Zeus eventually purges of blood-guilt and invites 
to Olympus,142 only to expel him for his attempted rape of Hera.  While Pindar makes 
specific reference to both of Ixion’s crimes (30-34), his reference to the father-in-law’s 
murder is vague and presupposes a precise familiarity with the rest of the myth.143  
Details of Ixion’s bloodguilt are omitted or downplayed in Pindar’s version, which 
focuses instead on the attempted seduction of Hera.  Furthermore, it is Zeus more than 
Hera who is depicted as the victim of Ixion’s crime.  While the crime is clearly attempted 
rape, Pindar later includes Zeus as a victim along with Hera, who is relegated to a 
possession of her husband:  (Øρας »τ’ SρUσσατο, τν ∆ιsς εupsilonpsiliνα λUχον | πολυγαθzες, “He 
                                                 
142 Most 1985, 77. 
 
143 Most 1985, 81-82. 
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fell in love with Hera, whom Zeus’ joyous acts of love possessed,” 27-28).  By doing so, 
Pindar underscores Ixion’s action as a violation of Zeus and reformulates the rape as a 
different type of offense.  Even Ixion himself understands his offense primarily to be a 
violation of his host rather than of Hera:  the mythical digression opens with a description 
of Ixion’s punishment, and the admonition he is forced to utter from his wheel of torment 
focuses on his betrayal of Zeus instead of his other crimes (τsν εupsilonpsiliεργzταν Fγανας 
Fµοιβας Sποιχοµzνους τoνεσθαι, “Go and pay your benefactor back with acts of gentle 
recompense,” 24).  
In depicting Ixion’s crime as a violation of xenia, Pindar departs significantly 
from other versions of the myth.  Ixion’s lust for Hera inverts Homer’s presentation, 
where it is Zeus who couples with Ixion’s wife (Il. 14.317).  Furthermore, in casting Zeus 
as the fashioner of the Hera-cloud, Pindar again varies from an account in which Ixion’s 
crime is depicted as more directly against Hera, who invents her own retaliatory 
imitation.144  These differences are significant, for they demonstrate Pindar’s shift in 
focus to the relationship between Zeus and Ixion and his incorporation of the Hera-cloud 
as a key component of that relationship.  In addition to a punitive instrument of Ixion’s 
downfall, this cloud represents a symbolic act of communication by Zeus, a substitute for 
a verbal response to Ixion’s wrongful lust for Hera.  Pindar refers to the Hera-cloud as a 
pseudos, a word he usually reserves for verbal falsehoods:   
Sπε νεφzλ­ παρελzξατο 
ψεupsilonperispδος γλυκupsilonvaria µεθzπων ιδρις FνHρ· 
ε©δος γρ upsilondasiaπεροχωτUτ­ πρzπεν Οupsilonpsiliρανιν 
θυγατzρι ΚρXνου· ντε δXλον αupsilonpsiliτ θzσαν 
Ζηνsς παλUµαι, καλsν πµα.  (Pyth. 2.36-40) 
 
                                                 
144 See Carey 1981, 39 ad 40, who cites RE X 1376; see also Gildersleeve 1885, 260, citing Schol. Eur. 
Phoen. 1185. 
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…since he lay with a cloud, an unwitting man pursuing a sweet lie, for the image 
suited the highest of the gods in heaven, the daughter of Kronos.  Zeus’ guile set it 
as a trap for him, a beautiful bane.   
 
The pseudos is the imitation of Hera that Zeus has fabricated as a trap (δXλον, 39) and a 
bane (πµα, 40) for Ixion.  Through this Hera-cloud, Zeus conveys to Ixion a false 
message that seduction of Hera is permissible.  Thus Zeus effectively “speaks” to Ixion 
through the Hera-cloud. 
What this episode reveals in terms of xenia and pseudos is that the two forces are 
at odds with one another, but not necessarily in the ways one might expect.  Ixion’s crime 
is neither deception nor falsehood, but rather, inappropriate seduction.  Pseudos occurs in 
this myth as a response to Ixion’s violation and consequent dissolution of xenia.  Ixion 
has effectively severed his relationship with Zeus by failing to recognize his proper place 
among the gods, thus leaving Zeus free to enact a deception and falsehood in retribution.  
Falsehood and deception can be introduced into the relationship only once the delicate 
balance of xenia has been disturbed.  Thus Pindar speaks of this falsehood in a largely 
positive manner, attributing no wrong-doing to its creator, Zeus, and expressing disdain 
only for Ixion’s own part in the affair.   
What is striking about this case of pseudos is its focalization through its recipient 
rather than its creator, a phenomenon I discussed in Chapter Two.  Pindar does not 
obscure Zeus’ agency in creating the false Hera, who is introduced in the narrative as a 
trick created by Zeus’ wiles (39-40).  But this brief reference to Zeus is embedded within 
a narrative that focuses increasingly on Ixion’s reaction to and interaction with the Hera-
cloud.  The description of the false Hera-cloud as “sweet” (γλυκupsilonoxia, 37) focalizes through 
Ixion and thus eclipses Zeus’ role in crafting this falsehood.  Similarly, the phrase 
“beautiful bane” (καλsν πµα, 40) cleverly encapsulates Ixion’s downfall with its cause, 
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for it is Ixion’s favorable disposition towards this Hera-cloud as an object of beauty that 
will prompt his lust for it. 
This focalization through Ixion has the effect of emphasizing Ixion’s 
culpability—he is the one who has effectively severed his guest-friendship with Zeus and 
thus brought the Hera-cloud upon himself.  Pindar even makes Ixion the agent of his own 
punishment (τsν δj τετρUκναµον Mπραξε δεσµXν | ¾sν λεθρον »γ’, “He fashioned that 
four-spoked fetter as his own destruction,” 40-41).  Of course, Ixion does not literally 
build the wheel himself, but the attribution of grammatical agency here reflects how 
Ixion’s hybris (28) and inability to endure the blessings of living among the gods (25-26) 
have led directly to the wheel’s creation.145  Although in other contexts, Pindar criticizes 
the use of deception, here he censures Ixion for the pre-existing lust that makes him prone 
to being deceived.  As Oates observes, “Ixion was ιδρις in not recognizing his 
limitations and also ιδρις in being deceived by the cloud.”146 
Moreover, the nature of this pseudos resonates with some ideas Pindar has 
elsewhere communicated about pleasure, perception, and poetry.  The relevance of 
Ixion’s story to the role of Pindar’s poetry is implied by verbal echoes:  Pindar tells us 
that Ixion made the four-spoked (τετρUκναµον, 40) fetter his own punishment,147 thus 
receiving a general message (τν πολupsilonoxiaκοινον Fνδzξατ’ Fγγελoαν, 41).  These phrases, 
which form the transition between the respective stories of Ixion and his descendants, 
echo the opening of the ode where Pindar refers to his poem as “a message of the four-
                                                 
145 Cf. Gildersleeve 1885, 260 ad Mπραξε:  “‘Effected,’ ‘brought about,’ and not Mπραξατο.”  Also, cf. Gantz 
1978, 23:  “Note too that it is not Zeus who binds Ixion, but Ixion who binds himself.”  The notion of self-
forged punishment persists at least until Dickens, whose Jacob Marley in A Christmas Carol haunts 
Scrooge with the words, “I wear the chain I forged in life.  I made it link by link, and yard by yard; I girded 
it on of my own free will, and of my own free will I wore it.” 
 
146 Oates 1963, 379. 
 
147 On the significance of the four-spoked fetter, see Race 1997 vol. 1, 235 n. 2 and Faraone 1993.   
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horse chariot” (Fγγελoαν τετραορoας, 4).148  Furthermore, the Ixion episode, while not 
explicitly about poetry, does offer a view of falsehood and deception that explains 
Pindar’s general disavowal of them in his own poetry.  Pindar frames the experience of 
Ixion as one that involves his interaction with a pseudos.  As I have argued above, the 
poet tells the story of the pseudos from the point of view of the one who experiences it.  
This focalization through the perceiver resonates with some of Pindar’s observations in 
Olympian 1 concerning the relationship between falsehood and pleasure: 
 θαupsilonoxiaµατα πολλU, καo ποupsilonoxia τι κα βροτnν φUτις upsilondasiaπjρ τsν Fλαθ λXγον   
δεδαιδαλµzνοι ψεupsilonoxiaδεσι ποικoλοις Sξαπατnντι µupsilonperispθοι·  
ΧUρις δ, περ παντα τεupsilonoxiaχει τ µεoλιχα θνατος, 
Sπιφzροισα τιµν κα πιστον SµHσατο πιστsν 
Mµµεναι τs πολλUκις· 
Éµzραι δ’ Sπoλοιποι 
µUρτυρες σοφτατοι.  (Ol. 1.28-34) 
 
Indeed, there are many wonders, and somehow the speeches of mortals, 
stories, have been embellished beyond the true account and deceive with 
intricate falsehoods; for Charis, who provides mortals with all pleasant 
things, often makes the incredible credible by bringing honor.  But days to 
come are the wisest witnesses.   
 
As I have already discussed, Pindar identifies falsehood and deception as problems in the 
propagation of stories and examines the psychology of believability.  He attributes the 
credibility of a story to the pleasures afforded by Charis (τ µεoλιχα, 29) and posits that 
all stories that possess this quality, regardless of their truth-value (παντα, 29), are 
persuasive.  Moreover, he emphasizes that his observations apply to mortal beings:  the 
tendency both to tell falsehoods and to believe them if they are pleasurable is a human 
one (βροτnν, 28; θνατος, 29).  With these lines Pindar evokes the ancient idea that 
                                                 
148 Oates 1963, 349 also notes these connections, as does Hubbard 1985, 136.  Cf. Most 1985, 78:  “In a 
certain sense, the Fγγελoα of Ixion (41) and the Fγγελoα of Pindar (4) are one and the same.” 
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verbal artfulness produces credibility, as Alcinoos observes in the Odyssey (σο δ’ Mπι 
µjν µορφr Sπzων, Mνι δj φρzνες Sσθλαo, 11.367).149 
Although these two passages present two very different contexts of falsehood, 
there are striking parallels.  The emphasis in the Olympian 1 passage on mortality as a 
defining condition of falsehood and persuasion seems particularly appropriate to Ixion, 
the mortal who fails to appreciate his divine friendships fully.  The figure of Ixion 
encapsulates Oympian 1’s references both to the mortals who tell false stories and those 
who are persuaded by them, for Pindar’s portrayal of Ixion, as I have argued, foregrounds 
Ixion’s experience and fascination with the false Hera to the point where he effectively 
becomes the agent of his own punishment.  A further point of connection lies in the role 
of Charis, whose effect in Olympian 1 is to bring credibility to all stories by making them 
pleasant.  MacLachlan compares the persuasive effects of Charis on a poet’s audience to 
those of Aphrodite on a lover:  “The work of charis in poetry is to soften an audience.  
This releases in them a response they might not otherwise make, akin to being touched by 
love.”150  In the case of Ixion, the pleasure afforded by the false Hera is explicitly sexual 
and is based on his attraction to the real Hera.  Like the Charis of Olympian 1.30 that 
makes an account pleasurable regardless of its veracity, Ixion’s sexual attraction is to 
both the real and the false Hera.  Moreover, with his confidence that the revelatory 
process of time will curtail the believability of false stories (1.33-34), Pindar suggests 
further that the pleasures associated with these false stories are also short-lived.  Such an 
                                                 
149 For the relationship between the truthfulness and aesthetic quality of what is said, see Adkins 1972. 
 
150 MacLachlan 1993, 114.  See also her discussion on p. 113, esp. n. 38, where she connects the instance of 
Charis in Ol. 1.30 to a subsequent characterization of the love relationship between Pelops and Poseidon in 
Olympian 1. 
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observation resonates with the immediacy of Ixion’s interaction with the false Hera, 
which, although offering initial pleasure, ultimately results in eternal condemnation. 
Ixion’s pleasure, then, could be said to result from a charis that Zeus has 
bastardized and adapted for his punishment.  Instead of immediate torment in the 
Underworld, Zeus’ initial response is to give Ixion something that will provide pleasure, 
thus maintaining a semblance of their guest-host relationship.  The charis emblematic of 
affectionate exchange151 is replaced by a perversion, affording an empty pleasure that 
results from inappropriate lust rather than mutually respectful xenia.152  Although the 
pleasure of the pseudo-Hera produces the material effect of offspring, this offspring is not 
attended by the Charites (Pyth. 2.42-43).153  Zeus takes advantage of Ixion’s wrongful 
propensity for sexual pleasure to turn that pleasure against him and to take away the 
charis that might have accompanied Ixion and his kin had he not offended his host.  The 
myth of Ixion thus presents a complicated perversion of xenia, in which the immediate 
consequence of its violation is a pseudos that simulates the joy brought by charis in a 
healthy guest-host relationship.  As in Olympian 1 where the pseudea of false accounts 
distort the xenia of Tantalos and the gods, the pseudos presented in Pythian 2 represents a 
variant perversion of the guest-host relationship. 
3.  Sex, Lies, and the Guest-Host Relationship: The Hera-Cloud, Koronis, and Hippolyta 
The figure of the Hera-cloud in the Ixion myth raises the issue of gender and its 
relationship to truth and falsehood.  As the invention of Zeus, the Hera-cloud represents a 
                                                 
151 Cf. Kurke 1991, 67:  “Charis, as always, designates a willing and precious reciprocal exchange.” 
 
152 Cf. MacLachlan 1993, 121:  “[Ixion’s] punishment…was to find emptiness instead of fulfillment:  The 
woman to whom he made love was ‘empty,’ a cloud, and the sweetness he pursued was an illusion.” 
 
153 Cf. MacLachlan 1993, 121:  “Further, he [Ixion] and his offspring are isolated from human society, from 
the Charites.” 
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passive entity, a physical embodiment of the pseudos that Zeus wishes to communicate to 
Ixion, yet she possesses her own agency and enough of the real Hera’s sexual allure to 
attract and couple with Ixion.  Thus the cloud combines male deception and female 
seduction and tells us that female seduction can be one form of the falsehood and 
deception that endanger guest-host relationships.  Pindar’s language of deception and 
seduction must now be considered within the broader context of ancient Greek treatments 
of women.  In his depictions of sacred relationships such as xenia, Pindar employs a 
familiar type of deceptive female that dates to Hesiod’s Pandora, who is, among other 
things, a figure of guile and deceit.   
Indeed, Pindar’s Hera-cloud bears striking resemblance to Pandora, whom Hesiod 
describes in similar language and gives comparable characteristics.154  Both Pandora and 
the Hera-cloud are oxymorons:  as the scholiast to Pindar notes, the “beautiful bane” 
(καλsν πµα, Pyth. 2.40) of the Hera-cloud echoes Hesiod’s description of Pandora as a 
beautiful evil (καλsν κακXν, Theog. 585) and a great bane to mankind (πµα µzγα, 
Theog. 592).  Furthermore, each female figure has been constructed as a likeness or an 
image, comparable to its model but not equivalent to it.  Hesiod’s Pandora is made in the 
image of a devout maiden (παρθzνl αiδοo¨ £κελον, Theog. 572) while the Hera-cloud, of 
course, is an imitation of Hera (ε©δος…upsilondasiaπεροχωτUτ­…θυγατzρι ΚρXνου, Pyth. 2.38-39).  
Each female figure embodies falsehood and deception:  the Hera-cloud is a “sweet lie” 
(ψεupsilonperispδος γλυκupsilonoxia, Pyth. 2.37) and Pandora, too, is described as a deception (αupsilonpsiliτρ Sπε 
δXλον αiπupsilonvariaν FµHχανον Sξετzλεσσεν, Erg. 83; ¶ς ε©δον δXλον αiπupsilonoxiaν, FµHχανον 
Fνθρποισιν, Theog. 589).  Perhaps most importantly, each female figure is created by 
                                                 
154 Cf. Most 1985, 82-84 who discusses the correlation between the Hesiod’s Pandora myth and Pindar’s 
Ixion myth, positing a parallel between Prometheus and Ixion. 
 91 
the mandate and wiles of Zeus (Ζηνsς πUλαµαι, Pyth. 2.40; cf. Κρονoδεω δι βουλUς, 
Theog. 572 = Erg. 71). 
Thus these figures represent acts of communication and exchange by Zeus, who 
produces each of them to punish mortals, yet they are also given the ability to act of their 
own accord.  As entities that are paradoxically both passive and active, pseudo-Hera and 
Pandora embody a recurrent female type in Greek thought.  In her discussion of women 
in Herodotus Ann Bergren notes the paradox of womankind: 
Women are like words, they are ‘metaphorical words,’ but they are also 
original sources of speech, speakers themselves.  They are both passive 
objects and active agents of linguistic exchange…In this relation to the 
linguistic and the social system, the woman…is paradoxically both 
secondary and original, both passive and active, both a silent and a 
speaking sign.  (Bergren 1983, 76) 
 
She draws on the work of Lévi-Strauss, who observes that in the practice of marriage 
exchange, women are traded between men as a communicative sign, yet the female 
herself also generates her own signs.155  These ideas resonate with both the Pandora-myth 
of Hesiod and the Ixion-myth of Pythian 2.  Pandora, as the price mankind must pay for 
fire, is the incarnation of Zeus’ deception, a message of retribution.  As a divine creation, 
she is a passive entity who embodies the various aspects of the gods who contributed to 
her making:  Hephaestus’ craftsmanship, Athena’s artistic skills, Aphrodite’s beauty, and 
Hermes’ trickery.  But the very gifts that she represents also enable her to act of her own 
accord.  Not only is she a “steep deception” of Zeus, she is also given the capacity to 
speak falsehoods and deceptions by Hermes (Erg. 78).  She subsequently, of her own 
will, opens the jar that unleashes all evil onto the world (Erg. 94-95) and serves as the 
prototype for woman, a bane for men.  Thus Pandora originates as Zeus’ deception, but 
                                                 
155 Bergren 1983, 75. 
 92 
her ability to act represents a combination of her own agency as well as an embodiment 
of the gods’ exchange with mankind. 
Similarly, Zeus creates the Hera-cloud in retribution for Ixion’s offense; the 
cloud, as a pseudos, effectively serves as an act of communication to Ixion.  The Hera-
cloud, like Pandora, is not entirely a passive entity or an illusion; her seductive effect on 
Ixion is powerful and “real” enough for her and Ixion to couple and produce children.  
While a creation of Zeus, she is also an independent being whose agency and ability to 
interact sexually with Ixion increasingly overtakes Zeus as the focus of the mythical 
narrative.  By describing the Hera-cloud as a “lie” and a “bane,” Pindar calls attention to 
her ability to cause deception and misery.  No mere illusion, the false-Hera, born as a 
cloud, nevertheless attains enough tangibility to couple with Ixion and foster a line of 
descendants, with which the mythical digression concludes:   
νευ ο Χαρoτων τzκεν γXνον upsilondasiaπερφoαλον  
µXνα κα µXνον οupsilonpsilioxiaτ’ Sν FνδρUσι γερασφXρον οupsilonpsilioxiaτ’ Sν θεnν νXµοις· 
τsν νupsilonoxiaµαζε τρUφοισα Κzνταυρον.  (42-44) 
 
Without the Graces’ blessing, that unique mother bore a unique son, who was 
overbearing and respected neither among men nor in the ways of the gods.  She 
who reared him called him Kentauros.  
 
At this point, Zeus’ hand has completely disappeared:  just as Hera is occluded by Zeus, 
Zeus, too, who has been mentioned only twice and each time in oblique cases (∆ιsς, 34; 
Ζηνsς, 40), recedes to the background.  Attention to Ixion as well, after a few reiterative 
words about his punishment, yields to a focus on the Hera-cloud and her progeny.  The 
repetition of µXνα/µXνον (43) stresses the singularity of the Hera-cloud and her child 
Kentauros, and, as MacLachlan observes, the absence of the Graces from the birth, along 
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with the exclusion of Kentauros from both mortal and godly realms further accentuates 
the isolation of these figures.156 
Thus the Hera-cloud, originally a passive creation, is now an independent, 
discrete entity.  Ultimately, figures such as Pandora or the Hera-cloud embody a paradox:  
by playing the dual roles of message and speaker, they enable communicative acts by 
Zeus, who in creating them as deceptions, metaphorically “speaks” them while absolving 
himself of culpability for their trickery.  By fashioning these female figures, Zeus ensures 
conveyance of punishment or retribution, but because these figures can speak and act for 
themselves, he transfers the agency of deception onto them.  Thus do Pindar and Hesiod 
feminize deception, for an initially male act of falsehood becomes a female act of 
seduction.157  To borrow the ideas of Bergren and Lévi-Strauss, Pandora and pseudo-Hera 
are signs both passive, embodying Zeus’ message to mortals, and active, as agents of 
their own communication. 
Pindar’s innovation lies in the incorporation of this female type into the ritualized 
relationship of xenia.  Unlike Pandora, who is simply a retributive figure, the Hera-cloud 
terminates a formalized relationship of reciprocity between guest and host, a relationship 
that serves as a metaphor for Pindar’s own relationship to his patron.  In the context of 
Pindar’s odes, the creation of a female, third-party pseudos between guest-friends Zeus 
and Ixion sheds light on both the poet’s metaphorical relationship of xenia with his 
patron, and the role of gender in his characterizations of truth, falsehood, and deception.  
By externalizing falsehood from Zeus and Ixion’s guest-friendship in the form of a 
seductive female figure, Pindar implies that falsehood and deception do not belong in the 
                                                 
156 Cf. MacLachlan 1993, 121:  “Further, he [Ixion] and his offspring are isolated from human society, from 
the Charites.” 
 
157 Cf. Buxton 1982, 63-66, who suggests that seductive persuasion is the female version of dolos. 
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xenia he shares with his patron and secondarily implies that the feminine, as represented 
by deceptive seduction, is external to the bounds of proper guest-friendship.  Pindar thus 
exploits a model of misogyny familiar from the earlier tradition, re-formulating it to suit 
his specifically epinician mode of poetry. 
In several of his mythical narratives, Pindar similarly points to a female figure as 
a source of deception, of the sort that corrupts or destroys sacred institutions such as 
xenia or marriage.  Perhaps the way has already been paved for him by Hesiod, who puts 
the source of both falsehood and truth in the mouths of the female Muses (Theog. 26-
29),158 or by Homer, whose Hera incorporates seduction in her deception of Zeus in Iliad 
14-15.  Pindar often embellishes a tale of seduction or infidelity by partnering such 
crimes with a deceptive element, thus adding another layer to the complicated puzzle of 
aletheia, pseudos, and xenia.  He seems to do so only with female seduction, leaving male 
seduction largely free of the anxieties associated with feminine wiles.   
The first example I will examine is Koronis in Pythian 3, whose story shares 
many points of similarity with Ixion’s and who, like the Hera-cloud, threatens a ritualized 
relationship of reciprocity with seduction and deception.  Koronis, having conceived the 
child of Apollo, falls in love with another man and couples with him, unbeknownst to her 
father.  Apollo, however, detects her infidelity and consequently sends his sister Artemis 
to fell Koronis with her arrows.  The similarities between Koronis and Ixion appear at the 
level of verbal resonance:  Pindar refers to both Koronis’ and Ixion’s crimes as mental 
folly (Fµπλακoαισι φρενnν, Pyth. 3.13; cf. α δupsilonoxiaο δ’ Fµπλακoαι, Pyth. 2.30), involving 
love for something inappropriate.  Koronis “was in love with what was distant” (ªρατο 
                                                 
158 Yet Hesiod also names Zeus as the Muses’ father in line 29, just as Zeus mandates the creation of 
Pandora in Hesiod and the pseudo-Hera in Pythian 2.  Zeus has a significant connection with several female 
propagators of deception. 
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τnν FπεXντων, Pyth. 3.20), while Ixion’s love for Hera is based on crazed irrationality 
(µαινοµzναις φρασoν | Øρας »τ’ SρUσσατο, Pyth. 2.26-27).  Moreover, Pindar emphasizes 
the profoundly delusional lust of each (FυUταν upsilondasiaπερUφανον, Pyth. 2.28; µεγUλαν FυUταν, 
Pyth. 3.24).159   
Beyond these verbal echoes, Koronis’ crime further resembles Ixion’s in that hers 
too occurs in the context of a guest-host relationship, although a more subtle one.  Pindar 
provides very few details about Ischys, the man who diverts Koronis’ affections from 
Apollo, but he does mention twice that her affair occurs with a xeinos (ξzνου, Pyth. 3.25; 
ξεινoαν κοoταν, 32), a significant repetition in light of the paucity of other details 
concerning Ischys.  In this context the term is generally translated “stranger” and reflects 
Pindar’s variation from the traditional myth in making Ischys a foreigner from Arcadia 
(25) rather than a fellow Thessalian like Koronis.160  As Young and Burton note, this 
innovation fits into the general message of the ode that one should love what is near, both 
geographically and figuratively.161  A side effect of this innovation is that Ischys becomes 
a guest-friend, presumably of Koronis’ father, whose expected participation in a 
diplomatic relationship of exchange is implied when Pindar faults Koronis for coupling 
with Ischys without her father’s knowledge (κρupsilonoxiaβδαν πατρXς, 13).  Furthermore, both 
Koronis’ and Ixion’s sexual activities offend the gods and produce offspring, who are 
borne of an act of deception. 
It is around the issue of deception that their stories diverge, for Ixion is the victim 
of a deception, while Koronis is the perpetrator of one.  Both stories center on sexual 
                                                 
159 Race 1986, 65 also notices this echo. 
 
160 Burton 1962, 83; Young 1968, 35. 
 
161 Burton 1962, 83; Young 1968, 36. 
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impropriety against a god, and in both stories, the transgressors are punished accordingly, 
but in the one instance, inappropriate lust is punished with a deception, whereas in the 
other, deception is part of the crime.  Ixion, despite his many faults, is depicted as 
deceptive only with respect to the murder of his father-in-law (οupsilonpsiliκ τερ τzχνας, 32), a 
crime which, as I have noted, receives very little attention in the mythical narrative of 
Pythian 2.  Koronis, on the other hand, is guilty of deception as part of her offense against 
Apollo.  Their respective crimes differ in that Ixion’s is against his host Zeus rather than 
his would-be lover Hera, whereas Koronis’ offense is against her godly lover himself.   
Furthermore, in the Koronis myth the guest-host relationship is not between 
Koronis and a god—indeed, female participation in xenia would have been rare, almost 
inconceivable162—but between the two mortals Ischys and Koronis’ father, whose sole 
mention in line 13 serves to note his participation in a relationship of alliance between 
host and guest.  Koronis violates this relationship by interfering in it and forging a 
marriage alliance without her father’s approval.163  Ixion’s and Koronis’ interactions with 
the gods represent two different albeit closely related relationships:  Ixion and Zeus are 
engaged in a guest-host relationship while Koronis and Apollo are essentially married, 
for they are involved in a binding sexual relationship whose trust Koronis violates by 
sleeping with Ischys.164  Marriage and xenia resemble one another in that each comprises 
                                                 
162 Herman 1987, 34 discusses the role of social status in the guest-host relationship and notes that 
“ritualised friendship appears as an overwhelmingly upper-class institution…People of humbler standing 
are significantly rare.  Non-free men are absent altogether.  And women are extremely rare.  There are 
remarkably few references to male-female alliances.” 
 
163 See Herman 1987, 24-25 for a discussion of how a xeinos might foster and encourage a marriage. 
 
164 Of course Apollo, as a god, never formally marries Koronis, but the possessive authority he exercises 
over her represents the closest approximation to marriage that can occur between a god and a mortal.  Cf. 
Il. 9.336 where Achilles laments the loss of Briseis, his λοχος, a word that evokes marriage, even though 
Achilles and Briseis have no formal relationship.  As a union between a mortal woman and an immortal 
god, Koronis’ and Apollo’s relationship operates on a double standard of fidelity.  Apollo expects 
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a set of expectations and reciprocal obligations, but the different dynamics of xenia and 
marriage make for different modes of violation.  The key difference between Ixion and 
Koronis is of course one of gender, and it is primarily this difference that explains the 
points of divergence between their otherwise similar stories.  While both violate xenia, 
only Koronis, as a woman, does so through deception and seduction, thus embodying the 
gender paradigms of ancient myth. 
The secrecy that characterizes Koronis’ relations with her father extends to her 
interactions with Apollo as well (θεµoν τε δXλον, 32) and further marks her crime as not 
merely one of delusion but also of deception.  This characteristic of deception enters into 
two crimes, against her father and against Apollo, and thus corrupts two sacred 
relationships.  The first is the relationship of xenia between Koronis’ father and Ischys, 
who is presumably a guest in her father’s house.  Koronis, as a woman, does not have a 
part in guest-host relations, nor does she have the authority to forge a marriage without 
the knowledge or consent of her father.165  Moreover, as Pindar tells the story, Ischys is 
not culpable in any way for his actions, and indeed, Pindar plays down his agency in the 
affair, even delaying the sole mention of his name until line 31.  Instead, Koronis is the 
constant focal point in this tale of wrongdoing.  She violates the unspoken agreement 
between Apollo and herself that she will remain faithful to him while pregnant with his 
                                                                                                                                                 
monogamy from Koronis, even though he would expect no such devotion from another immortal (cf. Lyons 
2003, 97 n. 21 on marriage in Hesiod:  “The gods already practice marriage of a sort, but it is not for the 
most part the enduring institution known to mortals, e.g, Ýαπετsς …, γUγετο Κλυµzνην, Theog. 507-
508.”). 
 
165 Cf. the comments on “wild women” by Carnes 1996, 31.  Carnes argues that Peleus’ marriage to Thetis 
in Nemean 4 imposes a custom of civilization on the untamed fringes of the earth.  Marriage, as an act of 
“civilization,” suppresses women “who must be exchanged by others, not by themselves.”  Koronis, in 
taking this act of exchange into her own hands, would qualify as an inappropriate, even untamed woman.  
Cf. also the plethora of scholarly work on marriage in ancient Greek society, including Finley 1981, 233-
245; Garland 1990, 210-241; and Finkelberg 2005, 90-108. 
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child.166  Her actions recall the paradox of woman described by Bergren, for by 
contravening the expectations of bridal passivity, Koronis’ deception of Apollo causes 
disorder in their marriage, which has obligations and expectations of reciprocity similar 
to those of xenia.167  
The emphasis on Koronis’ deception is clear, as is the role it plays in her 
detection.  Apollo’s omniscience is another Pindaric departure from the earlier version of 
the myth in which a raven informs Apollo of Koronis’ infidelity.  The intended 
significance of this change is debatable,168 but it is clear that Apollo’s knowledge of 
Koronis’ deception is of key importance to the tale.  Moreover, the way Pindar describes 
Apollo’s omniscience is significant: 
οupsilonpsiliδ’ Mλαθε σκοπXν· Sν δ’ ρα µηλοδXκl Πυθnνι τXσσαις ιεν ναοupsilonperisp  
   βασιλεupsilonoxiaς 
Λοξoας, κοιννι παρ’ εupsilonpsiliθυτUτl γνµαν πιθν, 
πUντα iσUντι νXl· ψευδzων δ’ οupsilonpsiliχ πτεται, κλzπτει τz µιν 
οupsilonpsili θεsς οupsilonpsili βροτsς Mργοις οupsilonpsilioxiaτε βουλας.  (Pyth. 3.27-30) 
 
She did not escape the watcher, but in sheep-receiving Pytho, the king of 
the temple, Loxias, happened to perceive her, entrusting his opinion to his 
most straightforward confidant, his mind which knows all things.  He does 
not embrace falsehoods, and neither god nor mortal deceives him in deed 
or thought.  
 
                                                 
166 Cf. Burton 1962, 83:  “Coronis’ sin was that she lay with a mortal while pregnant by a god.” 
 
167 Cf. Roth 1993, 3 on the relationship between Klytaimestra and Agamemnon in the Oresteia:  “Aside 
from the fact that like Helen and the lion of the parable she [Klytaimestra] is an outsider brought into the 
house who with time encompasses her host’s destruction, her status as a wife is analogous to that of a guest, 
for marriage and xenia were parallel social institutions.  The basic function of each was to bring an outsider 
into the kin-group, and both forms of relationship entailed the exchanging of gifts and the formation of a 
hereditary bond imposing mutual obligations between families.” 
 
168 See Young 1968, 37-38 for a discussion of this divergence.  Citing Burton 1962, 84, Fennell ad loc., and 
Wilamowitz 1922, 281, Young argues that Pindar alludes to the Hesiodic tale of the raven with the word 
σκοπXς (27), but chooses not to go into further detail, as the aetiological nature of the raven-myth does not 
fit into Pindar’s overall scheme in Pythian 3.  I am skeptical as to the allusive nature of σκοπXς, which I 
take to be a direct reference to Apollo’s omniscience.  Cf. Burton 1962, 84, who observes that the absence 
of the raven emphasizes Apollo’s reliance on his own omniscience for the truth of Koronis’ infidelity. 
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Pindar characterizes Apollo’s distance from falsehood not as a refusal to craft falsehoods, 
which an extra-contextual translation of ψευδzων δ’ οupsilonpsiliχ πτεται might suggest, but rather 
as an ability to recognize falsehood.169  Again, falsehood is focalized through the 
perceiver, as with Ixion in Pythian 2, but this time, the fault of Koronis as the female 
crafter is equally emphasized.   
Female seduction is central to both cases of deception.  By contrast, no sexual 
deception occurs in the story of Tantalos and Pelops in either of the versions Pindar 
proffers in Olympian 1, even though Poseidon’s sexual attraction to Pelops is a key 
component of Pindar’s retelling.  Seduction by a male figure, as I will discuss later, 
contains no deceptive element.  Thus the pseudos of Zeus’ creation is a female figure 
intended to allure Ixion, yet because this figure is capable of acting of her own will, 
seductive actions are imputed to her rather than to Zeus.  In Ixion’s story, although the 
agent of the deception is a male figure,170 the deception takes the form of a woman.  
Similarly, Koronis, a woman, deceives Apollo by seducing another man.  Although the 
two cases are not exact parallels—Koronis, after all, does not deceive Apollo by seducing 
him—in each case, nevertheless, female seduction is closely associated or even 
coincident with deception.  Moreover, Pindar downplays Ischys’ role while highlighting 
Koronis’ culpable deceptiveness (κρupsilonoxiaβδαν πατρXς, 13; οupsilonpsiliδ’ Mλαθε σκοπXν, 27; θεµιν 
δXλον, 31), thus departing significantly from earlier versions of the myth where Ischys is 
                                                 
169 Pace Gildersleeve 1885, 272, who interprets more ambiguity in the phrase:  “Neither deceiving nor 
deceived.” 
 
170 I.e., Zeus, and, indirectly, Ixion.  See my discussion above. 
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presented as a rival to Apollo for Koronis’ affections.171  Pindar recasts the myth to 
emphasize the central role of specifically female seduction and deception. 
The alliance of female seduction and deception becomes ever clearer as we 
examine the other examples in Pindar, which more than once show the tendency for 
mythical female figures to compound their wrongfully seductive activities with 
deception.  In Nemean 5 Hippolyta is a foil for the virtuous Peleus, whose marriage to 
Thetis serves as the mythical paragon of harmonious relations between man and god, the 
forging of an alliance with Zeus Xenios as its overseer.  Zeus’ decision to marry Peleus to 
a sea nymph specifically rests on the observations he makes as the god who protects the 
guest-host relationship (34-35).  His approval alone, however, is not sufficient, for he 
must obtain Poseidon’s consent.  The marriage of Peleus and Thetis thus represents the 
culmination of Peleus’ respect for the guest-host relationship, Zeus’ recognition of this 
respect, and the cooperation of Zeus and Poseidon to reward it.  Peleus and Thetis’ union 
represents and results from collaborative relationships on several levels:  on the mortal 
level  Peleus’ upstanding behavior toward his xeinos earns him the reward of marriage; 
on the divine level the marriage cannot occur until Zeus confers with his brother 
Poseidon, whose broad influence is encapsulated in line 37 with the summary of his 
travels from Aigai to the Isthmos.  The spirit of collaboration that pervades the myth of 
Peleus and Thetis explains its frequency in odes about Aigina, whose centrality in 
commercial affairs often leads Pindar to note its reputation for xenia.172 
                                                 
171 Hymn. Hom. Ap. 210.  Gantz 1993, 91 even calls this allusion to Ischys  a “clash between Apollo and 
Ischys,” thus investing Ischys with a great deal more agency in the Homeric Hymn than he has in Pythian 
3. 
 
172 For xenia in Aigina, cf. Ol. 8.20-23, Nem. 3.2, Nem. 4.12, Nem. 5.8.  I should also note that Aigina is 
the mythical homeland of the Aiakidai, which further accounts for Peleus’ presence in odes to Aiginetan 
victors (e.g., Nem. 4, Nem. 5, Isthm. 8). 
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Pindar introduces the story of Peleus and Thetis with Peleus’ interactions with 
Hippolyta.   Although married to Akastos, Hippolyta attempts to seduce Peleus, but he 
refuses her advances, fearing retribution from Zeus Xenios (33-34).  Hippolyta’s reaction 
is to recruit her husband for an act of vengeance, claiming falsely that Peleus attempted to 
seduce her.  Unlike Ixion, who succumbs to the charms of a deceptive female figure and 
thereby disregards the importance of his xenia with Zeus, Peleus resists such a woman 
out of respect for xenia.  As with Ixion Pindar’s narrative of falsehood focalizes not 
through the agent of deception, but through the one who experiences it:  Peleus is 
rewarded for his virtue, but Hippolyta disappears from the narrative without a word as to 
her punishment or subsequent fate.173 
In many ways Hippolyta parallels Ixion while Peleus runs counter to him, for she, 
like Ixion, engages in a lustful attraction that would harm a guest-host relationship, this 
time between her husband and Peleus, rather than between herself and a guest.174  As I 
have pointed out above, however, Pindar does not characterize Ixion as deceptive, 
whereas Hippolyta is emphatically deceptive:  she is sneaky (δXλl, 26), deceitful even in 
seduction (παρφαµzνα λιτUνευεν, 32),175 and deftly persuasive, convincing her husband 
to take retaliatory action for false charges (πεoσαισ’ Fκοoταν ποικoλοις βουλεupsilonoxiaµασιν, | 
ψεupsilonoxiaσταν δj ποιητsν συνzπαξε λXγον, 28).176  Furthermore, these contrasting depictions of 
                                                 
173 Carnes 1996, 46 also notes this omission. 
 
174 Hippolyta is not cast as directly betraying her own xeinos because, as I have noted, participation by 
women in xenia is very rare.  See Herman 1987, 34. 
 
175 Cf. Miller 1982, 117, who observes that the participle παρφαµzνα here has the force of erotic 
persuasion, but notes that the other Pindaric uses of παρUφηµι connote misspeaking or insincere utterance.  
Cf. Slater 1969 s.v. πUρφαµι.  Cf. McClure 1999, 63. 
 
176 Again, cf. Miller 1982, 117, whose analysis of πUρφασις in Nemean 8.32 concludes that both senses of 
the verb παρUφηµι, persuasion and misrepresentation, are present.  I believe a similar combination of 
 102 
two similar wrongdoers, Ixion and Hippolyta, cannot be fully attributed to differing 
circumstances, for Pindar does not inform us of any of the measures Ixion surely must 
have taken to conceal his lust for Hera from Zeus.  The characterization of Hippolyta as 
tricky in Nemean 5 is consistent with her characterization in Nemean 4 (δολoαις | 
τzχναισι, 57-58177), yet the Peleus myth serves an entirely different purpose in that ode, 
where Peleus’ rejection of Hippolyta is not an emphasized prerequisite of his marriage to 
Thetis.  Although Pindar does not depict her favorably, it is notable that Hippolyta is 
credited with techne, a term that suggests her talent, intelligence, and resourcefulness.  
The use of this term, which elsewhere is used positively of artistry and skill,178 further 
indicates what is so loathsome about deception and seduction:  they pervert or misuse 
ordinarily positive, lauded qualities such as artfulness (cf. ποικoλοις, Ol. 1.28), cunning, 
and intelligence.  Deception is driven not by madness of any sort, but by cool rationality, 
a trait that would normally be favorable. 
Gender is the key factor in coupling deception with seduction.  In all of the myths 
I have discussed above—Ixion in Pythian 2, Koronis in Pythian 3, and Peleus in Nemean 
5—female figures and the falsehood they enact or even embody are central to the 
disruption of a guest-host relationship.  While the ramifications for this disruption vary, 
in each story a female figure is the instrument of corrupted relations between guest and 
                                                                                                                                                 
meanings occurs in the participle in Nem. 5.32, although Carnes 1996, 44 argues that παρφαµzνα refers to 
Hippolyta’s impropriety rather than insincerity. 
 
177 This similarity appears to be one of the few between the two treatments of the Peleus and Thetis myth in 
Nemeans 4 and 5.  See Carnes 1996 for an examination of how the two odes and their differing emphases 
work together.  Carnes 1996, 32 argues that Peleus employs the trickery that characterizes Hippolyta and 
bases this argument partly on a translation of χρησUµενος in Nem. 4.58 as “making use of.”  I do not find 
this part of his argument convincing, as there is no reference in Nemean 4 to any sort of trickery used by 
Peleus.  I prefer instead to follow Slater’s suggested translation of “experience” for the participle 
χρησUµενος. 
 
178 E.g., Ol. 7.35, Ol. 7.50, Pyth. 12.6.  For other examples, see Slater 1969 s.v. τzχνα. 
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host, even when it is a male figure like Ixion who violates xenia.  As Jeffrey Carnes has 
observed, Hippolyta in Nemeans 4 and 5 
threatens the whole system of exchange of women and the Name of the 
Father…The consequences of this are represented in immediate, concrete 
terms:  in female hands, language is harmful, exchange—including 
marriage and xenia—is queered, and men must suffer unjustly.  (Carnes 
1996, 44-45) 
 
Carnes’ study notes Hippolyta’s disruptive role in relationship exchanges and focuses on 
her “masculine” sexual aggression179 when she hijacks, to disastrous ends, the typically 
male role in the exchange of women:  “[Women] must be exchanged by others, not by 
themselves.”180  His observations about the corruptive role of women in the Hippolyta 
myth can be applied to the Koronis myth of Pythian 3 and the Ixion myth of Pythian 2, 
for Koronis, as I have pointed out, disrupts various relationships by arranging her own 
marriage while the Hera-cloud, a female embodiment of pseudos, cements the end of 
Ixion and Zeus’ xenia.  
I have endeavored with these examinations to explain Pindar’s persistent stance 
against falsehood and deception.  One recurrent reason is the profound effect of verbal 
and nonverbal falsehoods on those who experience them.  These effects are highlighted 
by the negative consequences for those who are duped (e.g., Ixion) and by the positive 
consequences for those who recognize and resist the falsehood (e.g., Peleus).  Underlying 
all these examples is the idea that the toxicity of falsehood and deception lies in their 
disruption of the guest-host relationship, either between poet and laudandus, or between 
                                                 
179 Carnes 1996, 26:  “Hippolyte displays masculine traits in her combination of sexual desire and 
aggression (the inverted, or projected, version of the Amazons’ dual status as libidinally- and aggressively-
invested objects).” 
 
180 Carnes 1996, 31.  Carnes ties this disruption to a female misuse of language.  I am hesitant to espouse 
Carnes’ argument in its entirety, largely because his resolutely structural and psychoanalytical approaches, 
I have found, can result in distorted interpretations of literary works. 
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the mythical figures of Pindar’s digressions.  The question of why falsehood and 
deception are to be shunned, despite their usefulness in crafting elegant poetry, is settled 
by an examination of their effects on sacred relationships like xenia or marriage.  Finally, 
Pindar’s use and adaptation of Hesiod’s Pandora in seductive female figures such as the 
Hera-cloud, Koronis, and Hippolyta demonstrate how he carves out a niche for himself in 
Greek literature by borrowing earlier gender paradigms but assimilating them to his 
epinician models of truth, falsehood, and guest-friendship. 
EXCURSUS:  MALE SEDUCTION 
 My claims thus far have rested on examples of seduction instigated by women, 
and I have shown how Pindar employs the trope of the deceptive woman to illustrate 
negative models of sacred relationships like xenia or marriage.  In some cases he adjusts 
traditional versions of myth to create a model of delicate reciprocity endangered by a 
female seductress.  Of course, other forces can endanger xenia, but deception is a key 
one, and its incarnation as seduction is present only in female figures.  Seduction by 
Pindar’s ale figures is not characterized as deceptive:  when Aegisthus seduces 
Clytemnestra in Pythian 11 and Jason seduces Medea in Pythian 4, neither is potrayed in 
the same negative, specifically deceptive light as Hippolyta, Koronis, or the Hera-cloud.  
These two stories provide two models of male seduction, one which disrupts a marriage, 
while the other forges one.  As different as the two cases may be, each strengthens my 
claim that it is specifically female seduction that violates xenia in Pindar.  Even in the 
case of Ixion, whose lust for Hera terminates his good standing with Zeus, the final nail 
in his coffin is in the form of a seductive female figure, the Hera-cloud.  The equation 
Pindar draws between feminine seduction and deception demonstrates how gender is an 
additional component in the illustrative oppositions of epinician poetry:  to 
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truth/falsehood, obligation/negligence, and reciprocity/inequity may be added 
male/female.  In discussing gender, I am cautious to avoid oversimplification—in no way 
is Pindar a simple misogynist, for his mythical female figures are not universally depicted 
in the same negative light as those I examine here; rather, I aim to explore and examine 
how Pindar employs gender paradigms such as female enigma to illustrate the more 
perplexing facets of deception. 
The case of Clytemnestra demonstrates how closely women and deception are 
linked.  Even though she is a victim of seduction rather than herself a seductress, she is 
still marked by her destructive and deceptive activities while her male seducer has neither 
of these traits.  Pindar’s depiction of the Agamemnon myth differs markedly from 
previous versions by giving prominence to Clytemnestra’s role in the destruction of 
Atreus’ house.  Certainly she does not enjoy a reputation for good housewifery in 
previous versions of the myth; in Homer she is the foil for the model wife of Penelope, 
and her culpability for Agamemnon’s death is a resounding theme:  she is guilty of 
trickery (Od. 2.35, 4.91-92), she is a partner in Agamemon’s murder (Od. 3.232-235), 
and she is also blamed for Cassandra’s death (Od. 11.405-434).  But Homer places equal 
if not greater blame on Aegisthus, who stole the wife of another man before killing him, 
explicitly disregarding the advice of Hermes (Od. 1.32-43).  Clytemnestra is in nowise 
guiltless, but Aegisthus’ culpability is equally stressed.  By contrast, iconographic 
evidence of the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.E. shows Clytemnestra playing a central 
role in Agamemnon’s death; several terra cotta plaques from Gortyn and shield-bands 
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from Aegina and Olympia depict her wielding the murder weapon,181 whereas Homer 
faults her for her treachery, but not for committing the act itself. 
Pindar is the “first literary source to move Clytemnestra fully to center stage, 
making the initiative and control of the situation hers (as well as the deed?), with 
Aegisthus reduced to a supporting role.”182  He accomplishes this in part through a ring-
structured narrative that begins in medias res with the death of Agamemnon, then 
recounts the rescue of Orestes and the death of Cassandra:183 
τsν δr φονευοµzνου πατρsς bρσινXα ΚλυταιµHστρας  
χειρnν upsilondasiaoxiaπο κρατερν Sκ δXλου τροφsς νελε δυσπενθzος, 
pπXτε ∆αρδανoδα κXραν ΠριUµου ΚασσUνδραν πολι χαλκ σupsilonvariaν  
   bγαµεµνονo­ 
ψυχ πXρευ’ bχzροντος Fκτν παρ’ εupsilonpsilioxiaσκιον 
νηλrς γυνU.  (Pyth. 11.17-22) 
 
[…Orestes] whom indeed, when his father was murdered, the nurse 
Arsinoe took from under Clytemnestra’s mighty hands184 away from her 
grievous treachery when she with a gray sword185 made the Dardanian 
daughter of Priam, Cassandra, go to the shadowy promontory of Acheron 
with the soul of Agamemnon, pitiless woman.  
 
The effect of this narrative order is to highlight first the horrific events for which 
Clytemnestra is responsible and for which she is consequently characterized as guileful 
(Sκ δXλου…δυσπενθzος, 18) and pitiless (νηλrς γυνU, 22).  The syntax further 
                                                 
181 Gantz 1993, 668-669.  Cf. Prag 1991, 243 n. 3 for a list and fuller description of the material 
representations. 
 
182 Gantz 1993, 672.  There is, however, supposition that Stesichorus’ Oresteia first promotes Clytemnestra 
to central status; cf. Prag 1991. 
 
183 See Finglass 2007, 35-36 for a tidy presentation of the events of the Agamemnon myth, both in 
chronological order and in the order presented by Pythian 11. 
 
184 Or “when his father was murdered by the mighty hands of Klytaimestra.”  Cf. Finglass 2007, 65.  The 
ambiguity of the phrase χειρnν upsilondasiaoxiaπο κρατερν—does it refer to Agamemnon’s slaying or to the near murder 
of Orestes?—serves to highlight Klytaimestra’s agency in both deeds of destruction. 
 
185 There has been some debate as to whether Klytaimestra’s murder weapon was a sword or an axe.  See 
Prag 1991 for a summary of arguments on either side of this debate. 
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emphasizes this characterization:  νηλrς γυνU is conspicuous both for concluding a 
sentence and for beginning a line. 
 This doubly condemnatory depiction of Clytemnestra is ostensibly mitigated by 
the subsequent rhetorical question positing two alternative reasons for Clytemnestra’s 
violence: 
πXτερXν νιν ρ’ Ýφιγzνει’ Sπ’ Εupsilonpsiliρoπl 
σφαχθεσα τλε πUτρας Mκνισεν βαρυπUλαµον ρσαι χXλον; 
Ì ¾τzρl λzχεϊ δαµαζοµzναν Mννυχοι πUραγον κοται;  (Pyth. 11.22-25) 
 
Did Iphigeneia, slaughtered at the Euripos far from her homeland, goad 
her to awaken her heavy-handed anger?  Or did nightly couplings seduce 
her, conquered by the bed of another?   
 
Having previously painted Clytemnestra a treacherous woman, Pindar suggests motherly 
revenge as a motivation for her violence.  Maternal concern, however, is incongruous 
with the danger she poses to Orestes, which Pindar describes in the previous lines (Pyth. 
11.17-18).  Indeed, even the initial word of this rhetorical question, πXτερον, signals to 
the audience the imminent appearance of an alternative,186 the enticements of adultery.   
Pindar diminishes Aegisthus’ agency in this act of adultery, thus presenting a 
female victim of seduction without a male seducer.  He uses the language of seduction in 
the verb πUραγον, whose prefix πUρ- denotes something done “‘amiss’ or ‘wrongly’”187 
and is thus comparable to the verb πUρφαµι, used of Hippolyta’s beguiling speech at 
Nemean 5.32 (παρφαµzνα λιτUνευεν, 32).  Yet the language focalizes through 
Clytemnestra’s experience rather than any person responsible for instigating it:  
Clytemnestra’s seduction is effected by “nightly couplings” (Mννυχοι…κοται, 25) rather 
than Aegisthus, who is not even named as the agent of Clytemnestra’s seduction or 
                                                 
186 Cf. Finglass 2007, 96 ad 22 (πXτερον). 
 
187 Miller 1982, 117. 
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submission (δαµαζοµzναν, 24).  To emphasize her culpability even further, Pindar refers 
to her adultery as the “most hateful fault of young wives” (τs δj νzαις FλXχοις | Mχθιστον 
FµπλUκιον, 25-26).  Clytemnestra’s treachery is thus attributed to her own failure to resist 
the allures of seduction.   
Aegisthus’ characterization lies in sharp contrast.  He, unlike Clytemnestra, is not 
portrayed as deceptive, for he has not misled Clytemnestra’s senses the way the false 
Hera-cloud does Ixion’s in Pythian 2, nor has he offered the same overly pleasurable 
allurements as the Hera-cloud’s “sweet lie” (ψεupsilonperispδος γλυκupsilonoxia, Pyth. 2.37) or “beautiful 
bane” (καλsν πµα, Pyth. 2.40).  Furthermore, Aegisthus displays none of the conniving 
wiles of Hippolyta in Nemeans 4 and 5.  Instead, the manner of his seduction is presented 
as dominance rather than trickery (δαµαζοµzναν, 24).  Clytemnestra herself differs from 
male victims of seduction, both the impervious (Peleus) and the corruptible (Ixion), for 
she makes no attempt to resist.  In Homer, by contrast, Clytemnestra initially resists 
Aegisthus’ advances, succumbing only when her guardian is slain (Od. 3.263-275).  
Pindar places all culpability for death and destruction on Clytemnestra, thus presenting 
women seducers and women seduced as equally guilty of deception and treachery. 
While Medea in Pythian 4 and Clytemnestra in Pythian 11 are superficially 
dissimilar (the former is a heroine, the latter, a villainess), both figures experience male 
seduction and when compared to female seducers, provide evidence for a fundamental 
difference between seduction of a woman and seduction by a woman.  Female seducers 
are marked by the language of deception and trickery, while male seducers lack this 
aspect of deception and characteristically enjoy active and willing participation by the 
woman being seduced.  Pindar’s Medea, who helps her guest-friends the Argonauts in 
Pythian 4 and is lauded at Olympian 13.53-54 for choosing a husband in defiance of her 
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father, is a far cry from the Euripidean villainess and from the other female characters of 
Pindar’s odes.  What prompts her helpfulness is her seduction by Jason, which 
fundamentally differs from the trickery exercised by the female seducers of Ixion and 
Peleus. 
A key difference lies in the role of Jason, whose seduction of Medea is instigated 
and aided by Aphrodite.  She provides Jason with an iynx-love-charm (Pyth. 4.213-216) 
along with the requisite rhetoric necessary for using the iynx (λιτUς τ’ SπαοιδUς, 217).188  
The purpose of this charm is to remove Medea’s filial piety and instill in her a longing for 
Greece (φρα Μηδεoας τοκzων Fφzλοιτο αiδn, ποθειν δ’ ½λλς αupsilonpsiliτUν | Sν φρασ 
καιοµzναν δονzοι µUστιγι Πειθοupsilonperispς, 218-219).  These lines point up several key 
differences between the seduction of Medea and other seductions, for hers is marked by 
persuasion (Πειθοupsilonperispς) rather than deception,189 and the immediate result of Medea’s 
seduction is a desire for a new home and homeland rather than for Jason.190  In Medea’s 
case Aphrodite and Jason replace Medea’s familial loyalties with allegiance to a foreign 
land. 
Jason’s seduction of Medea is motivated not solely by his own attraction to her, 
but also by his quest for the golden fleece, whereas seductions by women serve only their 
own sexual desires.  Aphrodite’s aid to Jason is part of a greater mission than mere sexual 
                                                 
188 On the iynx, see Gow 1934 and Faraone 1993. 
 
189 In addition to Pyth. 4.219, Peitho personified appears three times in Pindar’s extant poetry (Pyth. 9.39, 
Fr. 122.2, Fr. 123.14), each time in association with sexual desire and pleasure.   
 
190 While both persuasion and deception often have the similar goal of dissuading someone from a usual 
course of action in favor of one less conventional, persuasion does not have the same negative associations 
with misdirection.  Cf. Buxton 1982, 63-66, who examines the ambiguous distinction between peitho and 
dolos in Greek tragedy and points out that peitho tends to be characterized by frankness, whereas dolos 
subverts the normal values of the polis. 
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conquest, which explains why her actions here resemble Hera’s earlier motivation of the 
Argonauts: 
τsν δj παµπειθ γλυκupsilonvariaν äµιθzοισιν πXθον Mνδαιεν Øρα 
ναsς bργοupsilonperispς, µH τινα λειπXµενον 
τν Fκoνδυνον παρ µατρ µzνειν αinνα πzσσοντ’, Fλλ’ Sπ κα  
   θανUτl 
φUρµακον κUλλιστον ¾ς Fρετς λιξιν εupsilondasiaρzσθαι σupsilonvariaν λλοις.  (Pyth. 
4.184-187) 
  
Hera kindled that all-persuasive sweet longing in the demigods for the 
ship Argo so that no one would be left behind to stay with his mother, 
nursing a life without danger, but would discover with his other comrades, 
even at the price of death, the most beautiful means to his achievement.   
 
The conjoining of persuasion and desire outlined here (παµπειθ γλυκupsilonvariaν…πXθον, 184) 
resembles the experience of Medea (ποθειν δ’ ½λλς αupsilonpsiliτUν | Sν φρασ καιοµzναν δονzοι 
µUστιγι Πειθοupsilonperispς, 218-219).  Just as Hera instills in the Argonauts “all-persuasive 
longing” for the Argo rather than their parents, so the iynx of Aphrodite dissolves 
Medea’s filial ties and fills her instead with a yearning for Hellas.  The efficacy of Hera’s 
influence relies on eliciting the same reactions of sexual desire:  dismissal of what one 
would normally espouse in favor of something unknown and potentially dangerous. The 
similarities between Aphrodite’s and Hera’s respective actions demonstrate the 
applicability of persuasion outside of sexual contexts:  unlike the deceptive seduction of, 
for example, Koronis and Hippolyta, persuasion is employed in situations where an 
individual act of sexual conquest is not the sole or primary goal.  The result of persuasion 
is an incorporation of Medea’s and the Argonauts’ skills into the larger goals of Jason’s 
quest. 
 Persuasion, unlike deception, changes Medea’s perspective but does not put her 
on uneven footing with Jason.  Medea and Jason enter into a partnership whose mutuality 
and parity are stressed by the language of sharing and reciprocity:  καταoνησUν τε κοινsν 
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γUµον | γλυκupsilonvariaν Sν FλλUλοισι µεξαι (“And they agreed to contract with one another a 
sweet marriage by mutual consent,” 222-223).  This idea of consensual seduction is 
subsequently reiterated when the poet says that Jason “stole Medea with her own help” 
(κλzψεν τε ΜHδειαν σupsilonvariaν αupsilonpsiliτ, 250).  When Pindar describes Medea’s help for Jason’s 
encounter with the fire-breathing bulls, he refers to Medea as a xeina (πupsilonperispρ δz νιν οupsilonpsiliκ 
SXλει παµφαρµUκου ξεoνας Sφετµας, “The fire did not cause him to waver because of the 
commands of the host-woman, all-powerful in magic,” 233), a clear reference to her 
ethnic alterity, but also an encapsulation of the aid she provides to her non-Colchian 
guests.  The term connotes the relationship of reciprocal benefit in which she and Jason 
participate and reinforces the spirit of mutual consent that characterizes their marriage.  
This seduction of Medea differs fundamentally from the seductions of Ixion and Peleus, 
for it forges a guest-host relationship, whereas the seductions of Ixion and Peleus 
represent dissolution of one. 
 This model of seduction thus serves as a metaphor for Pindar’s conception of 
epinician poetry.  As the target of persuasion, Medea resembles the audience of the poet, 
who, as a xeinos, ingratiates the victor with the audience.  Medea too is a xeina, but on 
the other side of the guest-host relationship, the one persuaded.  The goal of exerting 
peitho on Medea is to procure her aid for Jason and the Argonauts.  Thus, when depicting 
Jason’s seduction of Medea, the poet portrays it as persuasion instead of manipulation or 
force, incorporating it as part of a guest-host relationship of reciprocity between speaker 
and addressee.  In this analogy, then, the poet is not a charlatan who presents a slanted 
point of view, but a forger of guest-host relations between himself, victor, and audience; 
his rhetoric is meant to persuade the audience to participate somehow in an honorable 
 112 
system of give and take that solidifies relationships and, in the case of Medea, contributes 
to lawful order and rule in Iolcos. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
I began this chapter with an examination of Olympian 1, arguing that oppositions 
between truth and falsehood could be understood through the lens of xenia and other 
relationships of obligation.   To that end my investigations have revealed that aletheia is 
depicted as a stabilizing force in ritualized friendships.  As such, it is connected to the 
poet’s epinician purpose since his relationship to the victor is portrayed as one of 
friendship or guest-friendship which entails reciprocal obligation.  On the other hand 
deception and falsehood cause a rupture in the formalized and ordered relationships of 
marriage and xenia, which accounts for the frequent disavowals of falsehood spoken by 
Pindar in his poetry.  His depictions of falsehood and trickery emphasize the destructive 
role such forces play on recognized institutions of order such as xenia.  Furthermore, 
trickery and falsehood have associations with female seduction and treachery and often 
characterize and are characterized by dishonorable female characters, even to the point 
where male deception is transferred to a female agent, as in the case of Zeus and pseudo-
Hera.  Such depiction of female seduction adheres to some extent to dominant paradigms 
of women in antiquity,191 but Pindar portrays these women as dangers to sacred 
institutions and thus exploits gender paradigms to illustrate the perils of deception to 
societal stability.  While it is intuitively known that falsehood and deception are 
undesirable qualities and that women were often villainized in antiquity, what my 
                                                 
191 Cf. McClure 1999, 32-69 who argues that verbal genres are gendered and that seductive persuasion is a 
specifically female mode of speech. 
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discussion, I hope, facilitates is a deeper understanding of how Pindar explains their 
noxious effects.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  WHAT IS TRUTH TO AESCHYLUS? 
VERBAL ALETHEIA 
 In previous chapters I observed that Aeschylus follows Homer’s lead in depicting 
truth as a primarily verbal entity by reserving the term FλHθεια and its cognates for verbal 
depictions of truth, whereas Pindar distinguishes between FλHθεια and its verbal 
representations, even at times implying that words can only approximate the truth.  The 
two poets’ different uses of terms for truth reflect the differences between their two 
genres, lyric and tragedy:  in epinician lyric the “poet”192 is solely responsible for 
delivering the truth to his audience, and he depicts himself as having unique access to this 
truth, whereas in tragedy no poetic persona is apparent, and the contexts of truth and 
falsehood are acts of communication between speakers and addressees.  That Aeschylus 
adheres to a largely verbal model of truth and falsehood is only appropriate since verbal 
exchange lies at the heart of Greek tragedy.  While there is an overarching plot and an 
implied concomitant narrative, the soul of this plot and narrative are in the verbal 
interactions that occur between characters.  Aeschylean truth must be a particularly 
verbal concept because the characters in tragedy rely on one another to learn the truth. 
OPPOSITIONS 
This is not to say that Aeschylus treats truth as an entirely subjective entity 
formed by some sort of dialectic that constructs the truth through a series of question-
and-answer sessions between interlocutors.  Instead the dialogue between characters 
                                                 
192 By which I mean, of course, the poetic persona reflected in the odes. 
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reflects a search for a truth that is not fictive, a truth that is carefully specified often by 
opposition to the nebulousness of dreams, hopes, or illusions.  In some ways Aeschylean 
truth has more specificity than Homer’s, since Aeschylus contextualizes truth and 
falsehood in terms of such contrasts.193  When the Chorus of the Agamemnon listen to 
Cassandra’s ravings, they recognize that she speaks the truth, as opposed to a mere 
semblance of it:   
τrν µjν Θυzστου δατα παιδεoων κρεnν 
ξυνκα κα πzφρικα, κα φXβος µ’ Mχει 
κλupsilonoxiaοντ’ Fληθnς οupsilonpsiliδjν Sξ¨κασµzνα.  (Ag. 1242-1244) 
 
I understand the feast of Thyestes on the flesh of his children and I 
shudder, and fear takes hold of me as I hear it truly told and not in images. 
 
The Chorus respond to Cassandra’s perceptions about the house of Atreus.  Despite her 
well-known curse of incomprehensibility, the Chorus do indeed understand her here as 
she describes an event familiar to them in plain words devoid of enigmatic metaphors.  
Her words have so vividly expressed the fate of Thyestes that the Chorus equate her 
words to the truth rather than a semblance of it.  The Chorus’ words hold two major 
implications:  they equate Cassandra’s verbal report and truth and posit an opposition 
between aletheia and appearance.  These implications resonate with the sentiments of 
Nemean 7 where truth and appearance are similarly distinguished, but the key difference 
is that the Pindaric example depicts verbal reports as a representation, a “mirror,” of the 
truth, whereas the truth of Cassandra’s plain words is set in opposition to images that 
only resemble the literal meaning.  Like Pindar Aeschylus implies the existence of an 
objective reality, but differs in that he, perhaps because tragedy consists of 
                                                 
193  I do not refer here to the contrast implied by the etymology of FλHθεια, which, as I have argued in 
previous chapters, is not strikingly apparent in the use of the word.  Almost any instance of FλHθεια may 
arguably contain an implicit contrast to what is hidden or forgotten, but such a contrast is ancillary and does 
not reveal as much as contextual uses of the word do. 
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communicative interactions, suggests that truthful reporting equates rather than 
approximates the truth. 
In the Prometheus Bound Io very clearly puts pleasant falsehoods in a different 
category from accuracy:   
εi δ’ Mχεις εiπεν » τι 
λοιπsν πXνων, σHµαινε, µηδz’ µ’ οiκτoσας 
ξupsilonoxiaνθαλπε µupsilonoxiaθοις ψευδzσιν.  (PV 683-685) 
 
If you can tell me what remains for me of toils, tell me, and do not out of 
pity coddle me with false stories. 
 
In her request for knowledge of her future, Io demands that Prometheus not lie to her in 
an effort to spare her feelings, using the term pseudos in a context where falsehood and 
pity are closely aligned.  She is careful to differentiate between what she actually wants 
to hear and what Prometheus may think she wants to hear, specifying knowledge of what 
will really happen, however painful, as the ultimate goal of her inquiry.  Furthermore, she 
acknowledges the potential for falsehood to prevail by catering to the listener’s desires 
over all else; both the sentiment and the wording recall Olympian 1.28-34: 
 θαupsilonoxiaµατα πολλU, καo ποupsilonoxia τι κα βροτnν φUτις upsilondasiaπjρ τsν Fλαθ λXγον   
δεδαιδαλµzνοι ψεupsilonoxiaδεσι ποικoλοις Sξαπατnντι µupsilonperispθοι·  
ΧUρις δ, περ παντα τεupsilonoxiaχει τ µεoλιχα θνατος, 
Sπιφzροισα τιµν κα πιστον SµHσατο πιστsν 
Mµµεναι τs πολλUκις· 
Éµzραι δ’ Sπoλοιποι 
µUρτυρες σοφτατοι. 
 
Indeed, there are many wonders, and somehow the speeches of mortals, 
stories, have been embellished beyond the true account and deceive with 
intricate falsehoods; for Charis, who provides mortals with all pleasant 
things, often renders the incredible credible by bringing honor.  But days 
to come are the wisest witnesses. 
 
The notable difference between the two passages is that the term aletheia is absent from 
Io’s words; thus the contrast is not explicitly between truth and enjoyable falsehood, but 
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between what will happen and pleasant illusion.  In the Pindaric passage the truth and the 
future (Sπoλοιποι) are intertwined, whereas Io mentions the future (λοιπXν) without 
situating it explicitly in a context of truth.  Instead Io’s quest for truth is implied by her 
rejection of false stories, and possibly by the verbal resonances between her words and 
Pindar’s, both of which attribute transparency to the future.  In the context of the 
Prometheus Bound, however, the possibility of access to the truth is a rather complicated 
issue,194 a full discussion of which is outside the scope of this project.  Suffice it to say 
that Io posits a clear distinction between desire and accuracy. 
Similarly, when the Chorus of the Agamemnon anticipate the Herald’s report, 
they posit truthful and dream-like as the two alternatives for the beacon-fires.195 
τUχ εiσXµεθα λαµπUδων φαεσφXρων 
φρυκτωριnν τε κα πυρsς παραλλαγUς, 
ε£τ’ οupsilonpsiliperispν Fληθες ε£τ’ νειρUτων δoκην 
τερπνsν τXδ’ Sλθsν φnς SφHλωσεν φρzνας.  (Ag. 489-492) 
  
Soon we will know about the light-bearing beacons and the transmissions 
of fire, whether they are true or whether this pleasant light has come and 
deceived our minds in the manner of dreams. 
 
Here too is the contrast between reality and appearance.  The opposition here is not only 
between truth and dreams, but between truth and illusions that convey credibility because 
they are pleasant to believe. 
Manipulating the Contrast Between Truth and Hope 
 In light of these contexts of opposition, we can surmise that truth is a distinct 
entity, neither good nor bad, but despite the sometimes severe acknowledgment that the 
truth will not necessarily bear good news, the characters of Aeschylean tragedy seem to 
                                                 
194 See n. 227 below. 
 
195 Page’s OCT and Lloyd-Jones 1979 give these lines to Clytemnestra in accordance with the manuscripts, 
but most other editors attribute them to the Chorus. 
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desire it for its own sake, regardless of the consequences.  Thus, a paradox:  the truth is at 
once distinct from hopes, wishes, or pleasant illusions, yet it in itself is also an object of 
desire, a void in knowledge that characters seek to fill through verbal communication.  
This contrast between truth and what is pleasant presents a complication when characters 
express an awareness of it, yet simultaneously desire the truth because they think it will 
bring better consequences than lies.  The problems of this paradox are reflected in the 
interaction between the Chorus and the Herald of the Agamemnon on the whereabouts of 
Menelaus: 
Κη.  οupsilonpsiliκ Mσθ’ »πως λzξαιµι τ ψευδr καλU, 
Sς τsν πολupsilonvariaν φoλοισι καρποupsilonperispσθαι χρXνον. 
Χο.  πnς δτ’ ν εiπν κεδν τFληθ τupsilonoxiaχοις;  
σχισθzντα δ’ οupsilonpsiliκ εupsilonpsilioxiaκρυπτα γoγνεται τUδε. 
Κη.  Éνrρ φαντος Sξ bχαιικοupsilonperisp στρατοupsilonperisp,  
αupsilonpsiliτXς τε κα τs πλοον· οupsilonpsili ψευδ λzγω.  (Ag. 620-625) 
 
Herald:  It cannot be that I speak what is false as fair, so that my friends 
harvest it for the long time ahead. 
Chorus:  If only you can tell good news and still speak truth!  When these 
things are severed, it is not easy to conceal.   
Herald:  The man is vanished from the Achaean host, he and his ship; I 
speak no lies. 
 
The Chorus seeks news of Menelaus, whose disappearance and absence furthers the plot 
of the Agamemnon by enabling Clytemnestra and Aegisthus to carry out their planned 
murder.196  Their hunger for information is offset by the Herald’s unwillingness to deliver 
bad news, particularly since he cannot adorn it into something pleasant.  He sets forth his 
truth-telling mission by plainly admitting his inability to make falsehoods pleasant, 
delivering the disastrous news that Menelaus is missing, and punctuating this report with 
a denial of falsehood.  Having opened his report with an acknowledgement of the false 
parallels between good and true, however, he later concludes on a hopeful note: 
                                                 
196 Cf. Lloyd-Jones 1979, 62. 
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Μενzλεων γρ οupsilonpsiliperispν 
πρnτXν τε κα µUλιστα προσδXκα µολεν·  
εi δ’ οupsilonpsiliperispν τις Fκτς äλoου νιν στορε 
κα ζnντα κα βλzποντα, µηχανας ∆ιsς  
οupsilonpsilioxiaπω θzλοντος Sξαναλnσαι γzνος,  
Sλπoς τις αupsilonpsiliτsν πρsς δXµους «ξειν πUλιν. 
τοσαupsilonperispτ’ Fκοupsilonoxiaσας £σθι τFληθ κλupsilonoxiaων.  (Ag. 674-680) 
 
As for Menelaus, first and chiefly, expect that he will come.  Well, if some 
ray of the sun finds him out still flourishing in life, by the contrivance of a 
Zeus who does not yet wish to destroy his race, there is some hope that he 
will come back home.  Know that in hearing so much you have heard the 
truth!  
 
The Herald’s claim to accuracy is a fairly common generic trope of messenger 
speeches,197 but the placement of this claim at the conclusion of his speech is significant.  
He begins on a note of hesitation, reluctant to convey bad news but also unwilling to tell 
a placating falsehood.  The Chorus agree about the futility of concealing the truth when it 
is separate from the good, but at the same time express a desire for the truth to be good 
news.198  In any case the Herald delays the claim that his report is true (τFληθ) until he 
has delivered news of something hopeful, even though he cannot confirm Menelaus’ 
whereabouts.  The claim of truth at the end of such a speculative statement is odd and 
suggests that the desire for the truth as well as for good news can coincide when the full 
truth is unknown.   
The potential conflict that arises from the desire for truth is whether this desire 
will supersede others.  Clytemnestra exploits this conflict when she makes the 
astonishing and profoundly dishonest claim that she has been a faithful wife in 
Agamemnon’s absence:   
                                                 
197 Cf. Pers. 513-514, Sept. 66-68, 651-652.  See also Supp. 931-932 where the Herald of the Egyptians 
states the duty of a herald to report precisely and completely. 
 
198 Goldhill 1984, 57:  “In other words, this construction both asserts a wish (that the messenger might 
speak both good and true things) and puts its possibility under question.” 
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γυνακα πιστrν δ’ Sν δXµοις εupsilondasiaoxiaροι µολν 
οÊανπερ οupsilonpsiliperispν Mλειπε, δωµUτων κupsilonoxiaνα 
Sσθλrν Sκεoνl, πολεµαν τος δupsilonoxiaσφροσιν, 
κα τλλ’ pµοoαν πUντα, σηµαντHριον 
οupsilonpsiliδjν διαφθεoρασαν Sν µHκει χρXνου· 
οupsilonpsiliδ’ ο©δα τzρψιν οupsilonpsiliδ’ Sπoψογον φUτιν 
λλου πρsς Fνδρsς µλλον Ì χαλκοupsilonperisp βαφUς. 
τοιXσδ’ p κXµπος, τς Fληθεoας γzµων, 
οupsilonpsiliκ αiσχρsς ¶ς γυναικ γενναo­ λακεν.  (Ag. 606-614) 
 
Let him come and find a faithful wife at home, just as he left her, a watch-
dog of his home, loyal to him, hostile to his enemies, and in all other ways 
the same woman who has destroyed no seal over time.  I know neither 
pleasure nor censorious speech from another man any more than I know 
the art of tempering brass.  Such is my boast, brimming with truth, not 
shameful for a noble woman to shout. 
 
Her words express the direct and diametric opposite to the truth:  far from being a trusty 
watch-dog of Agamemnon’s home, she has taken a lover into her home with whom she 
conspires to murder her husband.  The most appalling aspect of her speech is not only 
that it is untrue but that in the wake of these patent untruths, it claims to be “brimming 
with truth.”  Her attachment of the term aletheia to a completely false statement reveals 
the extent of her character’s duplicity and showcases Aeschylean dynamics of truth and 
falsehood on several counts.199  First, she uses aletheia to characterize a verbal account, 
thus in keeping with the Aeschylean and Homeric notion that truth is a primarily verbal 
manifestation.  Secondly, she is telling the Chorus what she thinks is expected of a good 
wife.  Instead of confessing her actual activities during Agamemnon’s absence, 
Clytemnestra provides a description of how she should have behaved if she were truly 
devoted to him.  She exploits the Chorus’ desire for the truth by lying in such a way as to 
satisfy another of their desires, the desire for her wifely loyalty to Agamemnon.  Whether 
or not she successfully deceives the Chorus is another matter; their response comes in the 
                                                 
199 Cf. Goldhill 1986, 8, who observes that the phrase “‘loaded with truth’…suggests the marked possibility 
of its opposite, that words can be emptied, unloaded of truth.” 
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textually problematic lines αupsilondasiaoxiaτη µjν οupsilondasiaoxiaτως † ε©πε µανθUνοντo σοι, | τοροσιν ¾ρµηνεupsilonperispσιν 
εupsilonpsiliπρεπnς † λXγον (“So she spoke; if you understand through clear interpreters, her 
speech looks fair,” Ag. 615-616);200 although the meaning of these lines is not entirely 
clear, the Chorus’ references to interpreters of the speech and its seemliness (¾ρµηνεupsilonperispσιν 
εupsilonpsiliπρεπnς) indicate a degree of irony.201 
WHERE IS THE TRUTH TO BE FOUND?  WHO KNOWS THE TRUTH? 
So far I have argued that Aeschylean truth is a primarily verbal entity delineated 
by opposition to illusory hopes or desires.  It is separate from desire, yet is itself an object 
of desire since the characters of Aeschylus, while acknowledging the distinction between 
truth and what they want, nevertheless exhibit a consistent desire to learn the truth.  This 
desire for truth raises the questions, particularly in light of the doubt shown toward 
Clytemnestra by the Chorus in the last passage, of who has access to the truth and where 
it is to be found.  There are three main avenues to truth in Aeschylus:  nonverbal signals, 
messenger-figures, and prophecy. 
1.  Nonverbal Signals 
Of this first category, nonverbal signals, there are two significant examples, the 
similarities between which I discussed briefly in Chapter Two and now elaborate here.  In 
the Seven Against Thebes the Chorus of Theban women launch into a long choral ode, 
voicing their despair about the dangers that loom over their city as the troops of the 
feuding brothers Eteocles and Polyneices confront each other.  They justify their fears at 
                                                 
200 For a summary of scholarly controversies surrounding these lines, see Denniston and Page 1957, ad 615-
16. 
 
201 Cf. Goldhill 1984, 57:  “πρεπ- refers back to the element of the visible in the watchman’s speech and 
throughout the play, and implies, as before, here particularly through the irony of the chorus, the possibility 
of speech having an opposite predication.” 
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the opening of the ode by interpreting the dust-cloud raised by Polyneices’ army as 
evidence of Thebes’ imminent doom, a “clear, true messenger” of the danger to come:   
Χο.  θρεupsilonperispµαι φοβερ µεγUλ’ χη. 
µεθεται στρατsς στρατXπεδον λιπν· 
ε πολupsilonvariaς »δε λες πρXδροµος ππXτας· 
αiθερoα κXνις µε πεoθει φανεσ’ 
ναυδος σαφrς Mτυµος γγελος.  (Sept. 78-82) 
 
My sorrows are great and fearful; I cry aloud.  The army has left the camp 
and is gone.  Look at the forward rushing river, the great tide of horsemen!  
A cloud of dust on high appears and persuades me, a messenger clear and 
true, though voiceless.     
 
The second example is in the beacon-fires of the Agamemnon.  Upon spotting the beacon 
the Watchman declares the accuracy of its message—the fall of Troy—and hastens to 
notify Clytemnestra:   
bγαµzµνονος γυναικ σηµαoνω τορnς  
εupsilonpsiliνς Sπαντεoλασαν ¶ς τUχος δXµοις  
λολυγµsν εupsilonpsiliφηµοupsilonperispντα τÏδε λαµπUδι 
Sπορθoαζειν, ε£περ Ýλoου πXλις  
¾Uλωκεν, ¶ς p φρυκτsς Fγγzλλων πρzπει.  (Ag. 26-30) 
 
To Agamemnon’s wife202 I signal clearly that she may rise from her bed as 
quickly as possible and raise a jubilant cry of thanksgiving at this torch, if 
the city of Ilium is taken,203 as the beacon’s light announces. 
 
The Watchman informs Clytemnestra, who similarly treats the fires as evidence of 
victory and later announces the news to the Chorus. 
Both Clytemnestra and the Chorus of the Seven, however, encounter resistance to 
their claims.  In the Seven the Chorus’ lament elicits Eteocles’ fierce and unrelenting 
disapproval: 
upsilondasiaµς Sρωτn, θρzµµατ’ οupsilonpsiliκ FνασχετU, 
                                                 
202 It is significant that this reference to Clytemnestra does not use her name, instead designating her the 
wife of Agamemnon and thus portending the sexual conflict of the play, an issue I will discuss later in this 
chapter.  See Winnington-Ingram 1983, 102.  
 
203 The ε£περ designates confidence rather than skepticism.  See Denniston and Page 1957, ad 29. 
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 ταupsilonperispτ’ ριστα κα πXλει σωτHρια 
στρατ τε θUρσος τδε πυργηρουµzνl, 
βρzτη πεσοupsilonoxiaσας πρsς πολισσοupsilonoxiaχων θεnν 
αupsilonpsilioxiaειν, λακUζειν, σωφρXνων µισHµατα;   
µHτ’ Sν κακοσι µHτ’ Sν εupsilonpsiliεστο φoλ¨ 
ξupsilonoxiaνοικος ε£ην τ γυναικεol γzνει· 
κρατοupsilonperispσα µjν γρ οupsilonpsiliχ pµιλητsν θρUσος,  
δεoσασα δ’ ο£κl κα πXλει πλzον κακXν. 
κα νupsilonperispν πολoταις τUσδε διαδρXµους φυγς  
θεσαι διερροθHσατ’ ψυχον κUκην.  (Sept. 181-191) 
 
You insupportable creatures, I ask you, is it best, does it offer safety for 
the city and courage for this beleaguered army of ours for you to fall at the 
statues of the city’s gods crying and howling, an object of hatred for all 
temperate souls?  Neither in evils nor in fair good luck may I share a 
dwelling with the female race!  When she’s triumphant, hers a confidence 
past converse with another, when afraid an evil greater both for home and 
city.  Here now running wild among the citizenry you inspire spiritless 
cowardice with your clamor. 
 
The very fact of Eteocles’ response to the Chorus is significant, for as Hutchinson and 
Foley observe, choral songs are generally ignored by the next speaker.204  Eteocles’ 
reaction is far from dismissive, instead excoriating the Chorus for their overreaction and 
assigning their behavior to a female propensity for hasty extremes of emotion. 
Clytemnestra too encounters resistance.  Although the Chorus express their 
reverence to Clytemnestra (258), they make clear that their allegiance is a function of her 
marriage to Agamemnon, whose absence makes her his proxy (259-260).205  Her dealings 
with them are thereafter marked by persistent skepticism as she reports news of the fall of 
Troy:  they express disbelief (πnς φæς; πzφευγε τοupsilonpsiliperispπος Sξ Fπιστoας, “How do you say?  
From disbelief your word has escaped me,” 268) and request to know her sources, 
incredulous that a message could arrive so quickly (τo γρ τs πιστXν; Mστι τnνδz σοι 
τzκµαρ; “For what proof do you have?  Do you have evidence of this?” 272; κα τoς τXδ’ 
                                                 
204 Hutchinson 1985, ad 182-202; Foley 2001, 45. 
 
205 Cf. Goldhill 1984, 34:  “[Clytemnestra’s] power is because of the lack not just of the ruler but of the 
‘male.’” 
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Sξoκοιτ’ ν Fγγzλων τUχος; “And what kind of messenger could arrive with such speed as 
this?” 280).  They surmise that she may have gathered her news from dreams or rumors 
(πXτερα δ’ νεoρων φUσµατ’ εupsilonpsiliπιθ σzβεις, “But do you respect the visions of dreams as 
persuasive?” 274; Fλλ’  σ’ Sπoανzν τις πτερος φUτις; “But is it some wingless rumor 
exciting you?” 276).  Clytemnestra effectually deflects each of their accusations and puts 
the Chorus’ anxiety to rest by telling them of the beacon-fires (281-316) and even 
providing an imagined account of the events at Troy (320-350). 
The Chorus’ request for evidence (τs πιστXν, τzκµαρ, 272) accords with explicit 
expressions from contemporaneous literature of the value of witnessing events, for 
example when Pindar claims to be a witness or claims knowledge from witnesses, or in 
the Athenians’ marked contrast between hearsay and first-hand knowledge in Thuc. 
1.73.2.  Clytemnestra garners the Chorus’ acceptance by specifying her source and 
providing a description of the beacon-fires that explains the relay-system of message-
transference (281-316), but with one key opening phrase portrays its relay as a single, 
unified message:  Øφαιστος, çδης λαµπρsν Sκπzµπων σzλας· | φρυκτsς δj φρυκτsν δεupsilonperispρ’ 
Fπ’ FγγUρου πυρsς | Mπεµπεν (“Hephaestus, sending from Ida a bright flame.  And 
beacon began to send beacon this way by means of the courier fire,” 281-283).206  By 
attributing the fires to Hephaestus, Clytemnestra gives the message a divine source and 
thereafter presents the series of beacon-fires as a single traveling flame.207   
She then provides a detailed description of Troy, conveying far more information 
than what could be gleaned from the fires alone;208 she describes the fallen bodies (325-
                                                 
206 For the use of personification here, see Goldhill 1984, 38. 
 
207 Cf. Lloyd-Jones 1979, 15. 
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327), the lamentations of the newly enslaved Trojan elders (328), and the toils of the 
Greek conquerors (330-337), none of which could have been explicit in the beacon-fires.  
Even though the details provided are imagined, they are significant demonstrations of 
Clytemnestra’s grasp of war from both the Greek and Trojan points of view,209 and her 
understanding of the consequences of war, as she refers to the conquerors’ choice to 
respect or disrespect the gods of Troy (338-340).  Her account accordingly meets with 
acceptance by the Chorus, who praise her manlike prudence and her use of “trusty” 
proofs210 (γupsilonoxiaναι, κατ’ νδρα σφρον’ εupsilonpsiliφρXνως λzγεις· | Sγ δ’ Fκοupsilonoxiaσας πιστU σου 
τεκµHρια | θεοupsilonvariaς προσειπεν εupsilonpsiliperisp παρασκευUζοµαι, “Woman, you speak graciously like a 
prudent man.  I have heard your trusty proofs and am prepared to address the gods in 
praise,” 351-353).211  What Clytemnestra does to garner the Chorus’ trust, if only 
temporarily, is to elaborate the nonverbal message of the beacon-fires.212   
The Chorus, after initially accepting her story, regress to their earlier skepticism: 
πυρsς δ’ upsilondasiaπ’ εupsilonpsiliαγγzλου 
πXλιν διHκει θο  
                                                                                                                                                 
208 Goward 2005, 64 and Fraenkel 1950, ad loc. also note the degree of detail in Clytemnestra’s account.  
Fraenkel argues that Clytemnestra presents hoia an genoito rather than ta genomena, which Goward claims 
“misses the point:  Aeschylus deliberately undermines a logical foundation, leaving the voice to manifest 
itself in all its eloquence and power.”  I am inclined to agree with Fraenkel, since he suggests that 
Clytemnestra’s account is imagined but realistic, and the Chorus accept it as such; Goward’s focus on the 
power of Clytemnestra’s voice strikes me as overly speculative and narrowly focused. 
 
209 Clytemnestra presents the Trojan and Greek points of view in lines 326-329 and 330-337, respectively. 
 
210Pace Denniston and Page 1957, ad 352 who think the Chorus’ praise “is not to be taken seriously; 
nothing Clytemnestra has said affords evidence, let alone ‘convincing proof’, that the beacons betoken the 
fall of Troy.” 
 
211 McClure 1999, 74 argues that Clytemnestra builds credibility with the Chorus by using the masculine 
discourse of proofs and logic—indeed the Chorus praises Clytemnestra’s reason as belonging to a man—
but capping her speech with a clear statement of her womanhood (348), thus gaining the upper hand with 
the Chorus by blending masculine and feminine discourses and exploiting the advantages offered by both.  
McClure is correct to observe the ambiguity of Clytemnestra’s gender (cf. Winnington-Ingram 1983, 101-
131) but perhaps goes too far in designating Clytemnestra’s discourse one of proofs and logic—in itself a 
questionable assertion—and terming such a discourse “masculine.” 
 
212 Cf. Goldhill 1984, 38-39 who notes Clytemnestra’s verbalization of a non-verbal message. 
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βαξις· εi δ’ SτHτυµος,  
τoς ο©δεν, ª τι θεXν Sστo π¨ ψupsilonoxiaθος; 
τoς ºδε παιδνsς Ì φρενnν κεκοµµzνος, 
φλογsς παραγγzλµασιν 
νzοις πυρωθzντα καρδoαν, Mπειτ’  
 Fλλαγ λXγου καµεν; 
γυνακsς αiχµ πρzπει 
πρs τοupsilonperisp φανzντος χUριν ξυναινzσαι· 
πιθανsς γαν p θλυς »ρος Sπινzµεται 
ταχupsilonoxiaπορος· Fλλ ταχupsilonoxiaµορον 
γυναικογHρυτον λλυται κλzος.  (Ag. 475-487) 
 
At the bidding of the fire that brought good news through the city runs the 
swift message; who knows if it is true or if it is some godly lie?213  Who is 
so childish or so far shaken out of his senses as to let his heart take fire at 
the new messages of the beacon and then to suffer when the story is 
changed?  It is fitting for a woman’s spirit to give thanks for something 
before it has appeared.  Too persuasive, a woman’s ordinance spreads far, 
traveling fast; but dying fast a rumor voiced by a woman comes to 
nothing.214 
 
The Chorus of the Seven and Clytemnestra encounter two distinct accusations:  the 
Chorus is charged with immoderate emotionality, while Clytemnestra’s supposed error is 
capricious naïveté, but both of these are allegedly female tendencies.  A further similarity 
lies in the words describing their respective interpretations:  the Theban women describe 
the dust-cloud as a “true messenger,” an Mτυµος γγελος, while the Chorus of the 
Agamemnon term the beacon-fires as possibly SτHτυµος, a variant of Mτυµος.  The choice 
in both passages of the adjective Mτυµος instead of FληθHς is striking since each instance 
                                                 
213 Cf. the false dream sent by Zeus to Agamemnon in Il. 2. 
 
214 Scholarly confusion and disagreement surround the Chorus’ sudden reversal.  As Denniston and Page 
1957, ad 475ff. note, “There is nothing in this play or any other properly comparable with the present 
example, in which the foundations of a whole stasimon are undermined in the epode with sudden and total 
ruin.”  Fraenkel 1950, 249 posits a “certain looseness in the psychological texture of the Chorus” as an 
explanation.  Winington-Ingram 1983, 104 notes that the Chorus has just expressed anxiety over the 
negative consequences of war for its victors and conjectures that this passage expresses relief that the news 
of Troy’s fall may still be false.  Whatever the psychological motivation may be for the reversal, these lines 
and the ones that follow provide effective anticipation for the Herald’s imminent entrance and the news he 
brings.  Cf. Fraenkel 1950, 248:  “The moment which the poet has chosen for the utterance of the Elders’ 
doubts was dictated to him by considerations of dramatic structure, that is to say the need for an effectual 
foil to the Herald’s speech.” 
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refers to a nonverbal signal, whereas FληθHς, as I have discussed in Chapter Two, tends 
to characterize verbal communications.  The use of Mτυµος has implications for the truth-
value of the message—neither the dust-cloud nor the beacon-fires carries the authority of 
a speaking messenger who communicates a true report based on what he has witnessed 
first-hand.  Instead both the cloud and the fires are nonverbal signals whose authority as 
messages of truth rests with whoever has interpreted them as such.  The message of a 
nonverbal signal results not from a communication between two speakers but rather an 
interpretation by one person of an inanimate message; it thus does not convey the same 
degree of consensual truth that an FληθHς message does.  
The internal receptions of the Theban women and of Clytemnestra support the 
notion that their Mτυµος messages command very little belief.  Eteocles’ harsh reaction to 
the Chorus, who have annoyed him with their excessive lamentations, is understandable 
since the women have admittedly read a lot, perhaps too much, into the significance of 
the dust-cloud, which they mistakenly see as an omen of their annihilation.  At the end of 
the play Thebes still stands, and the Theban women are safe from the danger they so 
readily believed would overcome them.  Likewise, the doubt Clytemnestra encounters 
from the Chorus of the Agamemnon is somewhat justified, as the beacon-fires are proof 
positive neither of Troy’s fall nor of Agamemnon’s return, which Clytemnestra equates 
with the fall of Troy.  The harsh reaction from Eteocles and the doubt of the Chorus in 
the Agamemnon together imply that this type of truth, which derives from interpretation 
of nonverbal signals and is termed Mτυµος, is considered less reliable than the type 
relayed through verbal communication. 
The beacon-fires are eventually described as FληθHς, but not until the Herald’s 
arrival on the scene is anticipated: 
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τUχ εiσXµεθα λαµπUδων φαεσφXρων 
φρυκτωριnν τε κα πυρsς παραλλαγUς, 
ε£τ’ οupsilonpsiliperispν Fληθες ε£τ’ νειρUτων δoκην 
τερπνsν τXδ’ Sλθsν φnς SφHλωσεν φρzνας· 
κHρυκ’ Fπ’ Fκτς τXνδ’ pρn κατUσκιον 
κλUδοις Sλαoας.  (Ag. 489-494) 
  
Soon we will know about the beacon-watchings and the fire-transmissions 
of the light-bearing torches, whether they are true or whether this light that 
brought joy in its coming has beguiled us in the manner of dreams.  I see 
here a herald from the shore, his brow shaded with twigs of olive.215 
 
The Chorus speak these lines in response to Clytemnestra’s reading of the beacon-fires, 
and the implications are clear:  her interpretation can be proven only by the Herald.  
Significantly, the veracity of the beacon-fires is now described by the word FληθHς 
instead of Mτυµος or SτHτυµος.  Now that the Herald may corroborate or deny 
Clytemnestra’s claim, the beacon-fires that form its basis are either FληθHς or illusory.  
The fires themselves are not means to truth as much as the Herald is, since whether or not 
Clytemnestra’s interpretation is deemed true depends on his report.  The fires’ veracity is 
questionable until supported by another more credible source, a source that may engage 
in communicative interaction of a verbal nature; hence the application of the adjective 
FληθHς over Mτυµος here.   
Whereas Clytemnestra makes an inference based on a nonverbal message, the 
Herald’s information comes from eyewitness experience and communication with those 
present at the events he reports.  His capacity for verbal interaction is specifically 
contrasted with the “voicelessness” of the beacon-fires: 
  µαρτυρε δz µοι κUσις  
πηλοupsilonperisp ξupsilonoxiaνουρος διψoα κXνις τUδε, 
¶ς οupsilonpsilioxiaτ’ ναυδος οupsilonpsilioxiaτε σοι δαoων φλXγα 
upsilondasiaoxiaλης ρεoας σηµανε καπν πυρXς.  (Ag. 494-497) 
                                                 
215 Page’s OCT and Lloyd-Jones 1979 give these lines to Clytemnestra in accordance with the manuscripts, 
but most other editors attribute them to the Chorus. 
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Mud’s brother and neighbor, thirsty dust, attests this much, that he is not 
voiceless, nor will you find him kindling the flame of mountain 
brushwood to make signals with a fire that is illusion. 
 
While Mτυµος describes an interpretive truth that stems from a nonverbal signal, FληθHς 
designates a truth that can be communicated between two parties, an exchange of truth, 
which is what the characters of Aeschylean tragedy seem to value more. 
2.  Messengers 
The credibility granted to the Herald of the Agamemnon underscores the role of 
the messenger-figure as a speaker of truth.  Nonverbal signals do not carry the same 
authority by comparison and are explicitly compared to verbal messages in the 
Choephoroi.  When Electra catches sight of a lock of hair, she and the Chorus surmise 
that it may belong to Orestes, but lament that this unspeaking sign does not convey the 
same certainty as a messenger:  ε£θ’ ε©χε φωνrν Mφρον’ Fγγzλου δoκην, | »πως δoφροντις 
οupsilonpsiliperispσα µr ’κινυσσXµην (“If only it had sense and speech, like a messenger, so that I was 
not of two minds, swayed to and fro,” Cho. 195-196).  When she discovers an additional 
indicator of Orestes’ presence, she remains dubious (κα µν στoβοι γε, δεupsilonoxiaτερον 
τεκµHριον, “Yes, and here are footprints, a second sign,” Cho. 205), and her doubts 
gradually subside only when Orestes presents himself to her, confirms her suspicions 
about the lock (229-230), and produces an additional sign of his identity, a garment 
woven by her (231-232). 
The messenger-figure, then, is treated as the most credible, unquestionable 
purveyor of truth in Aeschylean drama because of his first-hand knowledge and his 
ability to communicate it verbally.216  None of the messengers in Aeschylus encounters 
                                                 
216 Cf. Pers. 266-267 where the Herald claims eyewitness knowledge of the events he reports. 
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incredulity, and those who are particularly welcomed as sources of truth report what has 
happened abroad, far from the staged action of the tragedy.  Although it is a 
commonplace in Greek drama for a messenger-figure to report offstage action, the 
Aeschylean messenger is distinct in that he is comparatively rare and often reports events 
that have occurred prior to, rather than simultaneously with, the events of the play.217  He 
is therefore endowed with a great deal of privileged information and enjoys authority 
because he alone can provide a first-hand account of events that would otherwise be 
unknown or unknowable to the characters onstage.218   
The Herald of the Agamemnon consequently arrives on the scene amidst eager 
anticipation of his truthfulness.  Since his first task is to confirm Clytemnestra’s report, 
he is not the sole source of information, but he is the only one who can provide a first-
hand account of the events at Troy.  He therefore does not need to provide evidence 
either for his report or for his character to elicit the Chorus’ belief, and his quite general 
account is consistent with Clytemnestra’s, but provides no details that would afford him 
greater credibility over her.  The Chorus receive him with a friendly greeting and with 
questions about his well-being, thus showing how they identify with and relate to him 
(κρυξ bχαιnν χαρε τnν Fπs στρατοupsilonperisp, “Hail, herald of the Achaean army!” Ag. 539; 
Mρως πατρ²ας τσδε γς σ’ Sγupsilonoxiaµνασεν; “Did love of your ancestral land afflict you?” Ag. 
540).  When the Herald concludes his first speech, the Chorus cement their unquestioning 
belief in his account, even paying him the further compliment that his account edifies and 
rejuvenates:  νικµενος λXγοισιν οupsilonpsiliκ Fναoνοµαι, | Fε γαρ äβ τος γzρουσιν εupsilonpsiliµαθεν 
                                                 
217 Cf. Taplin 1977, 83.  The notable exception is the angelos at Sept. 792. 
 
218 Cf. Taplin 1977, 81-82 who discusses the essential elements of a messenger scene:  “Not every scene 
with any sort of narrative element will pass as a messenger scene.  Rather, there are three elements 
involved:  anonymous eye-witness, set-piece narrative speech, and over-all dramatic function…The usual 
angelos is, like this in Pers, a lower-status character who has no other part in the play.” 
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(“Your words prevail on me, and I do not reject them; for eagerness to learn is always a 
renewal of youth for the old,” 583-584). 
Clytemnestra’s interpretation of the beacon-fires, by contrast, meets with 
skepticism from the Chorus, whose doubt indicates that her means of acquiring the truth 
are not as credible as the Herald’s.  When she is vindicated, she mocks those who would 
discredit the beacon-fires and her belief in them: 
FνωλXλυξα µjν πUλαι χαρς upsilondasiaoxiaπο, 
»τ’ λθ’ p πρnτος νupsilonoxiaχιος γγελος πυρsς 
φρUζων λωσιν Ýλoου τ’ FνUστασιν· 
καo τoς µ’ Sνoπτων ε©πε “φρυκτωρnν δι 
πεισθεσα Τροoαν νupsilonperispν πεπορθσθαι δοκες; 
 κUρτα πρsς γυναικsς α£ρεσθαι κzαρ.”  (590-592) 
 
I cried aloud with joy long since, when the first message of the fire came 
by night, indicating the capture and sack of Ilium.  And some rebuking me 
said, “Convinced by fire signals do you now think Troy has been sacked?  
Indeed it is like a woman to let her feelings carry her away.” 
 
She exits soon thereafter, leaving the Herald and the Chorus to continue their discourse 
(615-680).  This section showcases the uniqueness of the Herald’s knowledge:  the 
Chorus ask about Menelaus, who they learn is missing along with his crew.  The Herald 
alone is in a position to provide information about Menelaus.  While Clytemnestra learns 
much from the beacon-fires, they tell her nothing of Menelaus’ whereabouts, or even that 
Menelaus is lost.   
The Messenger of the Persians enjoys a similar singularity of knowledge.  When 
he reports to Queen Atossa the disaster in Greece, he concludes with a claim to truth that 
goes unquestioned:   
ταupsilonperispτ’ Mστ’ Fληθ, πολλ δ’ Sκλεoπω λzγων 
κακnν ¥ Πzρσαις Sγκατzσκηψεν θεXς.  (Pers. 512-513) 
 
These things are true, but I omit many of the woes a god has hurled 
against the Persians.   
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He does not lose any credibility by admitting the curtailed nature of his account, instead 
boosting it with his implied knowledge of further corroborating details.219  The response 
from the Chorus and the Queen is not to question his account but to give tacit recognition 
of its veracity by posing no further questions, instead simply bursting into exclamations 
of lament (515-531).  Indeed, his very arrival on the scene is marked by the Chorus’ 
anticipation of his report: 
Fλλ’ Sµο δοκεν τUχ’ ε£σ¨ πUντα ναµερτ λXγον. 
τοupsilonperispδε γρ δρUµηµα φωτsς Περσικsν πρzπει µαθεν, 
κα φzρει σαφzς τι πργος Sσθλsν Ì κακsν κλupsilonoxiaειν.  (Pers. 246-248) 
 
But soon you will know the whole infallible account:  a Persian runner 
comes bearing some clear report, good or bad to hear. 
   
The terms the Chorus use to designate the Messenger’s account clearly convey their 
expectation of accuracy (ναµερτ, σαφzς), and they entertain no possibility that his report 
may be false.  As Barrett notes, the Chorus invoke “both the messenger’s reliability and 
the fullness of his account.”220  This Messenger models the exceptional authority 
accorded to such a figure.  Since the Chorus and the other characters at home have no 
other way of knowing what is happening in Greece, the Messenger has the unique 
position of being the sole source of information, which he may edit as he pleases.  His 
first-hand knowledge precludes any doubt. 
3.  Prophecy 
                                                 
219 Indeed, he has said twice before that his account is incomplete (329-330, 429-430). 
 
220 Barrett 2002, 29.  Barrett observes that the Messenger does not adhere to the koruphaios’ expectations 
of him; the Chorus expect a conventional messenger-figure, but the Messenger deviates from this course by 
summarizing rather than detailing what has happened, thus imposing his own point of view on his 
narrative.  Cf. de Jong 1991 on the various perspectives offered by Euripidean messengers.  I find Barrett’s 
reading interesting, but hesitate to assign too much significance to the omissions of the Persian Messenger, 
since it seems to me that any narrative is by nature edited by its speaker. 
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The third means to truth I have identified is prophecy or statements that prove 
prophetic.  As I observed in Chapter Two, there are several instances where words for 
truth such as FλHθεια, FληθHς, and Mτυµος designate accurate prophecies of events that 
have not yet occurred, whether these prophecies stem from individual prescience or 
interpretation of divine will.  In some ways prophetic figures might be considered a type 
of messenger, as they serve as intermediaries between a message’s source and its 
recipient and express their messages verbally.  Seers fundamentally differ, however, since 
their information originates from divine knowledge. 
The most obvious example of a prophetic figure is Cassandra of the Agamemnon, 
whose truthfulness is both self-proclaimed and acknowledged by the Chorus: 
Κα.  τs µzλλον «ξει, κα σupsilonoxia µ’ Sν τUχει παρν 
γαν γ’ FληθXµαντιν οiκτoρας Sρες. 
Χο.  τrν µjν Θυzστου δατα παιδεoων κρεnν 
ξυνκα κα πzφρικα, κα φXβος µ’ Mχει 
κλupsilonoxiaοντ’ Fληθnς οupsilonpsiliδjν Sξ¨κασµzνα.  (Ag. 1240-1244) 
 
Cassandra:  The future will come; and soon you shall stand here to 
pronounce me, in pity, a prophet who spoke all too true. 
Chorus:  Thyestes’ feast upon his children’s flesh I understand and 
shudder at, and fear takes hold of me as I hear it truly told and not in 
images. 
 
At first Cassandra seems an unlikely voice for truth, as she is initially silent and remains 
so for more than two hundred lines, prompting Clytemnestra to belittle her as either a 
Greek-illiterate barbarian (1050-1053) or a madwoman unaccustomed to her newly 
imposed servitude (1064-1068).  The Chorus agree that Cassandra’s behavior is strange 
and confusing:  ¾ρµηνzως Mοικεν ä ξzνη τοροupsilonperisp | δεσθαι· τρXπος δj θηρsς ¶ς νεαιρzτου 
(“The stranger seems to need a clear interpreter; and her manner is that of a newly 
captured beast,” Ag. 1062-1063).  When she finally does speak, it is in agitated 
exclamations to Apollo that elicit confusion from the Chorus (1074-1075), whose stated 
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need for an interpreter, at the time a reference to Cassandra’s foreignness, now takes on 
new meaning.  The communicative gap between the Chorus and Cassandra is emphasized 
by their contrasting modes of speech, Cassandra’s sung lyrics interwoven with the 
Chorus’ spoken trimeters.221 
Her lack of lucidity, however, diminishes even in the midst of her exclamations of 
lament.  The Chorus have already found an affinity with her and pity her (1069) despite 
Clytemnestra’s encouragement towards scornful disdain.  Perhaps it is their pity for her 
that facilitates ready recognition of her prophetic ability: 
χρHσειν Mοικεν Fµφ τnν αupsilondasiaτς κακnν· 
µzνει τs θεον δουλo­ περ Sν φρενo.  (Ag. 1083-1084) 
 
She will prophesy about her own sorrows; the god’s gift remains in her 
mind, even in servitude.222 
 
The developing bond between Cassandra and the Chorus further strengthens as she 
displays her gifts of prophecy.  Her words are perfectly understood at first: 
Κα.  é é  
µισXθεον µjν οupsilonpsiliperispν, πολλ συνoστορα 
αupsilonpsiliτοφXνα κακ †καρτUναι† 
Fνδροσφαγεον κα πzδον αντHριον. 
Χο.  Mοικεν εupsilonpsilioxiaρις ä ξzνη κυνsς δoκην 
ε©ναι, µατεupsilonoxiaει δ’ºν FνευρHσει φXνον. 
Κα.  µαρτυρoοισι γρ τοσδ’ Sπιπεoθοµαι 
κλαιXµενα τUδε βρzφη σφαγς  
πτUς τε σUρκας πρsς πατρsς βεβρωµzνας. 
Χο.   µrν κλzος σου µαντικsν πεπυσµzνοι 
µεν, προφHτας δ’ οupsilonpsilioxiaτινας µατεupsilonoxiaοµεν.  (Ag. 1090-1099) 
 
Cassandra:  No, to a house that hates the gods, one that knows many sad 
tales of kindred murder…, a slaughter-place for men, a place where the 
ground is sprinkled. 
                                                 
221 Cf. Lloyd-Jones 1979, 87. 
 
222 On the meaning of τs θεον cf. Denniston and Page, 1957, ad 1084:  “The ‘day of slavery which takes 
from a man half his excellence’…has not robbed Cassandra of her gift of prophecy (which is all that τs 
θεον means here).” 
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Chorus:  The stranger seems to have keen scent, like a hound, and she is 
on the track of those whose blood she will discover. 
Cassandra:  Yes, for here are the witnesses that I believe.  These are 
children weeping for their slaughter, and for the roasted flesh their father 
ate. 
Chorus:  Indeed we had heard of your prophetic fame; but we seek no 
interpreters of the gods. 
 
Cassandra’s words are vague, yet sufficiently allusive for the Chorus to recognize that 
she refers to the past carnage of the house of Atreus; they are consequently quick to 
ascribe prophetic ability to her (1098-1099).223 
Cassandra is alternately lucid and incomprehensible to the Chorus, who 
understand her when she speaks allusively about events familiar to them but are confused 
when her utterances become predictive rather than reflective.  As she progresses to 
predictions of Agamemnon’s death, the reaction from the Chorus is confusion:  
Κα.  i πXποι, τo ποτε µHδεται; 
τo τXδε νzον χος; µzγα,  
µzγ’ Sν δXµοισι τοσδε µHδεται κακXν, 
φερτον φoλοισιν, δυσoατον· Fλκ δ’ ¾κς Fποστατε. 
Χο.  τοupsilonoxiaτων ιδρoς εiµι τnν µαντευµUτων, 
Sκενα δ’ Mγνων· πσα γρ πXλις βο.  (Ag. 1100-1106) 
 
Cassandra:  O horror, what plot is this?  What is this great new agony?  A 
great evil is being plotted in this house, unbearable for its friends, hard to 
remedy; and protection stands far off. 
Chorus:  These prophecies I know not; but the others I recognized; for it is 
the talk of all the city. 
 
The Chorus themselves state the difference between this prophecy and her earlier ones, 
which were recognizable, whereas the present ones are not.  Cassandra’s knowledge of 
the truth is well received, but only as long as what she says relates to the past and is thus 
already familiar to her listeners.  When she describes events not yet known to the Chorus, 
they are stopped short, claiming ignorance (ιδρις, 1105). 
                                                 
223 Cf. Zeitlin 1990, 111 on the visionary quality ascribed to women. 
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 As Cassandra proceeds to detail Agamemnon’s death and her own (1107-1148), 
she continues to be incomprehensible to the Chorus, who consequently diagnose her with 
madness (1140-1145).  But she is able to overcome this accusation of madness when she 
achieves a moment of clarity in which the Chorus understand her once more: 
Κα.  i γUµοι γUµοι ΠUριδος λzθριοι φoλων· 
i ΣκαµUνδρου πUτριον ποτXν· 
τXτε µjν Fµφ σς FιXνας τUλαιν’ 
    νυτXµαν τροφας· 
νupsilonperispν δ’ Fµφ ΚωκυτXν τε κ’ bχερουσoους  
χθους Mοικα θεσπιlδHσειν τUχα.  (1156-1161) 
Χο.  τo τXδε τορsν γαν Mπος Sφηµoσω; 
νεογνsς ν Foων µUθοι· 
    πzπληγµαι δ’ upsilondasiaπα δHγµατι φοινol 
δυσαλγε τupsilonoxiaχ­ µινυρ θρεοµzνας,  
θραupsilonoxiaµατ’ Sµο κλupsilonoxiaειν.  (1162-1166) 
 
Cassandra:  O the marriage, the marriage of Paris, bringing ruin on his 
loved ones!  O the native flow of the Scamander!  Wretched me, I was 
once reared and grew up around your banks!  But now I am likely to 
prophesy soon around the Cocytus and the Acherousian shores. 
Chorus:  Why have you voiced this saying, all too clear?  A new-born 
could hear and understand.  I am struck by a bloody bite, by your painful 
fate as you shriek your plaintive notes, shattering for me to hear. 
 
What contributes to this dawn of understanding is a description of the events at Troy, 
which Cassandra has herself witnessed.  Her allusion to Paris establishes a point of 
commonality between her history and the Chorus’ as she speaks of past events in a way 
that they would understand, thus making them more receptive to her prophetic utterances.  
Again, her explanation of events that would be recognizable to the Chorus garners their 
trust and facilitates their comprehension and belief.  As Lebeck notes, Cassandra 
interweaves her own fate with Agamemnon’s and the destruction of Troy with the curse 
upon the Atreids.224   
                                                 
224 Lebeck 1971, 51-58. 
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Cassandra’s reports resemble a messenger-figure’s in their descriptive quality.  
She alternately encounters belief and incomprehension from the Chorus, but when they 
do understand her, they credit her with reporting on events as if she were actually there:  
                                   θαυµUζω δz σου, 
πXντου πzραν τραφεσαν FλλXθρουν πXλιν 
κυρεν λzγουσαν σπερ εi παρεστUτεις.  (Ag. 1199-1201) 
 
But I marvel at you, that though bred beyond the seas you speak truly of a 
foreign city, as though you had been present.   
 
The Chorus’ response to Cassandra’s speech about the House of Atreus (1178-1197) 
encapsulates why they believe her:  she speaks of events with first-hand knowledge and 
clarity.225   
The difference between Cassandra’s access to truth and a messenger-figure’s is 
that hers comes from an entirely different source.  Whereas her knowledge results from 
the gift of sight given her by Apollo (1202-1212), messengers rely on eyewitness 
information and therefore may only report on events that have already occurred.  
Cassandra, like Clytemnestra, receives her knowledge of events without being present at 
them herself, eliciting belief when her accounts are sufficiently vivid to effect 
comprehension.  While Clytemnestra is vindicated when the Herald’s report concurs with 
her own interpretation, Cassandra must rely on her knowledge of the past to win over the 
Chorus.  But the Chorus implicitly place a higher premium on her type of knowledge, 
prophecy, when they acknowledge and recognize her gifts in this arena.  As I stated 
previously, the Chorus have no trouble recognizing Cassandra’s prophetic abilities when 
                                                 
225 Denniston and Page 1957, 166 and Lloyd-Jones 1979, 93-94 argue that Cassandra evokes the past and 
tells the Chorus about Apollo’s curse in a purposeful endeavor to persuade the Chorus of her prophetic 
knowledge about the future.  I prefer to read these lines as emphasizing the frustrating paradox of 
Cassandra, by turns believed and incomprehensible.  
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she talks about the past.226  Their comprehension of Cassandra is akin to their belief in 
the report of the Herald, for when they do understand her, it is because she speaks like an 
eyewitness.  
Furthermore, Cassandra’s references to past carnage, unlike a messenger speech, 
include allusion to future consequences.  She speaks of “kindred Furies” (συγγXνων 
°ρινupsilonoxiaων, 1190), the “original ruin” of Thyestes’ and Atreus’ crimes (πρταρχον την, 
1192), and the by-turns recurrence of their misdeeds (Sν µzρει, 1192), all of which point 
up the reciprocal and self-perpetuating nature of individual acts of violence.  She later 
explicitly refers to the reciprocal nature of Atreid carnage as she foretells the deaths that 
will result from her own: 
οupsilonpsilioxiaτοι δυσοoζω θUµνον ¶ς ρνις φXβl, 
Fλλ’ ¶ς θανοupsilonoxiaσ¨ µαρτυρτz µοι τXδε,  
»ταν γυνr γυναικsς Fντ’ Sµοupsilonperisp θUν¨ 
FνHρ τε δυσδUµαρτος Fντ’ Fνδρsς πzσ¨.  (1316-1319) 
 
I do not tremble as a bird before a bush in fear, but as I die, bear me 
witness to this, when a woman shall die in return for me, a woman, and a 
man falls in return for a man unfortunate in his wife.  
 
Using repetitive language that reflects the reciprocity of retribution (γυνr γυναικsς, 
FνHρ…Fνδρsς), Cassandra again demonstrates that her gift of sight comprises awareness 
of causality as well as a simple prediction of events.  Her observations suggest an 
understanding of the continuous bloodshed that past events effect and show the 
connectivity between past, present, and future that her particular brand of truth enables 
her to perceive.  The Chorus, however, do not readily perceive the future implications of 
this trend of reciprocal violence, instead only noting the accuracy of her references to 
Atreus and Thyestes.  The singularity of Cassandra’s access to truth is that it knows no 
                                                 
226 See p. 29 for my discussion of prophecy as entailing knowledge about the past and present in addition to 
the future. 
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time dimension.  She sees the future just as she sees the past or present, an ability that 
automatically sets her apart from her interlocutors, who, of course, do not share the same 
keen-sightedness.  As a result the Chorus are sympathetic to Cassandra when she reports 
on events familiar to them, but her knowledge of future events isolates her.  Thus when 
she connects the ghosts of Thyestes’ children to the imminent vengeful actions of 
Clytemnestra, the Chorus understand only the former: 
τrν µjν Θυzστου δατα παιδεoων κρεnν 
ξυνκα κα πzφρικα, κα φXβος µ’ Mχει 
κλupsilonoxiaοντ’ Fληθnς οupsilonpsiliδjν Sξ¨κασµzνα· 
τ δ’ λλ’ Fκοupsilonoxiaσας Sκ δρXµου πεσν τρzχω.  (Ag. 1242-1244) 
 
I understand the feast of Thyestes on the flesh of his children and I 
shudder, and fear takes hold of me as I hear it truly told and not in images.  
But when I hear the rest I falter and run off the course. 
 
The various receptions of Cassandra, Clytemnestra, the Theban women, and 
messenger-figures indicate that despite the variety of its instantiations, truth in Aeschylus 
is most believable in its manifestation as a messenger’s report, but the demonstrable 
validity of other forms of truth and the characters’ erroneous disregard of them are 
reminders that the truth may be found in less obvious places.227 
GENDER AND CREDIBILITY?  
                                                 
227 I do not include the predictions of Prometheus in my model, largely because he is a god and provider of 
prophecy to mankind (PV 484-499), yet he also obstructs true prophecy by instilling in man blind hopes 
(τυφλς…Sλπoδας, 250).  His relationship to prophecy therefore inherently differs from Cassandra’s 
because he himself is a source for prophecy, rather than one who can access this source.  Cf. Griffith 1983, 
ad 484-90:  “Occasionally scepticism was expressed about the value of µαντικH (e.g. Xenophanes A 52 
DK, Soph. OT 852-8, Eur. Hel. 744ff., etc.), but this was more often directed against its human 
practitioners (oraclemongers, priests, etc.) than against the divine basis of the art, e.g., Eur. El . 399-400 
Λοξoου γρ Sµπεδοι | χρησµοo, βροτnν δj µαντικrν χαoρειν Sn (with Denniston’s n.).”  Furthermore, to 
examine other characters’ credulous reactions to his predictions misses one important point of the play, 
which is to present the conflict between possibility and necessity.  It is no accident that his predictions are 
not explicitly associated with truth (either Mτυµος or FληθHς) so much as with the future (cf. λοιπXν, PV 
684; τ λοιπU, 703), which is a less certain concept than truth and is not unquestionably inevitable in the 
PV. 
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My discussion of the various means to accessing truth in Aeschylus—nonverbal 
signals, messenger-figures, and prophecy—begs an inclusion of gender, since each 
source corresponds to a particular gender:  the nonverbal signals I discussed are noticed 
by female figures (Clytemnestra in the Agamemnon, the Chorus of Theban women, and 
Electra in the Choephoroi), whereas messenger-figures are invariably male.228  
Furthermore, the most conspicuous example of prophetic truth resides in Cassandra, a 
character who happens to be a woman.  What makes this a specifically gendered issue is 
the varying degrees of belief elicited by these characters:  Clytemnestra, the Theban 
women, and Cassandra each meet with resistance to their claims, and in some cases their 
interlocutors specifically point to their gender as a basis for incredulity.  These 
coincidences of gender and disbelief are a useful starting point for studying the credibility 
assigned to each of these sources of truth because they raise the question of to what 
extent Aeschylus aligns credibility, or lack thereof, with gender. 
It is no secret that consideration of gender is useful in studying tragedy, as 
evidenced by the abundance of scholarship devoted to the topic229 and by the numerous 
references to gender and gender differences within the plays themselves:  the Chorus of 
Danaids appeal to their father not to leave them, citing their feminine lack of bellicosity 
(µXνην δj µr πρXλειπε, λoσσοµαι, πUτερ· | γυνr µονωθεσ’ οupsilonpsiliδzν· οupsilonpsiliκ Mνεστ’ ±ρης, 
Supp. 748-749); Eteocles expresses impatience with the Chorus of the Seven, ascribing 
their supplicating behavior to womanly capriciousness (κρατοupsilonperispσα µjν γρ οupsilonpsiliχ pµιλητsν 
θρUσος, | δεoσασα δ’ ο£κl κα πXλει πλzον κακXν, Sept. 189-190); Clytemnestra 
                                                 
228 Cassandra shares some characteristics with messenger-figures, but I do not include her in this category, 
since the source of her knowledge is so different from theirs. 
 
229 See Winnington-Ingram 1983, 101-131; Goldhill 1984; Rabinowitz 1993; Zeitlin 1996; Wohl 1998; 
McClure 1999; Foley 2001. 
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punctuates her rendition of the fall of Troy with a reminder about her sex (τοιαupsilonperispτU τοι 
γυναικsς Sξ Sµοupsilonperisp κλupsilonoxiaεις, Ag. 348); the Chorus of the Agamemnon attribute the tendency 
towards premature joy to the female gender (γυναικsς αiχµ πρzπει | πρs τοupsilonperisp φανzντος 
χUριν ξυναινzσαι, Ag. 483-484); Orestes mocks Aegisthus for having a woman’s heart 
(θHλεια γρ φρrν, Cho. 305); and in the Eumenides issues of gender underlie the two 
opposing arguments as to whether a matricide trumps a mariticide.230  
In some ways Aeschylus seems to subscribe to a simple and familiar paradigm of 
gender-based credibility in which women are not considered trustworthy.231  For 
example, the Chorus of Danaids encounter skepticism in their interactions with Pelasgus, 
the king of Argos, who notices, among other things, their femaleness (Supp. 237).  But 
gender is only one identifying difference between the suppliant Danaids and their 
interlocutors and it seems to work in tandem with other differences to elicit antagonism 
and disbelief: 
Βα.  ποδαπsν »µιλον τXνδ’ FνελληνXστολον 
πzπλοισι βαρβUροισι κFµπυκµασι 
χλoοντα προσφωνοupsilonperispµεν; οupsilonpsili γρ bργολς  
Sσθrς γυναικnν οupsilonpsiliδ’ Fφ’ ½λλUδος τXπων.  (Supp. 234-237) 
… 
πρsς ταupsilonperispτ’ Fµεoβου κα λzγ’ εupsilonpsiliθαρσrς Sµοo.  (249) 
… 
πιστα µυθεσθ’, Ä ξzναι, κλupsilonoxiaειν Sµοo, 
»πως τXδ’ upsilondasiaµν Sστιν bργεον γzνος.  (277-278) 
 
From what country is this throng that I accost, clad un-Greekly and 
reveling in foreign robes and snoods?  The raiment of these women is 
neither Argive nor Greek. 
…Reply and speak boldly to me. 
…You speak things untrustworthy for me to hear, stranger-women, how 
this Argive race is yours.  
 
                                                 
230 See Eum. 209-212, 217-221. 
 
231 E.g., McClure 1999, 26 dates this tradition to Hesiod’s Pandora. 
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Despite the obvious femaleness of the Danaids, Pelasgus’ primary preoccupation is with 
their foreignness,232 which is a recurrent theme in the play.233  It is clear that Pelasgus, 
from the beginning, approaches the Danaids as inherently different from himself and uses 
language that emphasizes the differences (FνελληνXστολον, 234; βαρβUροισι, 235; οupsilonpsili… 
bργολς…οupsilonpsiliδ’ Fφ’ ½λλUδος, 236-237; ξzναι, 277).  Accompanying this language is a 
distrust of the Danaids (πιστα, 277) that stems from the difference between their 
appearance and the reality they claim.  Pelasgus’ willingness to help the Danaids rests on 
their ability to provide some proof of similarity between themselves and him, but their 
efforts to do so are stymied by their egregiously non-Greek apparel. 
But the very differences observed by Pelasgus are at once expressions of distance 
and invitations to proximity.  Pelasgus invites the Danaids to close the gap by using 
language that evokes the reciprocity of friendly exchanges (Fµεoβου, 249); his reference 
to them as strangers (ξzναι, 277) marks their difference but also invites a relationship of 
alliance (xenia) and thus forges the connectedness inherent in guest-host relationships.  
Furthermore, Pelasgus suggests his possible willingness to help the Danaids should they 
persuasively demonstrate their Argive descent:  διδαχθες <δ’> ν τXδ’ εiδεoην πλzον, | 
»πως γzνεθλον σπzρµα τ’ bργεον τs σXν (“If instructed, I would know this better, how 
your race and seed are Argive,” Supp. 289-290). 
 The paradoxical relationship between Pelasgus and the Danaids, at once strangers 
and kin to Argos, barbarians and Greek (Fστοξzνων, 356), has been well summarized by 
Froma Zeitlin: 
                                                 
232 Cf. Friis Johansen and Whittle 1980, ad 238-40:  “Though he has of course noticed their sex (cf. 237), 
the King makes no further reference to it until 277ff. and, with the possible exception of his allusion to 
Amazons (287), displays no sign of regarding it as in the least relevant or important.  What is particularly 
surprising to him is that foreigners should not have tried to secure any kind of local assistance.”   
 
233 Cf. Mitchell 2006, 212 for a list of references to the Danaids’ un-Greekness. 
 143 
In their flight from Egypt to Argos, the suppliants’ intermediate position 
also corresponds to the position of virgins, who are situated on the 
margins of society, betwixt and between, both “other” to the culture and a 
part of it…As insiders and outsiders, the Danaids are both Greek and 
barbarian.  They belong in the city yet remain foreign to it.  (Zeitlin 1996, 
125) 
 
We have seen the relationship of the feminine to xenia in Pindar’s poetry, where the 
guest-host reciprocity that is central to his epinician poetry is threatened by female 
deception.  Aeschylus alters this relationship.  Although he may seem at first to resemble 
Pindar in his depiction of the feminine as a destabilizing “otherness,”234 the example of 
the Danaids indicates that feminine destabilization occurs with the establishment, rather 
than dissolution, of xenia.  The Danaids eventually win over Pelasgus with the tale of 
their descent from Io, which endears them to him, but creates the subsequent problem of 
the instability Argos will face should its citizens risk war with Egypt by helping the 
Danaids.  It is their position of marginality that works both to the Danaids’ advantage and 
disadvantage:  as suppliants, they are entitled to request help under the auspices of Zeus, 
but as foreigners, they are subject to the suspicions of a king wary of foreign 
difference.235   
Zeitlin has identified femininity as one form of “otherness,” but it should be stated 
explicitly that in Aeschylus femininity is compounded by other differences of identity.  
Credibility is granted to those who can establish similarity, while distrust obtains when 
oppositions of identity cannot be overcome.  Thus Electra in the Choephoroi must 
similarly build credibility with the Chorus of slave-women who, although of the same 
                                                 
234 For an introductory discussion of opposition and difference, see Zeitlin 1996, 1-15. 
 
235 For an excellent study of ancient supplication, see Naiden 2006, esp. 1-27 where he demonstrates that 
successful supplication requires a series of actions beyond a mere plea for aid. 
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gender as Electra, are of different socio-political status.  In her address to them Electra 
acknowledges this disparity but attempts to narrow the gap: 
τσδ’ Mστε βουλς, Ä φoλαι, µεταoτιαι· 
κοινsν γρ Mχθος Sν δXµοις νοµoζοµεν.  
µr κεupsilonoxiaθετ’ Mνδον καρδoας φXβl τινXς· 
τs µXρσιµον γρ τXν τ’ Sλεupsilonoxiaθερον µzνει 
κα τsν πρsς λλης δεσποτοupsilonoxiaµενον χερXς. 
λzγοις ν ε£ τι τnνδ’ Mχεις upsilondasiaπzρτερον.  (Cho. 100-105) 
 
Be accessories to this plan, friends, for we practice a shared hatred in the 
house.  Do not hide it in your hearts out of fear of any, for doom awaits 
both the freeman and the one ruled by the hand of another.  You might 
speak if you have anything better than this. 
 
Electra establishes familiarity by addressing the Chorus as φoλαι and by using terms of 
commonality (µεταoτιαι, κοινXν).  Furthermore, she subordinates class differences by 
pointing out their shared hatreds and common fates and by putting herself in the position 
of advice-seeker, thus elevating the agency of the Chorus, who in turn duly instruct 
Electra and facilitate the emotional expression of both Electra and Orestes.236  The steps 
Electra must take to ingratiate herself with the Chorus resemble the Danaids’ rhetoric 
towards Pelasgus and demonstrate that gender alone guarantees neither alliance nor 
opposition. 
Gender in Aeschylus, then, is a more complicated issue than a simple dichotomy 
between male and female, since femaleness is only one characteristic that distinguishes 
female characters from their male interlocutors.  By the same token the role of gender in 
issues of truth and falsehood is similarly complicated.  To generalize the ancient Greek 
paradigm of truth, falsehood, and gender as one in which women are treated as deceptive 
and men are truthful does not do justice to the complexity of gender dynamics in 
Aeschylean tragedy.  Although several of Aeschylus’ female characters encounter 
                                                 
236 See Foley 2001, 154-159 for the Chorus’ role in the Choephoroi.  
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challenges to their credibility which might derive from ancient views of female 
deceptiveness, my central argument in this section is that Aeschylus manipulates this 
gender paradigm, thereby problematizing and perhaps even implicitly criticizing it by 
showing how disbelieved female characters in the end prove to be “right.”   
The most prominent examples are the Chorus of the Septem and Clytemnestra, 
who each encounter a skepticism or even hostility that is connected specifically to their 
status as women, a specific point of commonality that merits further examination of how 
their gender influences the credibility they are accorded—or denied—by their 
interlocutors.  The Chorus of Theban women receive a harsh response from Eteocles, 
who faults their extreme anxiety, which he asserts is a female tendency.  After his initial 
chastisement of the Chorus he generalizes their behavior as a feminine trait and 
concludes with a statement about the proper roles of man and woman:  µzλει γρ Fνδρo, 
µr γυνr βουλευzτω, | τξωθεν· Mνδον δ’ οupsilonpsiliperispσα µr βλUβην τoθει (“What is outside is a 
man’s province:  let no woman debate it; within doors do no mischief!” 200-201). 
It should be noted that Eteocles does not specifically fault the Chorus for being 
deceptive or untruthful, preferring instead to characterize them as irrationally and 
detrimentally fearful.  Furthermore, despite his explicit comments about the differences 
between male and female, his conflict with the Chorus seems to stem from their differing 
world-views, a difference for which gender serves as his shorthand explanation.  As 
Hutchinson and Brown observe, Eteocles and the Chorus express divergent religious 
views,237 neither of which is unambiguously “right”:  as I noted earlier, Eteocles is partly 
                                                 
237 Hutchinson 1985 and Brown 1977 differ as to the precise nature of this religious conflict.  Hutchinson 
1985, 74 asserts that Eteocles’ problem with the Chorus is one of religious practice rather than attitude:  
Eteocles objects not to prayer itself, but to the Chorus’ manner of prayer.  Brown 1977, 301, on the other 
hand, interprets the scene as a conflict between religious attitudes:  Eteocles’ pragmatism contrasts with the 
Chorus’ total submission to and trust in the gods.  While I am inclined to agree with Brown more than 
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justified in his annoyance with the Chorus, for ultimately the total destruction of Thebes 
is avoided.  But even so, the deaths of Eteocles and Polyneices at the end of the play also 
demonstrate the deficiencies of Eteocles’ worldview and reflect the short-sightedness of 
his fraternal feud and his earlier rebuke of the Chorus.238 
 The case of Clytemnestra proves a more prominent gender issue since her 
femaleness is a recurrent point of emphasis by both the Chorus of the Agamemnon and 
Clytemnestra herself.239  Twice does she conclude a speech with a reference to her 
womanhood (τοιαupsilonperispτU τοι γυναικsς Sξ Sµοupsilonperisp κλupsilonoxiaεις, “Such things do you hear from me, a 
woman,” Ag. 348; τοιXσδ’ p κXµπος, τς FλHθειας γzµων, | οupsilonpsiliκ αiσχρsς ¶ς γυναικ 
γενναo­ λακεν, “Such is my boast, brimming with truth, not shameful for a noble woman 
to shout,” 613-614), and when her pronouncement of Troy’s fall is corroborated by the 
Herald, she notes how she, despite being charged with a femininely premature joy (590-
592), observed the proper womanly duties of sacrifice: 
λXγοις τοιοupsilonoxiaτοις πλαγκτsς οupsilonpsiliperispσ’ SφαινXµην· 
»µως δ’ Mθυον, κα γυναικεol νXµl 
λολυγµsν λλος λλοθεν κατ πτXλιν 
Mλασκον εupsilonpsiliφηµοupsilonperispντες, Sν θεnν ¿δραις  
θυηφUγον κοιµnντες εupsilonpsiliδη φλXγα.  (Ag. 592-597) 
 
By such words I appeared to wander in my wits; nevertheless I sacrificed, 
and as is women’s custom one here, one there in the city uttered the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hutchinson, I find the subtle differences between their two arguments less important than their shared 
premise that while Eteocles may describe his conflict with the Chorus in terms of gender, it is more a 
matter of religious difference than gender-based animosity.   
 
238 Cf. Foley 2001, 48:  “Whatever we are to think of this scene in Seven against Thebes, however, the 
tables are eventually turned on the emphatically rational Eteocles.”  Of course, as with all Greek tragedy, 
culpability lies dually with the individual and with larger forces at play.  In some ways Eteocles cannot 
prevent his downfall, which is decreed by Oedipus’ curse. 
 
239 This is not to say that the Chorus of the Septem do not self-identify as women, but their references to 
womanhood are more general than specific to themselves and are less emphatically “gendered.”  For 
example, Sept. 326-335 discusses the general fate of women in the aftermath of war, using feminine 
participles and adjectives (τς κεχειρωµzνας, 326; νzας τε κα παλαιUς, 327) rather than the noun for 
woman γυνH. 
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jubilant cry, giving praise in the gods’ abodes, lulling the fragrant flame 
that feeds on incense. 
 
Unlike the Chorus of Theban women, whose religious worldview is questioned by 
Eteocles more than their accuracy, Clytemnestra faces accusations that her accounts may 
be false.  The Chorus initially doubt that news of Troy’s fall could come so quickly (280), 
then re-orient their doubt around the questionable accuracy of the beacon-fires (475-482), 
which in their view would be accepted only by a woman (483-484, 590-592).  
Clytemnestra specifically addresses challenges to her credibility using the same terms of 
gender as her challengers, thus emphasizing the gender basis of the Chorus’ doubt and 
demonstrating that their doubt and its basis are unfounded. 
Despite the Chorus’ skepticism as to the accuracy of Clytemnestra’s information, 
they do not overtly accuse her of deceptiveness when she claims wifely devotion in Ag. 
613-614.  Their only acknowledgement of her duplicity in these lines is to mention 
briefly that her words beg interpretation (615-616);240 later, they do try to warn 
Agamemnon of her disloyalty by advising him to exercise scrutiny as to the fidelity of his 
subjects (783-809), but they do not explicitly point the finger at Clytemnestra, and 
Agamemnon ignores them.  Upon Clytemnestra’s description of her husband’s murder 
(1372-1398), the Chorus’ immediate reaction is to note her verbal audacity 
(θρασupsilonoxiaστοµος, 1399) and later the general atrocity of the crime rather than her 
deceptiveness, to which they finally allude nearly one hundred lines later (δολol µXρl, 
1495).  Deceptiveness is not a trait the Chorus conspicuously assign to Clytemnestra; 
even their doubt about the beacon-fires stems from fears of hope-driven inaccuracy rather 
than suspicions of feminine deception, and the fallacy of their assessment is borne out by 
                                                 
240 Furthermore, these lines are notoriously opaque and can at best be read as a veiled warning about 
Clytemnestra’s untruthfulness.  See Denniston and Page 1957, ad 615-16 for the uncertainty surrounding 
these lines. 
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the events of the play.  Aegisthus in the Choephori makes a similar error of judgment:  
he, like the Chorus of the Agamemnon, faults the female race for letting emotion dictate 
belief when he hears the (false) news of Orestes’ death:  πnς ταupsilonperispτ’ Fληθ κα 
βλzποντα241 δοξUσω; | Ì πρsς γυναικnν δειµατοupsilonoxiaµενοι λXγοι | πεδUρσιοι θρ²σκουσι, 
θνæσκοντες µUτην; (“How am I to suppose this tale is true and real?  Is this a story born 
of women’s terror that darts upward and perishes in vain?” 844-846).  In this case he is 
correct:  the news of Orestes’ death is false, but it is not false for the reasons he assumes.  
Instead of perceiving deceit, he mistakenly attributes falseness to female tendencies 
toward irrationality.  Ultimately his doubt does not save him, as he still enters the house 
and meets his death.  Aeschylus is implicitly critical of statements about the female 
tendency to yield to emotion at the expense of accuracy, which are proven false as the 
drama unfolds.  Furthermore, he demonstrates that this gender-based doubt is 
misdirected, since it fails to expose and prevent the larger and more destructive deception 
enacted by either Clytemnestra or by Orestes. 
Cassandra faces similar challenges in that her prophecies are not invariably 
welcomed and meet a receptive audience only when she describes familiar events.  But 
her struggle is not strikingly similar to the Theban women’s or to Clytemnestra’s, as she 
encounters neither hostility nor disbelief but incomprehension.  Moreover, her 
interlocutors do not denigrate her prophecies as a symptom of her femaleness, nor is her 
gender conspicuous at all except when she tells the Chorus about the curse of Apollo, 
with whom they presume Cassandra has had a sexual relationship (1204, 1208).  The 
character of Cassandra is relevant to my discussion of how gender relates to issues of 
                                                 
241 Note the choice of participle βλzποντα, which implies that the report has a life of its own.  See Garvie 
1986, ad 844. 
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truth and falsehood only in that she has difficulty being believed and that she happens to 
be a woman, but her difficulty stems from incomprehension rather than mistrust, and her 
femaleness is acknowledged but not held against her by her interlocutors.  By the same 
token the messenger-figures, who uniquely enjoy unquestioned credibility, are male 
characters, but their maleness is not an emphasized, or even mentioned, component of 
their authority.  Cassandra’s only association with falsehood or deceptiveness is made by 
her own admission, when she explains that Apollo’s wrath stems from her deception of 
him:  ξυναινzσασα Λοξoαν SψευσUµην (“I consented, and then played Loxias false,” 
1208).  
What Cassandra, Clytemnestra, and the Chorus of Theban women do have in 
common is that they are proved correct as the events of the play unfold.  Given the 
varying degrees of emphasis on their gender, however, it is unclear how much their 
credibility is hindered by their femaleness.  Eteocles’ and the Chorus of the 
Agamemnon’s disdainful comments about women should be read more as indicators of 
the vexatiousness of the Theban women and Clytemnestra than as serious judgments 
about female credibility (or lack thereof).  Furthermore, not only are their generalizations 
about gender proved incorrect, so too are their justifications for their gender stereotyping.  
The accuracy of the beacon-fires in the Agamemnon is vindicated as are Cassandra’s 
prophecies and the dangers foretold by the dust-cloud in the Septem.  It cannot be said, 
then, that Aeschylus’ treatment of his female purveyors of truth reflects a misogynist 
alignment of femininity and deception such as we have seen in Hesiod or Pindar; if 
Aeschylus is implying anything about truth, falsehood, and gender, it seems to be a 
criticism of this paradigm.  Even Clytemnestra’s guile is not easy to condemn since the 
audience’s sympathies to her have been roused early on in the play with the story of 
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Iphigeneia’s sacrifice (Ag. 205-247).  Perhaps the old-fashioned view of Pindar as the 
backward-looking preserver of the past and Aeschylus as a progressive transformer is 
correct in this case,242 as Pindar’s female characters more conspicuously reflect a 
Pandora-like conception of woman, whereas the Aeschylean treatment of female 
characters is implicitly critical of this view.   
TRUTH, FALSEHOOD, AND EXCHANGE 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, Pindaric truth and falsehood must exist in 
relation to the reciprocity of xenia that underscores poet-patron relations.  My discussion 
of truth and falsehood in epinician therefore took into consideration the overriding force 
of reciprocity and exchange:  epinician truth complements praise and is even in part 
equivalent to it and vice versa; Pindar expresses the negativity of falsehood and deception 
by depicting them in contexts of relationships of reciprocity, which they destabilize.  As 
in Pindar’s odes, exchange and reciprocity lie at the heart of truth in Aeschylus, who 
depicts messenger’s reports, themselves items of verbal exchange, as the most credible 
(although he also implicitly criticizes this view).  As I discussed earlier, truth in tragedy 
is manifested in the verbal exchange between characters and is thus intimately tied to this 
idea of exchange. 
A further type of exchange and reciprocity in tragedy, and perhaps the one most 
discussed in Aeschylean scholarship, especially on the Oresteia, is the retributive justice 
that drives the plots.  In the Suppliants the Danaids appeal to Zeus for help, phrasing their 
request in terms of FλHθεια: 
γε δr λzξωµεν Sπ’ bργεoοις  
εupsilonpsiliχς Fγαθς Fγαθnν ποινUς· 
Ζεupsilonvariaς δ’ Sφορεupsilonoxiaοι ξzνιος ξενoου 
                                                 
242 Summarized in Finley 1955, 3-8.  
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στXµατος τιµς †Sπ’ Fληθεo­ 
τzρµον’ Fµzµπτων πρsς παντα†.  (Supp. 625-629) 
 
Come then, let us offer for the Argives good prayers, a return for good 
things.  And may Zeus of strangers, blameless, behold from the mouth of a 
stranger offerings in truth, an end for all things. 
 
It is natural for the Danaids to offer prayer to Zeus Xenios, who would protect them as 
strangers and suppliants to Argos.  The presence of FλHθεια in this invocation,243 echoes 
the association between Alatheia, Zeus, and xenia that opens Olympian 10 and links truth 
to reciprocal relationships: 
Fλλ σupsilonvaria κα θυγUτηρ 
bλUθεια ∆ιXς, ρθ χερo  
Sρupsilonoxiaκετον ψευδzων   
Sνιπν FλιτXξενον.  (Ol. 10.3-6) 
 
You and the daughter of Zeus, Truth, with a correcting hand ward off from 
me the charge that I harm a guest friend with broken promises. 
 
Whatever the correct text of Supp. 628, the appearance of FλHθεια in a context that 
invokes reciprocity, both with an invocation to Zeus in his aspect as guest-friend and with 
language that mirrors the symmetry of reciprocal relationships (Fγαθς Fγαθnν, 626; 
ξzνιος ξενoου, 627), indicates the relevance of truth to the reciprocity of guest-friendship. 
 But the reciprocity that permeates Aeschylean tragedy is not confined to the 
exchange of goods that underlies friendships or guest-host relationships.  Instead, it is 
aggression and violence that drive the tragic plots.244  As Gagarin argues, “underlying all 
[Aeschylus’] dramatic action is a fundamental sense of rise and fall in human affairs, of 
                                                 
243 The corruption of the text here (Fληθεo­ vs. Fληθεoας) has frustrated commentators and occluded precise 
translation.  Cf. Friis Johansen and Whittle ad loc.:  “to the achieving of truth (sc. “that they may come 
true!);” Grene and Lattimore 1991, 28 (using the translation of Seth G. Benardete):  “in true frankness.” 
 
244 For the sake of simplicity and clarity I have here distinguished two types of reciprocity, the reciprocity 
of charis (such as is found in relationships of xenia or philia) as opposed to the reciprocity of revenge, but 
tragedy sometimes showcases the conflict between the two.  Belfiore 1998, 139-158 argues interestingly, 
and for the most part convincingly, that “harm to philoi is a central element in the plot structures of nearly 
all of the extant tragedies,” and some of that harm results from a perpetuation of retributive violence. 
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action and reaction, of reciprocity, and of dikē.”245  Although Aeschylean dikē is 
generally discussed in the context of the Oresteia, there is evidence that similar themes 
run through some of the other Aeschylean tragedies:  the Danaids make claims to dikē 
(78, 343, 395, 406, 430, 437), always in connection with Zeus or the gods, although they 
never provide specific reasons for their claims, as do the Egyptians,246 and the loss of the 
rest of the trilogy leaves unanswered whose claims prove ultimately to be the more valid.  
But it is clear that the Danaids, like the other characters of Aeschylus, show a concern for 
reciprocity, both in benefits that should be conferred on their Argive benefactors and in 
retribution for the wrongs they have suffered.  Polyneices and Eteocles too each “have a 
valid claim to dikē.”247  Like Pindar’s epinician, Aeschylean tragedy presents a tit-for-tat 
system, but the obvious difference is that the Aeschylean model has a greater focus on 
perpetuating acts of violence rather than charis and is thus mutually detrimental to its 
participants rather than beneficial.  It is this model of exchange that I now propose to take 
up, particularly in its relevance to truth and falsehood.   
The relationship between truth and retributive violence is clearest when 
Clytemnestra speaks with the Chorus in the aftermath of her husband’s murder: 
Χο.  νειδος «κει τXδ’ Fντ’ νεoδους, 
δupsilonoxiaσµαχα δ’ Sστι κρναι. 
φzρει φzροντ’, Sκτoνει δ’ p καoνων· 
µoµνει δj µoµνοντος Sν θρXνl ∆ιsς  
παθεν τsν Mρξαντα· θzσµιον γρ. 
τoς ν γονν Fραον SκβUλοι δXµων; 
κεκXλληται γzνος πρsς τ­. 
Κλ.  Sς τXνδ’ Sνzβης ξupsilonvariaν Fληθεo­ 
χρησµXν.    (Ag. 1560-1568) 
 
                                                 
245 Gagarin 1976, 137. 
 
246 The observations about and citations of dikē  are taken from Gagarin 1976, 129-130, 134. 
 
247 Gagarin 1976, 120.  See his discussion on pages 120-123. 
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Chorus:  This reproach meets reproach, and it is difficult to judge.  
Someone plunders the plunderer, and a murderer pays the price.  It awaits 
that the doer suffer while Zeus abides on his throne, for it is the law.  Who 
would cast out the cursed stock from the home?  The race is bound fast to 
ruin. 
Clytemnestra:  You have come upon this prophecy with truth. 
 
This passage serves to emphasize a cosmic system of reciprocity and posits Zeus as the 
overseer of such a system.  The repetitive language emphasizing the symmetry of 
reciprocity (νειδος…νεoδους, 1560; φzρει φzροντ’, 1562; µoµνει δj µoµνοντος, 1563) 
recalls the similar repetition of Supp. 625-629, but here the reciprocity is one of 
retributive violence rather than xenia.  Just as Zeus oversees both types of reciprocity, 
FλHθεια serves as a further common link as Clytemnestra acknowledges the inevitability 
of what the Chorus predict.  More than a simple message accurately conveying events, 
FλHθεια also characterizes the certainty of reprisal for murder; divine law ensures this 
reprisal, which, as we know, will be carried out by Clytemnestra’s son.   
Truth is inextricably tied to this system of reprisal, as it characterizes the 
inevitability of retributive aggression.  This is made painfully clear by Cassandra, whose 
access to truth via prophecy serves only to give her knowledge of her disastrous future 
without the ability to prevent it; foreknowledge of Agamemnon’s and her deaths does not 
alter their unavoidability, and the Chorus and she are painfully aware of this: 
Χο.  Fπs δj θεσφUτων τoς Fγαθ φUτις  
βροτος στzλλεται; κακnν γρ δια 
πολυεπες τzχναι θεσπιlδnν 
φXβον φzρουσιν µαθεν.  (1132-1135) 
 
From oracles what good message is sent to men?  For through evil the 
wordy arts of prophets bring fear to their listeners. 
 
Κα.  upsilondasiaπ’ αupsilonpsiliperisp µε δεινsς ρθοµαντεoας πXνος 
στροβε ταρUσσων φροιµoοις <δυσφροιµoοις>.  (1215-1216) 
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The fearsome toil of true prophecy whirls me around, disturbing me with 
ominous preludes. 
 
Χο.     εi δ’ Sτητupsilonoxiaµως  
µXρον τsν αupsilondasiaτς ο©σθα, πnς θεηλUτου  
βοsς δoκην εupsilonpsiliτXλµως πατες;  (1296-1298) 
 
But if truly you know your fate, how do you walk courageously toward the altar 
like a god-driven cow?  
 
In fact the truth cannot be controlled by anyone, and accurate perception of the truth 
cannot alter the course of events that are to unfold in accordance with the continuing 
cycle of revenge.  With some degree of accuracy the Chorus of Theban Women can 
predict disaster for Thebes, but they cannot prevent the deaths of Eteocles and 
Polyneices. 
Just as in Pindar where truth serves to strengthen the cycles of reciprocity (xenia), 
while falsehood dissolves them, in the Aeschylean framework of retribution the truth 
designates the inevitability of vengeful violence.  The accuracy of the beacon-fires, 
although doubted by the Chorus, signals the fall of Troy and Agamemnon’s return, which 
will enable Clytemnestra to exact her revenge.  Whereas in Pindar’s Pythian 11 
Clytemnestra is depicted as a guileful destroyer of her marriage and family, the depiction 
of her in the Agamemnon is a little more complicated, for the stage for Agamemnon’s 
murder has been set with the account of Iphigeneia’s sacrifice,248 a personal wrong for 
which Agamemnon must pay the price.  Knowledge of the truth only serves to bring 
greater awareness to the forces of retribution that govern the play.  In the case of 
Cassandra this knowledge provides some comfort, however cold, as she understands that 
Agamemnon’s and her deaths will trigger the vengeful spirit and actions of Orestes: 
οupsilonpsili µrν τιµοo γ’ Sκ θεnν τεθνHξοµεν· 
                                                 
248 See Lebeck 1971, 60-63 for a discussion of the sacrifice motif in the Oresteia. 
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«ξει γρ äµnν λλος αupsilonpsiliperisp τιµUορος,  
µητροκτXνον φoτυµα, ποινUτωρ πατρXς.  (1279-1281) 
 
We shall not die unavenged by the gods.  For another avenger of us will 
come in turn, a mother-killing scion, avenger of his father.   
 
Whereas truth strengthens the reciprocity of retribution by emphasizing its 
certainty, falsehood and deception play their parts by ensuring individual acts of violent 
revenge.  Clytemnestra’s act of deception, the cunning with which she lures Agamemnon 
to his death, enables this particular instance of retributive justice, but it will be 
reciprocated by her own death in the Choephoroi, which, as Orestes describes, is effected 
through tactics that mirror her own murder of Agamemnon: 
αiνn δj κρupsilonoxiaπτειν τUσδε συνθHκας SµUς, 
¶ς ν δXλl κτεoναντες νδρα τoµιον  
δXλl γε κα ληφθnσιν, Sν ταupsilonpsiliτ βρXχl 
θανXντες, ë κα Λοξoας SφHµισεν 
ναξ bπXλλων, µUντις Fψευδrς τs πρoν.  (Cho. 555-559)249 
 
I recommend you conceal this agreement with me so that after killing an 
honored man with a trick, they may be taken by a trick, dying in the same 
snare as Loxias has prophesied, lord Apollo, the seer unlying heretofore. 
 
This marriage of retributive violence with truth, falsehood, and deception dissolves in the 
Eumenides when the cycle of reciprocal vengeance comes to an end.  The acquittal of 
Orestes cements the transformation of dikē from personal vengeance into legal justice250 
and coincides with the gradual disappearance of truth and falsehood as affiliates of 
revenge; hence the relative infrequency of terms for truth and falsehood in the 
Eumenides.  When truth is mentioned, it is in contexts of legal judgment where truth 
                                                 
249 Cf. Garvie 1986, ad 556-8 who notes the recurrence of the theme of “tit-for-tat vengeance” in the 
Oresteia. 
 
250 Cf. Kitto 1961, 67-95.  Many have noted, of course, that this resolution is not altogether satisfactory:  
Orestes’ crime being lesser than Clytemnestra’s should not automatically merit acquittal, nor does his 
acquittal provide closure for the deaths of guiltless innocents like Cassandra and Iphigeneia.  Cf. Cohen 
1986. 
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accompanies a system of justice based on equity rather than individual retaliation (cf. 
Eum. 487-488:  κρoνασα δ’ Fστnν τnν Sµnν τ βzλτατα | «ξω διαιρεν τοupsilonperispτο πργµ’ 
Sτητupsilonoxiaµως, “After choosing the best of my citizens, I will come to judge this affair 
correctly;” Eum. 795-796: οupsilonpsili γρ νενoκησθ’, Fλλ’ iσXψηφος δoκη | Sξλθ’ Fληθnς οupsilonpsiliκ 
Fτιµo­ σzθεν, “For you are not defeated, but justice by an equal number of votes resulted 
in truth, with no dishonor to you.”).   
CONCLUSIONS 
 Aeschylus follows Homer’s lead in depicting truth as a primarily verbal entity but 
adds further specificity by depicting truth in contexts of opposition to hopes, illusions, or 
dreams, which are sometimes more readily believable because they reflect desires.  Yet 
paradoxically truth is itself an object of desire, one that is achieved primarily through 
communicative exchange between speakers, especially in messenger-reports.  But 
prophecy and nonverbal signs are also ways to access truth, although neither carries with 
it the authority accorded to messenger reports; hence the contrasting vocabulary used to 
describe the two means to truth (Mτυµος vs. FληθHς).  By showing that only messenger 
reports are readily believed, but that nonverbal or prophetic sources are equally accurate, 
Aeschylus implicitly criticizes a system of ascribing belief to some sources of truth while 
denying it to others, particularly when those sources are (erroneously) associated with 
female emotionality or gullibility.  Finally, Aeschylean and Pindaric truth are natural 
comparanda, for both revolve around systems of reciprocity that pervade their respective 
genres.  For Aeschylus this reciprocity is primarily manifested in violent acts of 
vengeance; the truth revealed to various characters is essentially knowledge of this 
vengeance.  Falsehood and deception play a slightly different role in Aeschylus than in 
Pindar:  while acts of deception destabilize relationships of xenia or marriage, just as in 
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Pindar, they also act to reinforce a different system of reciprocity by enabling the 
completion of individual acts of violence that perpetuate the larger cycle of retribution.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUSION 
The primary aims of any interpretation of literature are to facilitate and deepen 
understanding.  This project stemmed from a fascination with Pindar’s unusual 
personification of aletheia in Olympian 10 and Fragment 205, which I consequently set 
out to satisfy.  What grew from this was a realization that there was a much bigger topic 
to be studied here which extended beyond the bounds of the four surviving books of 
Pindaric odes.  I have endeavored with this dissertation to point out the need for scholarly 
attention to truth and falsehood in Pindar and Aeschylus and to provide some of that 
attention here.   
I devoted Chapter Two to an examination of various terms for truth and falsehood 
in Pindar and Aeschylus.  The purpose of this examination was to supplement other 
word-studies whose focus had been on Homer and Hesiod.  In the course of my 
examination I found various complexities in Pindar’s and Aeschylus’ ideas about truth 
and falsehood that differed or innovated from Homeric usage.  Although distinctive in 
their respective variations from earlier poets, both Pindar and Aeschylus similarly expand 
on the conceptions of truth inherited from their poetic predecessors.  In particular they 
each move beyond the idea of truth as a verbal communication that accurately reflects 
what happened.  Aeschylus uses words for truth and falsehood to designate suitability, 
individual disposition, and statements about the past, present, or future.  He notably 
enlarges the time dimension of truth so that it is no longer limited to statements about 
what has already happened.  Pindar too manipulates terms for truth and falsehood, 
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making them more specific to the genre of epinician poetry by including truth as part of 
his relationship to the laudandus and describing falsehood as anathema to such a 
relationship. 
Taking note of the broader ways in which Pindar and Aeschylus use terms for 
truth and falsehood allows for fuller comprehension of their respective poetic aims.  
When Pindar invokes the goddess of truth (Ol. 10.4, Fr. 205), he refers to accuracy both 
in his poetry and in his obligation to the laudandus.  In Chapter Three I explored various 
contexts of truth and falsehood in Pindar’s odes, examining direct references to the 
purpose of poetry as well as the mythical digressions that were not overtly about poetry, 
but could be understood as relevant to it because of the similar language used by Pindar 
to discuss both.  The specific connection I saw between the two discourses was the model 
of xenia, which describes the relationship between poet and patron as well as various 
relationships between the characters of Pindar’s myths.  In some cases, specifically in 
Olympian 1 and Nemean 7, the narrative of the mythical digression blended into the 
narrative of the larger ode, thus lending weight to my premise that Pindar’s myths could 
facilitate understanding of his conception of poetry.  Pindar incorporates truth into the 
relationship with his patron, thus verging on a notion of truth that approaches sincerity 
without abandoning accuracy.  He very explicitly puts forth praise as his purpose, yet he 
suggests that inaccurate praise is invalid and even takes measures to define truth in terms 
of the spirit of praise and obligation that pervades epinician poetry.  Deception and lies 
are thus depicted as detrimental not only for their own atrocity but for their destabilizing 
effects on relationships of reciprocal obligation.  My investigation in this chapter led me 
to the conclusion that truth and falsehood in Pindar could not be understood outside of his 
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relationship to the laudandus, which he constructs as one of reciprocal obligation 
governed by aletheia.   
This conclusion in turn prompted me to hypothesize that ideas about truth and 
falsehood in poetry are inherently related to genre.  Accordingly, I devoted Chapter Four 
to contexts of truth and falsehood in Aeschylus with the aim of discovering their 
relevance to the playwright’s tragic objective.  The various characters of Aeschylean 
tragedy desire to learn the truth even with full knowledge that it may be unwelcome.  
What I found was that truth and falsehood in tragedy, as in Pindar, were inherently 
communicative entities, but the tragic mode of discourse differed from the epinician 
lyricist’s in that communication of truth involved the further step of acceptance or belief.  
Many characters claim to know the truth, but only some of them can communicate it free 
of doubt.  Both truth and falsehood—and belief and doubt—served to further the plot of 
reciprocal vengeance that permeates Aeschylean drama, truth by emphasizing the 
inevitability of retaliation, falsehood and deception by ensuring its enactment.  My earlier 
word-study allowed me to realize that when Aeschylus describes a prophecy as “true,” he 
makes reference not only to its fulfillment, but also to the predetermination or 
inevitability that surrounds prophecies related to plots of reciprocal violence. 
Thus Aeschylus parallels Pindar on two counts:  he incorporates truth and 
falsehood into the language of his genre, specifically by assimilating them to the cycles 
of reciprocal violence that pervade his plots, and he uses a model of reciprocity as a 
defining feature of his genre.  This reciprocity obviously differs from epinician xenia in 
that it consists of retributive violence, which is a product of personal feelings of 
vengeance and cosmic inevitability rather than of friendly obligation.  In short both poets 
assimilate truth and falsehood to the purposes of their respective genres:  Pindar’s 
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epinician poetry is meant to praise and to affect its audience’s beliefs, while the goal of 
tragedy, if we are to believe Aristotle, is to effect the experience of pity and fear through 
the mimesis of an action (Poet. 1449b); in Aeschylus this action usually takes the form of 
violent reprisal.  Both incorporate models of reciprocity, of systems in which no action 
goes unrewarded (or unpunished), and despite the many differences between Pindar and 
Aeschylus in terms of form and purpose, both incorporate truth and falsehood into these 
models.  The dynamics of this reciprocity differ between the two poets, of course, and 
part of my purpose in this dissertation was to compare and contrast these dynamics.  
Pindar as a lyric poet depicts a relationship of xenia through his voice alone, and what we 
see as the product of this relationship is what the poet produces for his share of the 
agreement; we must accept the conceit that the relationship between the poet and his 
patron is one of xenia or philia, even though we cannot see this relationship from the 
patron’s point of view.  The tragedian, by contrast, uses dialogue between actors and 
reactors to present both sides of a reciprocal relationship, a relationship in which he 
himself has no part. 
In the medium of tragedy where truth is communicated between interlocutors, the 
issue of truth involves credibility, since mere knowledge of the truth does not ensure its 
believability once communicated.  This receptive aspect of communication raises issues 
of the credibility surrounding truth in a way that Pindar’s monophonic lyric does not.  
Thus falsehood in Pindar is rather straightforwardly depicted as deception, whether 
successful or not, in contrast to the complicated dynamics of credibility that surround 
communicative acts in Aeschylean tragedy.  Issues of truth and falsehood in tragedy can 
further the onset of retributive action whether through establishment of credibility or 
denial of it. 
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My examination has also called attention to gender as a prominent issue to be 
considered in truth and falsehood studies.  Pindar depicts several female characters as 
harmful to the stability of ritualized relationships of reciprocal obligation, since they 
often have traits of selfishness and seduction, which is a feminine form of deception.  In 
this way he recalls a previous model of woman, dating to Hesiod’s Pandora, wherein the 
female is associated with sexual allure and deception, but he assimilates this model to his 
own epinician genre by depicting such women specifically as harms to xenia, the defining 
relationship between himself and his patron.  Aeschylus too refers to this type of woman, 
primarily by showing how some female characters have a hard time being believed.  
Unlike Pindar, however, he often implicitly criticizes the Pandora-type by putting true 
statements in the mouths of his female characters, who must overcome preconceptions of 
their deceptiveness.   
Despite the abundance of scholarship on truth and falsehood, very little of it has 
paid substantial attention to Aeschylus and Pindar; this dissertation is meant as a first step 
toward addressing this need.  Furthermore, I hope that my dissertation lays the 
groundwork for future considerations of Pindar and Aeschylus as comparably genre-
driven poets.  I have tried to show that truth and falsehood cannot be understood in a 
vacuum and are reflected in each poet as concepts that further their generic aims.  The 
implications of this argument are twofold:  neither Pindar nor Aeschylus can be 
adequately interpreted without full consciousness of their respective genres and how they 
define them; furthermore, examinations of generic purposes in Pindar and Aeschylus 
should take into account their treatments of truth and falsehood and how these concepts 
reinforce their aims.  Future work on this topic might include a fuller consideration of 
truth in epinician poetry, which would involve discussion of Bacchylides, and an 
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expanded examination of truth and falsehood in the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides, 
what their tragic aims are, and how their presentation and characterization of truth and 
falsehood serve to further those aims.
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